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ABSTRACT 
The experiments reported in this thesis were conducted to examine the effects 
of executive-control and associative-learning processes on performance in 
conventional executive-control paradigms.  
For this purpose, I developed comparative task-switching and response-
inhibition paradigms, which were used to assess the performance of 
pigeons, whose behaviour is presumably based purely on associative 
processes, and of humans, whose behaviour may be guided by executive 
control and by associative processes. Pigeons were able to perform 
accurately in the comparative paradigms; hence, associative-learning 
processes are sufficient to account for successful performance. However, some 
task-specific effects that can be attributed to executive-control processes, and 
which were found in humans applying executive control, were absent or greatly 
reduced in pigeons. Those effects either reflect the mental operations that are 
performed to ensure that a specific set of stimulus-response-contingencies is 
applied and any contingencies belonging to a different set are suppressed, or 
reflect mental preparations for the possibility that the requirement to execute a 
certain response suddenly changes. In particular, in Chapter 3, it is shown that 
the benefits of repeatedly applying the same set of stimulus-response 
contingencies (or, in reverse, the costs of switching from one set to another) do 
not apply when Pavlovian processes dominate learning, which is likely the case 
for pigeons. Furthermore, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the behavioural effects 
of preparing for an unpredicted change in response requirements appeared to 
be absent when behaviour was based purely on associative processes. Instead, 
associatively mediated performance was primarily influenced by the stimulus-
response contingencies that were effective in each paradigm. Repeating the 
same response in consecutive trials facilitated the performance of pigeons and 
associatively learning human participants in the task-switching paradigms, and 
performing a particular Go response increased the pigeons' likelihood of 
executing that response in the following trial in two response-inhibition 
paradigms.  
In summary, any behavioural effects that can be observed at the level of 
abstract task requirements reflect the influence of executive-control 
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processes, both in task-switching paradigms and in response-inhibition 
paradigms.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Every day, humans are faced with a multitude of decisions: to do homework or 
watch TV (or do both at the same time?), have a quick look out the window to 
decide whether to take an umbrella or sunglasses, and finally start a diet - but 
then who could say no to a cheeky Nando's? Multitasking, planning, impulse 
control - all these complex cognitive abilities are said to be governed by 
executive control (Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 
2004b; Ardila, 2008; Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Suchy, 2009). 
Because of the wide range of abilities that are ascribed to executive control, it is 
still difficult to pin down a unified concept of what constitutes executive control. 
In their review of close to a dozen definitions of executive functions, Jurado and 
Rosselli (2007) conclude that executive-control processes "allow us to shift our 
mind set quickly and adapt to diverse situations while at the same time inhibiting 
inappropriate behaviors. They enable us to create a plan, initiate its execution, 
and persevere on the task at hand until its completion. Executive functions 
mediate the ability to organize our thoughts in a goal-directed way.” The 
processes of task-set shifting (or task switching), response inhibition and 
working-memory updating have been identified as distinguishable components 
of executive control (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wagner, 
2000; Friedman, Miyake, Young, DeFries, Corley, & Hewitt, 2008).  
 
Executive-control functions have been linked to the prefrontal cortex (Robbins, 
Weinberger, Taylor, & Morris, 1996; Kimberg, D'Esposito, & Farah, 1997; 
Roberts, Robbins, & Weiskrantz, 1998; Stuss & Alexander, 2000; Royall, 
Lauterbach, Cummings et al., 2002; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; 
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004a; Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004b; Braver & Barch, 2006; Niendam, Laird, Ray et al., 2012; Stuphorn & 
Emeric, 2012; Friedman & Miyake, in press); therefore, the ability to control 
ones actions in a goal-directed way has only been attributed to humans and 
animals that possess a frontal cortex (or analogue thereof). There is a large 
body of research investigating executive-control mechanisms in non-human 
primates  (e.g., Asaad, Rainer & Miller, 2000; Fuster, 2000; Moore, Killany, 
Herndon, Rosene & Moss, 2005; Isoda & Hikosaka, 2007; Johnston, Levin, 
Koval & Everling, 2007; Desrochers, Burk, Badre & Sheinberg, 2015) and 
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corvids (e.g., Lefebvre, Reader, & Sol, 2004; Kirsch, Güntürkün, & Rose, 2008; 
Striedter, 2013; Clayton & Emery, 2015), although the efforts to confirm 
executive control in other species are growing (for example, for dolphins, 
Marino, 2002; for sheep, Morton & Avanzo, 2011; for rats, Brown & Bowman, 
2002; Dalley, Cardinal & Robbins, 2004). But for animals lacking a prefrontal 
cortex, it is thought that behaviour is primarily governed by associative 
mechanisms, which Mitchell, De Houwer, and Lovibond (2009) describe as "the 
formation of links between mental representations of physical stimuli […]. The 
links are said to be formed passively and automatically as a direct consequence 
of contiguous (with some restrictions) pairings of those physical stimuli." 
Pigeons, for example, have repeatedly demonstrated responding purely on the 
basis of stimulus-response associations, even under conditions where humans 
employ more reflective processes (e.g., Lea, Wills, Leaver et al., 2009; Wills, 
Lea, Leaver et al., 2009). 
 
One current theory in cognitive research suggests that human behaviour can be 
mediated by both executive-control and associative processes (McLaren, 
Green, & Mackintosh, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2007; Ashby, Paul, & Maddox, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011; Forrest, 2012; but see Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 
2009 for alternative theories). The two processes can be distinguished by the 
way in which they enable humans to extract information to learn about their 
environment: for example, category learning aided by executive control is 
explicit and rule-based, and information is extracted from a single dimension of 
a (multidimensional) stimulus (Lea & Wills, 2008). Conversely, in the automatic, 
nonanalytic form of associative learning, behavioural responses are associated 
with the perceived stimulus as a whole (Ashby & Ell, 2001; Ashby, Ennis, & 
Spiering, 2007; Smith & Grossman, 2008; Dreisbach, 2012; Forrest, 2012; 
Smith, Berg, Cook et al., 2012; McLaren, Forrest, McLaren et al., 2014; Smith, 
Boomer, Zakrzewski et al., 2014); a stimulus may be categorised by using all of 
its dimensions combined and comparing its similarity to a stimulus to which the 
correct response is known (Lea & Wills, 2008).  
Although both executive-control and associative processes govern human 
behaviour, it is uncertain under which conditions each process comes to control 
behaviour. Executive processes are supposed to be intentional and directed at 
a specific action goal, whereas associative processes occur without intention 
17 
 
(McLaren et al., 1994; Ashby et al., 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Forrest, 2012). It is 
possible that both processes control behaviour in a flexible way or even occur in 
parallel, as it is assumed that associative processes work automatically and 
potentially unconsciously (Gigerenzer, 2007; Shanks & St. John, 2010; 
Kahneman, 2011). If this is the case, then it is less certain whether a specific 
human behaviour can unambiguously be attributed to the influence of executive 
control or to associative processes. This can have potentially detrimental 
implications: executive-control processes are thought to be the basis of many 
higher-order cognitive functions, and many psychopathological symptoms, such 
as major deficits in attention, pathological gambling or substance abuse, have 
been linked to limited or impaired executive control (e.g., Royall et al., 2002; 
Bekker, Overtoom, Kenemans et al., 2005; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs & 
van den Brink, 2005; Li, Milivojevic, Kemp, Hong & Sinha, 2006; Liu, Heitz & 
Bradberry, 2009; Winstanley, 2011; Grant, Chamberlain, Schreiber, Odlaug & 
Kim, 2011; Urcelay & Dalley, 2012). Core executive functions, such as an 
individual's ability to flexibly readjust behaviour to changing demands or inhibit 
inappropriate behaviour, are often assessed in clinical, developmental or 
neuropsychological settings (Robbins et al., 1996; Salthouse, 2005; Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007; Chan et al., 2008; Suchy, 2009; Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010). 
However, if performance in the paradigms used for these assessments is 
mediated by associative learning, it becomes questionable to what degree 
those paradigms are in fact suitable to assess a subject's level of executive 
control (cf. Forrest, 2012). 
 
Two widely used paradigms that supposedly rely on executive control are the 
task-switching paradigm, which measures the ability to flexibly adapt one's 
behaviour to changing task demands, and the stop-signal task, which measures 
response inhibition. In Section 1.1, I summarise the current theories and 
empirical evidence that performance in task-switching studies may either reflect 
executive-control processes or be mediated by associative processes. In 
Section 1.2, I provide a similar overview of the current theories and empirical 
evidence regarding the influence of executive control or associative processes 
on performance in response-inhibition tasks. 
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As will become evident in those sections, the current evidence for an influence 
of associative processes in executive-control paradigms is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that most empirical studies were carried out with 
humans or other primates, species that arguably possess executive control, so 
it cannot be ruled out that executive-control processes contributed to the 
performance of those individuals. Thus, in the later chapters of this thesis, I 
examine the patterns of performance in task-switching and response-inhibition 
paradigms that occur in pigeons, which have repeatedly demonstrated an 
preference to learn based on associative processes rather than analytical 
processing (Lea & Wills, 2008; Lea et al., 2009; Wills et al., 2009; Smith, Ashby, 
Berg et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Maes, De Filippo, Inkster et al., 2015), and 
contrast them to the performance of humans supposedly relying on either 
associations or executive-control processes (or both). 
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1.1  Task Switching and the Presence of Switch Costs 
Executive control is presumed to be at the core of the human ability to switch 
between two or more different tasks in rapid alternation, and task-switching 
paradigms have been used extensively as a tool to assess executive-control 
mechanisms in human behaviour (Monsell, 2003; Kiesel, Steinhauser, Wendt et 
al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010; Dreisbach, 2012).  
Commonly, task-switching paradigms involve the classification of the same set 
of stimuli along different stimulus dimensions, for which the defining dimension 
switches frequently depending on the task that is currently being performed 
(Kiesel et al., 2010). A specific task cue indicates which task is relevant in a 
given trial: for example, subjects might be asked to judge a visual grating 
pattern by its spatial frequency when the background colour is yellow, but to 
classify the same stimulus according to whether the pattern is vertically or 
horizontally orientated (whilst ignoring spatial frequency) when the background 
colour is red. 
 
Evidence for humans’ reliance on executive control in such paradigms is taken 
from the presence of 'switch costs' 1  (Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Dreisbach, 2012): humans generally take longer 
and make more errors in 'switch' trials, in which the dimension that determines a 
correct response differs from the one in the previous trial (that is, participants 
have to switch from one task to the other) than in non-switch or 'repeat' trials, in 
which the same task as in the previous trial is repeated and thus the response 
                                            
1 It has to be noted that this statement is rather simplified, as the presence of switch 
costs on its own is not a sufficient indicator of executive control (see Forrest, 2012; 
Forrest et al., 2014). The clearest evidence for executive-control processes might be 
found in the reduction of switch costs (RISC) with increasing time for preparation 
(Monsell, 2003): the more time to prepare for a task switch a participant has, the 
smaller the cost of performing a task switch. Importantly, even when the preparation 
time is very long or when no time restrictions are given, switch costs do not disappear 
entirely, but a residual switch cost persists (Monsell, 2003) - and It is this residual 
switch cost that is referred to here as providing evidence for humans' reliance on 
executive control. The experiments performed in this thesis do not impose any 
restrictions on preparation time; thus, it is assumed that participants were maximally 
prepared for a task switch when responding. The observation that they nonetheless 
expressed switch costs under these conditions can be regarded as evidence for 
executive-control processes. 
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has to be made on the basis of the same stimulus dimension as before 
(Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Dreisbach, 
2012). It is argued that switch costs exist because humans perform the 
executive-control operations of identifying the current task, retrieving its specific 
stimulus-response rules into working memory (and deleting the rules of the 
previous task) and adjusting the response reaction to the new requirements, a 
process known as 'task-set reconfiguration' (Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 
2006). This mental reorientation process would be necessary on switch trials 
but not on repeat trials, for which the task-set is already available, leading to a 
measurable difference in performance on these two types of trial. 
 
The easy detectability and reliability of switch costs have made task-switching 
paradigms a popular instrument to assess human executive control in both 
experimental and clinical settings (cf. Monsell, 2003; Kiesel, et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck, et al., 2010). But given that the stimulus sets used in task-
switching paradigms are often small and contain easily distinguishable stimuli, 
performance in task-switching paradigms might be entirely the result of 
associative-learning processes, i.e., the retrieval of cue-stimulus-response 
associations (Wylie & Allport, 2000; Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Schneider & 
Logan, 2005). Learning to respond correctly could be accomplished by 
associating the overall visual appearance of a cue-stimulus combination with a 
certain response (Lea & Wills, 2008). Even when large stimulus set sizes are 
used to prevent participants from memorising individual stimulus-response 
combinations, each stimulus could be categorized by using all of its dimensions 
in combination (including the task cue) and computing its overall similarity to a 
stimulus, or a prototype image for many such stimuli, to which the correct 
response is known. It is even possible that switch costs might emerge under 
such conditions, if the presentation of a stimulus primed a specific stimulus-task 
association (Monsell, 2003) that would make it more difficult to disengage from 
the previous task when there is a switch. 
 
A task-switching phenomenon often observed in addition to switch costs, 
namely the effects of stimulus-response congruency (Monsell, Yeung, & 
Azuma, 2000), might in fact as easily be explained by associative learning 
processes as it is in terms of executive control. As each task makes use of the 
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same set of multidimensional stimuli, stimulus values on individual dimensions 
can be defined as either congruent or incongruent in relation to the correct 
response towards them. If a stimulus is response-congruent, it always requires 
the same response regardless of the current task; learning to discriminate 
between different congruent stimuli thus takes the form of a component 
discrimination, in which the correct response depends on a single element of a 
multidimensional stimulus. However, when a response-incongruent stimulus is 
shown, the correct response varies depending on the current task in the manner 
of a bi-conditional discrimination. Given that there is good evidence that such 
discriminations are difficult to learn (Harris & Livesey, 2008), it is no surprise 
that on trials in which a congruent stimulus is shown, reaction time and error 
rate are distinctly lower compared to trials with an incongruent stimulus (e.g., 
Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Forrest, 2012; 
Schneider & Logan, 2014; Schneider, 2015), and human task-switching 
performance can be influenced by large response-congruency effects (Monsell 
et al., 2000), often at a magnitude of 0.5 to three times the numerical value of 
switch costs (Forrest, 2012; Schneider & Logan, 2014; and even when switch 
costs were absent in their data, Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b). 
It has to be noted that this congruency effect can be explained in terms of 
executive control, e.g., by postulating that, because correct response selection 
is achieved by firstly identifying the relevant task and then selecting the 
appropriate task-stimulus-response mappings (Kiesel, Wendt, & Peters, 2007; 
Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Schneider & Logan, 2014; Schneider, 2015), the 
mappings of both the competing task sets are held active in working memory 
and influence each other. On this account, response selection might be 
facilitated when both task sets include the same stimulus-response mappings 
(as is the case for congruent stimuli), but impaired when the same stimulus is 
linked to different responses in the two task sets (Schneider & Logan, 2014; 
Schneider, 2015). However, the associative-learning account seems to prevail 
(Mayr & Kliegl, 2000), especially when task-switching paradigms deal with 
relatively small sets of stimuli (Kiesel et al., 2007), so it is plausible that 
nonanalytic associative processes might routinely play a substantial part in task 
switching, and perhaps even in the occurrence of switch costs. 
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A few studies have explicitly tried to elicit an associative approach to task 
switching in humans (e.g., Dreisbach, Goschke, & Haider, 2006, 2007; 
Dreisbach, 2012), either by using paradigms in which participants were only 
provided with a list of the cue-stimulus-response contingencies instead of full 
instructions for the underlying task rules, or by withholding any information and 
forcing participants to learn task contingencies by trial and error. The underlying 
hypothesis of these experiments was that, if humans performed task switching 
by retrieving implicit cue-stimulus-response associations, they should not suffer 
switch costs, since the responses following different stimuli would not be 
encoded in a way that recognises any analytic task-based hierarchies or 
different 'tasks' as such. Indeed, Dreisbach and colleagues only observed 
switch costs in humans who were aware of task rules; there was no sign of 
differential reaction times in task-switch and task-repeat trials when participants 
were trained in a way that promoted an associative acquisition of the paradigm. 
 
Although Dreisbach et al.'s (2006, 2007) results conformed to what would be 
expected when solving the task based on stimulus-response associations, their 
design differed from traditional task-switching paradigms. Conventional 
paradigms such as the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) use bivalent stimuli: the 
same stimulus can occur in each task, so that participants require additional 
information about which task is currently relevant in order to categorise a 
stimulus accurately (for example in the form of a task cue). Dreisbach et al., 
however, used univalent stimuli, meaning that each stimulus was only 
presented in one task. Univalent stimuli are analogous to the response-
congruent stimuli mentioned above, in that they perfectly predict the correct 
response on its own, even when no additional information about the currently 
relevant task is available. Essentially, this means that there was no benefit of 
using task rules in Dreisbach et al.'s design. It has been shown that, under 
conventional task-switching conditions, switch costs are smaller when stimuli 
are univalent than when they are bivalent (Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 
1976; Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Kiesel et al., 
2010). Therefore, the possibility remains that even an associative approach to 
task switching would create switch costs, but that the use of univalent stimuli in 
Dreisbach’s studies reduced switch costs to the point at which they became too 
small to be of statistical significance. Bivalent stimuli (which are analogous to 
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the response-incongruent stimuli mentioned above) cannot accurately predict 
the correct behavioural response without additional information from the task 
cues, and it seems that task-switch costs primarily occur in response to such 
stimuli. Forrest (2012) and Forrest, Monsell, and McLaren (2014), for example, 
used bivalent stimuli in an attempt to promote associative learning in task 
switching and found that, contrary to Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007), participants 
who solved the paradigm without knowledge of the task rules demonstrated 
significant switch costs, albeit considerably smaller than those for participants 
who solved the tasks based on task instructions. To confirm that this finding can 
be attributed to associative-learning mechanisms, Forrest (2012) used an 
associative learning algorithm (Adaptively Parametrised Error Correcting 
System, APECS) based on back propagation to model task-switching 
performance in the absence of task rules. The computational simulation also 
predicted small but reliable switch costs in response to response-incongruent 
stimuli but not to response-congruent stimuli. In summary, it would seem that 
human participants will exhibit switch costs in a task-switching paradigm when 
responding to bivalent, response-incongruent stimuli, regardless of whether 
they are using task-sets or simple associations between stimuli and responses, 
whilst switch costs in response to univalent or response-incongruent stimuli 
might only occur when responses are based on task rules.  
 
Unfortunately, even if careful precautions are in place and participants are 
thoroughly questioned about their approach to a paradigm, the use of task rules 
can never be fully discounted when testing humans. Thus, it might prove difficult 
to assess whether executive control is indeed a necessary requirement to 
exhibit switch costs when using human participants. An obvious way around this 
problem is to test task-switching effects in animals that are presumed to be 
unable to rely on abstract task rules. There are a few animal studies available 
already that might provide some insight into what cognitive processes lead to 
the emergence of switch costs. Stoet and Snyder (2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009) 
were the first to investigate task-switching effects in non-human primates, 
specifically two rhesus macaques. While they showed large congruency effects 
in their performance, switch costs were minimal, and in fact absent in one 
animal. In the light of these results, Stoet and Snyder (2003a, 2003b) assumed 
that monkeys might lack at least one of the cognitive mechanisms necessary to 
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solve task-switching paradigms in the way humans do. However, in the 
discussion of their results, they argued that macaques nonetheless applied 
some form of executive control, and did not consider the possibility that their 
results might be explained by associative mechanisms. 
Caselli and Chelazzi (2011), in an attempt to validate Stoet and Snyder's 
(2003a, 2003b) findings, exposed two rhesus macaques to a comparable task-
switching paradigm. Their subjects behaved remarkably similarly to Forrest's 
(2012) and Forrest et al.'s (2014) humans who memorised cue-stimulus-
response contingencies, in that both monkeys demonstrated small but reliable 
switch costs. Caselli and Chelazzi declared these effects to be comparable to 
those expressed by humans, claiming that both species relied on the same 
executive-control processes when switching tasks. Like Stoet and Snyder, they 
acknowledged that, compared to humans, monkeys might be more limited in the 
extent to which they were able to perform the necessary task-set 
reconfiguration, but they took the fact that their subjects not only succeeded in a 
task-switching paradigm but also showed the characteristic switch costs as 
evidence that rhesus macaques can employ executive control similar to 
humans. Their methods and conclusion, however, were criticised by Avdagic, 
Jensen, Altschul, and Terrace (2014), who themselves successfully taught three 
rhesus macaques to switch tasks in a simultaneous chaining paradigm. Their 
subjects showed no significant switch costs in doing so, replicating Stoet and 
Snyder's (2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009) results and casting doubt on Caselli and 
Chelazzi’s. Thus, switch costs are evidently not always present in a task-
switching setting, contrary to what Forrest et al. (2014) and Forrest (2012) 
concluded, but may in fact be absent in the task-switching performance of 
nonhuman primates. Given this, instead of assuming that only human 
executive-control processes lead to switch costs, but executive control in 
monkeys does not, it might be more likely that the macaques performed task 
switches based on associative processes instead of executive control, and thus 
did not suffer switch costs. 
 
Taken together, the above studies might point towards the possibility that task 
switching can involve executive control or associative learning, and that an 
absence of switch costs might indicate a reliance purely on associative 
processes. There is evidence that both humans and rhesus macaques possess 
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two distinct learning systems: an explicit, rule-based system reliant on executive 
control and an implicit, nonanalytic learning system based on associative 
processes (Smith et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014), though the monkey 
equivalent of executive control seemed to be limited compared to human 
executive control (Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b; Smith, Beran, Crossley, 
Boomer, & Ashby, 2010; Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011; Smith et al., 2012). The 
results described above could be a sign that both species are able to benefit 
from either of the two cognitive processes in a flexible manner depending on the 
precise demands of the test paradigm – when subjects applied executive 
control to the paradigm, they exhibited switch costs, and on occasions in which 
their performance was marked by a lack of switch costs, associative learning 
prevailed.  
 
In Section 1.3, I elaborate on the approach taken in this thesis to test this 
hypothesis, using pigeons as a model species.  
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1.2  Stop-Signal Paradigms and the Ability to Inhibit Prepared Responses 
In addition to task switching, another core feature of executive control is the 
ability to inhibit behaviours when their execution suddenly becomes 
inappropriate. A widely used task to assess this ability in a range of 
neuropsychological, clinical or developmental contexts is the so-called Stop-
Signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984), in which subjects repeatedly perform a 
simple task (often under time constraint) and are sometimes, by the appearance 
of a stop signal, instructed to withhold executing the task-appropriate response. 
The ability to stop a behaviour after it has been initiated is assumed to require 
executive control, like the readjustment of attentional and response goals and 
anticipatory motor regulation, to find a balance between the focus on performing 
the required response and the distribution of attentional resources to enhance 
the detection of the signal (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b, 2015; Elchlepp, Lavric, 
Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen & McLaren, in preparation).  
One of the most prominent models of the mechanisms underlying response 
inhibition in Stop-Signal tasks is the independent horse-race model (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 2009c), which postulates that 
initiating a response and withholding a response are two distinct processes, and 
each of them is triggered by the presentation of either a stimulus demanding 
that response (the Go stimulus) or a signal not to respond (the Stop signal). It is 
thought that these two processes operate independently of each other; that is, 
response inhibition can be triggered immediately when the signal to do so 
appears, irrespective of whether or not the Go process had been initiated at that 
point. However, it is also assumed that once the preparation of the Go response 
is completed, the Go response necessarily has to be executed and can no 
longer be inhibited. Consequently, the two processes (one of response 
execution, the other one of response inhibition) engage in a "horse race" with 
each other. The process that is completed first determines whether a response 
in executed or inhibited: if the Go process finishes before the inhibition process, 
inhibition fails and the response is executed; if the inhibition progress finishes 
before the Go process, inhibition of the Go response is successful. 
Interestingly, the horse-race model makes no assumptions about the 
involvement of executive control in response inhibition - and indeed it has been 
proposed that response inhibition in Stop-Signal paradigms may be partly 
27 
 
mediated by associative processes (cf. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den 
Wildenberg & Lamme, 2009). In fact, assuming (as the independent horse-race 
model does) that the appearance of the signal to withhold a response triggers 
the initiation of the inhibition process immediately, associative processes might 
be entirely sufficient to elicit response inhibition. In several studies, Verbruggen 
and colleagues (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2009a; Verbruggen, Best, 
Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014; Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, & 
Verbruggen, 2016) presented evidence that a stimulus that was consistently 
paired with the command to withhold a response eventually elicited automatic 
response inhibition. They argued that the effect could occur either because that 
stimulus became associated with the subsequent occurrence of the stop signal 
(and was thus indirectly associated with stopping), or because the stimulus 
became directly associated with the process that stopped the response. 
 
Executive functions are crucial for the planning of actions, which demands the 
ability to anticipate and select appropriate responses. The independent horse-
race model only applies to inhibition in response to a signal to withhold a 
prepared response, and associative processes might well suffice to accomplish 
this kind of reactive response inhibition; proactive inhibition, by which subjects 
prepare for the possibility of having to inhibit a response, might be a better 
indicator of executive-control processes (cf. Chikazoe, Jimura, Hirose et al., 
2009; Aron, 2011).  
Elchlepp et al. (2016) argued that most of the mental operations that enable 
response inhibition are performed before the appearance of a stop signal and 
involve proactive adjustments of attention and response thresholds. For 
example, it is commonly observed that participants respond more slowly to the 
Go stimulus if response execution was inhibited in the previous trial (e.g., 
Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Bissett & Logan, 2011, 2012), and it is thought that 
this post-signal slowing reflects an anticipatory adjustment of response 
thresholds to prevent inappropriate responding (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c; 
Bissett & Logan, 2011; Elchlepp et al., 2016). On a given trial of a Stop-Signal 
paradigm, the requirement to perform or withhold a response leads to the 
activation of the respective mental action goal, i.e., to perform or inhibit a 
response, to facilitate the correct execution of the relevant action (Boucher, 
Stuphorn, Logan, Schall, & Palmeri, 2007; Verbruggen & McLaren, in 
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preparation). To achieve an efficient balance between quickly but inflexibly 
performing the Go response and efficiently detecting the appearance of the stop 
signal, the currently active action goal is adjusted flexibly from one trial to the 
next (Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012; Verbruggen & McLaren, in preparation) - similar 
to the mental task-set reconfiguration needed in task-switching studies (cf. 
Monsell, 2003). Following their evaluation of different potential causes (both 
controlled and situational) of post-signal slowing, Bissett and Logan (2011) 
concluded that this trial-to-trial adjustment is most likely based on a proactive 
prioritising of one action goal over the other; that is, after the occurrence of a 
stop signal, subjects shift their priority from the goal of performing a fast Go 
response to the goal of successfully detecting the stop signal. Nonetheless, 
there is the possibility that post-signal response slowing can occur 
independently of executive-control processes (Emeric, Brown, Boucher et al., 
2007; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008; Bissett & 
Logan, 2012; see also van Gaal et al., 2009): especially when the stimulus in 
the current Go trial is the same as the stimulus to which a response had to be 
inhibited, response slowing could be an effect of stimulus-specific response 
priming, if that stimulus became associated with the concurrent presentation of 
the stop signal in the previous trial. 
 
Similarly, it might be assumed that the influence of a proactive reconfiguration 
of action goals would be apparent in the way in which participants utilise 
available information about whether or not response inhibition will be required in 
an upcoming trial; indeed, subjects are more readily able to apply inhibitory 
control when they expect a stop signal on a given trial than when they expect to 
perform the Go response (Boulinguez, Ballanger, Granjon, & Benraiss, 2009; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). However, Bowditch, Verbruggen, and McLaren 
(2016) showed that changes in behaviour that are based on the presentation of 
cues that predict the likelihood of a stop signal in the upcoming trial might in fact 
not require any proactive adjustments of mental action goals: any implicitly 
formed associations with stopping can extend to such cues, in such a way that 
seeing the cue alone might initiate a stopping response, even before any stop 
signal has appeared. Thus, it is possible that even behaviour that seemingly 
involves proactive operations, such as improved inhibition in response to 
predictive cues, might be reduced to associative processes. 
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There is a large body of research on the ability of animals to perform reactive 
response inhibition, mostly performed with macaques (i.e., Emeric, et al., 2007; 
Hanes & Schall, 2009; Liu et al., 2009; Stuphorn, Brown & Schall, 2010) and 
rats (i.e., Eagle & Robbins, 2003a; 2003b; Eagle, Bari & Robbins, 2008; Eagle, 
Baunez, Hutcheson et al., 2008; Bari, Mar, Theobald et al., 2011; Eagle, Wong, 
Allan et.al., 2011; Beuk, Beninger & Paré, 2014), but also with baboons 
(Lacreuse, Gullstrand, & Fagot, 2016). As expected, stop-signal performance of 
those animals consistently adhered to the predictions of the independent horse-
race model, such as faster latencies to make an incorrect response in stop-
signal trials (which is incorrect) than in Go trials (which is correct), and an 
increased probability of incorrectly responding with increasing delay between 
the initial presentations of the Go stimulus and the presentation of the stop 
signal. However, investigations of proactive response adjustments in animals, 
such as post-signal response slowing (Bissett & Logan, 2012) or altered 
performance following the presentation of predictive cues (Bowditch et al., 
2016), have been less extensive. Mayse, Nelson, Park, Gallagher, and Lin 
(2014) found that rats responded more slowly in Go trials following response 
inhibition than in Go trials following response execution. Healthy macaques also 
showed post-signal slowing of responses (Emeric et al., 2007), whereas 
macaques that experienced limited executive control as a consequence of 
cognitive deficits caused by chronic cocaine administration did not (Liu et al., 
2009). These results might indicate that executive control does indeed play a 
crucial role in proactive inhibition - but since there are currently no data 
available about whether or not subjects lacking in executive control would 
consequently also not show post-signal response slowing, such an assumption 
is speculative at the moment. The same goes for response adjustments elicited 
by predictive cues: there are no data about the influence of presenting such 
cues on stop-signal performance governed by associative processes, which 
makes it difficult to assess whether such adjustments are a consequence of 
executive control or associations. 
 
Regardless of whether inhibition is governed by executive control or associative 
processes, the literature on human response inhibition unambiguously assumes 
that the withholding of an action after its initiation necessitates a cognitive 
30 
 
response-inhibition mechanism (cf. Boecker, Gauggel, & Drueke, 2013). It is 
widely assumed that the appearance of a signal to inhibit a prepared response 
activates a global stopping process that inhibits all responses (e.g., Mostofsky & 
Simmonds, 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b; Kenner, Mumford, Hommer et 
al., 2010; Boecker et al., 2013).  
However, there is less consensus about how response inhibition is achieved 
when (as is often the case in natural, not experimentally controlled situations) 
only a specific action has to be withheld, but other actions have to be executed.  
In this regard, it is worth considering the Change-Signal paradigm, in which the 
occurrence of the signal indicates that an alternative response has to be 
executed instead of the usual Go response. The Stop-Signal and Change-
Signal tasks can use the same stimuli and very similar procedures, and it is 
most commonly thought that the same global stopping process that governs 
response inhibition when any response should be withheld is also engaged 
when only the main Go response has to be withheld but a different response 
still has to be executed (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009b; Kenner et al., 2010; Boecker et al., 2013). The Change-Signal task has 
even been described as merely a "complication of the Stop-Signal paradigm" 
(Logan, 1994) in that stopping the Go response is followed by an additional 
process of initiating an alternative response. In support of this assumption, 
Verbruggen and Logan (2009b) successfully applied the independent horse-
race model not only to Stop-Signal paradigms but also to Change-Signal 
paradigms. The alternative response in Change-Signal tasks may be prepared 
either at the same time as the global inhibition process is initiated or, if the 
mental capacities for parallel processing are limited, after the inhibition process 
is completed (Verbruggen, Schneider, & Logan, 2008b).  
However, despite considerable support for a common, global mechanism, there 
are voices advocating two different response-inhibition processes governing 
Stop-Signal and Change-Signal performance. Since one task requires the 
complete suppression of a response, whilst the other task requires the 
execution of an alternative action, response inhibition in Change-Signal 
paradigms may be governed by a selective inhibition mechanism that stops only 
the inappropriate action but permits the execution of the alternative response 
(De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995; Aron & Verbruggen, 2008; Krämer, Knight, & 
Münte, 2010; Schall & Godlove, 2012; Boecker et al., 2013; Gulberti, Arndt, & 
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Colonius, 2014). The idea of a selective inhibition mechanism draws parallels to 
the concept of mental task-set reconfigurations during task-switching (cf. 
Monsell, 2003), by which appropriate stimulus-response sets are selected but 
inappropriate stimulus-response sets are inhibited; therefore, the mechanism 
that inhibits an inappropriate response in Change-Signal paradigms might afford 
executive control, whereas the mechanism that merely stops any response in 
Stop-Signal paradigms might be sufficiently acquired via associative processes.  
Lastly, it has also been considered whether Change-Signal paradigms would 
require the involvement of a response-inhibition mechanism at all (Verbruggen 
et al., 2008b). The process of initiating the alternative response might suffice to 
override the initiation process of the Go response, making a separate process 
to inhibit the initially indicated Go response unnecessary (cf. Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009b). Thus, whilst Stop-Signal tasks might require a mechanism to 
suppress inappropriate responses, Change-Signal tasks might be accomplished 
without a response-inhibition mechanism. In fact, there is the interesting 
possibility that pigeons in particular might perform better if they are given the 
option to execute an action instead of having to withhold a response. Pigeons 
often require more time to acquire the No-Go stimulus in a Go/No-Go paradigm 
(for example, this has been the case in the training phase of the study reported 
in Ghosh, Lea, and Noury, 2004; Lea, personal communication), whereas the 
competing stimulus-response contingencies in dual-task paradigms or 
simultaneous-discrimination tasks are often acquired at the same rate (e.g., 
Lejeune, Macar & Zakay, 1999). In relation to the Stop-Signal and Change-
Signal paradigms, pigeons might face more difficulties in suppressing any 
response to a stimulus than in acquiring an additional set of stimulus-response 
associations. In terms of the underlying mechanisms governing behaviour in the 
two tasks, performance differences in this direction would suggest that Change-
Signal tasks afford less cognitively demanding processes than Stop-Signal 
tasks.  
 
In summary, since the independent horse-race model (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009b) makes no assumptions about the involvement of specific cognitive 
capacities in response inhibition, the predictions of the model should apply to 
performance in Stop-Signal tasks regardless of whether performance is 
governed by executive control or associative processes. However, although it is 
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mostly assumed that the same global inhibition mechanism that enables the 
stopping of a response in Stop-Signal tasks is also engaged in Change-Signal 
tasks (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b), this might not be the case. Previous 
research has proposed both that performance in Change-Signal paradigms 
might afford a higher level of inhibitory control than Stop-Signal tasks (cf. De 
Jong et al., 1995), and that it might require a lower level of inhibitory control (or 
none at all; cf. Verbruggen et al., 2008b). 
 
In Section 1.3, I elaborate on the approach taken in this thesis to test these 
contradictory hypotheses by assessing the ability of pigeons to perform a Stop-
Signal or a Change-Signal task. 
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1.3  The Influence of Associative Processes on Performance in Executive-
Control Paradigms 
If, as contemplated in the opening section of this chapter, human behaviour can 
be controlled flexibly by either executive control or associative processes, 
results taken from studies with humans (and also nonhuman primates, which 
might possess a similar executive-control system as humans) face some 
limitations when trying to pin down which of the two cognitive processes is 
momentarily involved in a given executive-control paradigm, and whether 
associative learning could in fact be sufficient to produce the patterns of 
performance generally assumed to result from executive-control processes. 
A promising way to overcome this issue is to assess the performance of 
animals whose ability to exert executive control is severely limited compared to 
humans (or even monkeys), such as pigeons. Pigeons have repeatedly 
demonstrated an absence of analytical processing where humans show it (Lea 
& Wills, 2008; Lea et al., 2009; Wills et al., 2009; Smith, Ashby, Berg et al., 
2011; Smith et al., 2012; Maes, De Filippo, Inkster et al., 2015), suggesting a 
lack of the kind of mental capabilities that would provide evidence for executive 
control: instead of attending to a single informative stimulus dimension, they 
evidently associate the stimulus as a whole with its appropriate behavioural 
response (Pearce, 1994; Smith et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012). Indeed, Smith 
et al. (2011) proposed that the implicit, nonanalytic learning mechanism of 
pigeons constitutes a universal, phylogenetically old system, from which the 
rule-based approach found in primates emerged. Therefore, using pigeons as a 
model species, I explored the pattern of performance that occurs if behaviour is 
guided entirely by associative processes, both in a task-switching paradigm, 
reported in Chapters 2 and 3, and in Stop-Signal and Change-Signal 
paradigms, reported in Chapters 4 and 5. In all paradigms, the influence of 
associative processes on performance should be evident in specific ways, as 
summarised below. 
 
It has to be noted that, when adapting any paradigm originating from human 
psychology for the use with animals, it is inevitably necessary to make a series 
of adaptations to the paradigm, which may lead to unwanted changes in the 
way subjects respond - at the worst, it may make the altered paradigm 
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unsuitable to detect the behavioural effects that are of interest. To ensure that 
the paradigms that were developed for the pigeon experiments reported in this 
thesis were still useful in detecting the relevant human performance effects, I 
tested humans in (as far as possible) identical tasks and assessed whether the 
desired effects were observable in their performance, both during the 
development of the paradigms, the results of which are reported in Chapters 2 
and 4, and during the administration of the final paradigms, reported in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Task Switching  
 
Following the considerations in Section 1.1, if pigeons succeeded in solving a 
task-switching paradigm associatively, they might show an absence of switch 
costs. Instead, they might predominately be susceptible to stimulus-congruency 
effects or other sequential effects that would be expected to occur if 
performance is based on associative processes. There are very few data at 
present concerning pigeons' task-switching abilities. Castro and Wasserman 
(2016) tested pigeons in a task-switching paradigm and did indeed find an 
absence of any switch costs. However, as stated in Section 1.1, associatively-
mediated task-switch costs might primarily emerge in response to bivalent, 
response-incongruent stimuli, which were not included in Castro and 
Wasserman's study. Forrest's (Forrest, 2012; Forrest et al., 2014) participants 
memorising cue-stimulus-response contingencies (and thus presumably relying 
on associative processes) did show switch costs in response to those stimuli. 
Therefore, if those humans and pigeons both employed an associative-learning 
approach to the paradigm, both species would be expected to show similar 
task-switching effects (or the absence thereof). But if the task-switching 
performance of pigeons indeed differed from those of humans who assumedly 
did not use executive control to organise tasks, then those humans could not 
have acquired the paradigm in the same associative way as pigeons did – 
which would raise the question as to what learning strategies humans do 
employ when they are unaware of task rules.  
 
In Chapter 2, I report how I developed a computerised task-switching paradigm 
that allows the comparison of the task-switching abilities of several species. In 
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Chapter 3, I report the results and implications of this comparison. The results 
reported in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have also been published in Meier, Lea, and 
McLaren (2016b). 
 
Response Inhibition 
 
As regards the Stop-Signal task introduced in Section 1.2, the successful 
acquisition of this task by pigeons would have several theoretical implications. 
Firstly, the predictions of the independent horse-race model (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009b) should apply to the performance of pigeons, that is, the model is 
expected to capture the effects of associative processes involved in response 
inhibition following a stop signal. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.1, the 
independent horse-race model makes the following predictions (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009b): 
- The probability that a response is incorrectly made in trials in which a 
signal is presented (henceforth referred to as Signal trials) is expected to 
increase with increasing interval between the presentation of the stimulus 
that indicates that a response should be executed and the subsequent 
presentation of the signal indicating to withhold that response (the stop-
signal-onset interval, SSO).  
- Erroneous responses in Signal trials will primarily be made before or very 
shortly after the signal appears, as a consequence of the process that 
initiates a response being completed before the inhibition process to stop 
the response. Consequently, mean latencies to make a response should 
be shorter in Signal trials compared to Go trials, in which no signal 
appears and the prepared response needs to be executed. 
-  It is further expected that the mean latency for incorrect responses in 
Signal trials will increase as the signal-onset interval increases. 
 
Secondly, I aimed to discern the potential limits of associative processes in 
mediating proactive response inhibition, by which subjects adjust their 
readiness to inhibit an action independently of the occurrence of a stop signal. 
The proactive adjustment of attentional or response thresholds in anticipation of 
a Stop signal is thought to require executive control - signal-independent effects 
such as response slowing following a Signal trial (Bissett & Logan, 2011) should 
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be the result of executive-control processes. However, response adjustments 
that occur after receiving information about the likelihood of a signal (i.e., in the 
form of a cue) might be accomplished associatively; since such a cue is 
stochastically related to the outcome (stopping or not stopping a response), it 
might come to deliver associatively-mediated inhibition in a similar fashion to 
that observed in experiments with humans (Bowditch et al., 2016). Therefore, I 
assessed the occurrence of associatively mediated response adjustments 
following post-signal trials and in response to predictive cues. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3.1. Expected performance in a Stop-Signal task, both measured in the 
probability of making a Go response and in the latencies to make the Go response, as 
predicted by the independent horse-race model (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). SSO: 
Stop-signal-onset interval, the interval between presenting the stimulus that indicates to 
execute a response and presenting the signal that indicates to withhold that response. 
 
 
Lastly, the above assumptions about the involvement of associative processes 
in response inhibition might also apply to Change-Signal tasks, in which the 
occurrence of the signal indicates that an alternative response has to be 
executed, instead of signalling that any response has to be withheld. Since 
Stop-Signal and Change-Signal tasks often use the same stimuli and very 
similar procedures, it seems logical to assume that they both involve the same 
inhibition mechanisms. However, despite considerable support for this view, it is 
possible that two different response-inhibition processes govern Stop-Signal 
and Change-Signal performance. Since one task requires the complete 
suppression of a response, whilst the other task requires the execution of an 
alternative action, Change-Signal tasks might elicit more selective inhibition 
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processes than those involved in the mere stopping of a response (De Jong et 
al., 1995; Aron & Verbruggen, 2008; Krämer et al., 2010; Schall & Godlove, 
2012; Boecker et al., 2013; Gulberti et al., 2014) potentially making the Change-
Signal task more cognitively demanding (or even requiring a level of cognitive 
control that pigeons are incapable of).  Another possibility is that associative 
processes might facilitate performance in Change-Signal tasks in such a way 
that the presentation of the Change signal immediately triggers the execution of 
the alternative response without the need to inhibit the Go response, so that 
only performance in the Stop-Signal tasks relies on a response-inhibition 
process, but performance in the Change-Signal task does not. Verbruggen and 
Logan (2009b) claimed that the independent race model fit the data from both 
Stop-Signal and Change-Signal paradigms, supporting the idea that they 
involve a common mechanism.  
 
In Chapter 4, I report how I developed a computerised Stop-Signal and a 
Change-Signal paradigm that allow the comparison of the response-inhibition 
abilities of humans and pigeons, and report the results and implications of this 
comparison. In the light of the results of that chapter, in Chapter 5, I report the 
results of an additional study that was designed to assess the performance of 
pigeons in a setting that might necessitate a higher degree of response 
inhibition than the computer-based tasks. 
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPING A COMPARATIVE TASK-SWITCHING 
PARADIGM 
Parts of this chapter have been published as Meier, C., Lea, S.E.G., & 
McLaren, I.P.L. (2016). A stimulus-location effect in discrimination learning. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, 42(2), 
177-186. 
 
 
In this chapter, I report pilot studies conducted to establish the design of a 
comparative task-switching paradigm. Taking into account the results of the 
studies in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, I report the specifics of the final design in 
Section 2.3. 
 
Constructing a paradigm that is intended to explore cognitive performance 
across several species (especially if these species differ in their cognitive 
abilities as much as humans and pigeons do) requires a series of careful 
choices. On one hand, the paradigm has to be simple enough to allow pigeons 
to acquire it easily; on the other hand, it has to be ensured that, even when 
simplified, the paradigm captures the corresponding human phenomena of 
interest. In the specific case of task-switching, the paradigms used in human 
experiments often incorporate semantic stimuli and verbal instructions, making 
them unsuitable for use with animals. The procedure described below did not 
rely on language-based stimuli or cues but instead used varying values of 
several visual dimensions, namely colour, line orientation and spatial frequency, 
to indicate which response should be made. 
 
An important matter to consider was the question of how to introduce the 
competing task sets to the subjects. Detailed instructions could only be given to 
humans; pigeons would have to learn the two tasks based on trial and error. To 
limit the number of stimulus-response contingencies that the pigeons would 
have to acquire at the same time, and to ensure that both response-congruent 
and response-incongruent stimuli were learned at a similar rate, it seemed the 
most plausible to train each task in separation before exposing the pigeons to 
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the task-switching paradigm. However, to preserve comparability, any method 
of training for pigeons would also have to be applied to humans, and extensive 
training might have unforeseen consequences for the induction of task rules or 
the task-switching performance of human participants.  
Specifically, as the pigeons ultimately had to be able to perform two very 
different discrimination tasks on the same set of stimuli, with only visual cues to 
guide them as to which particular feature of the stimulus was relevant for 
discrimination at the time, I anticipated that the pigeons might have to be 
exposed to the components of each task (i.e., the cues indicating the currently 
relevant discrimination task and the specific values of the dimension that would 
have to be categorised) one at a time to ensure stable performance in response 
to each individual feature. The pigeons might only be able to acquire the 
contingencies embedded in a task if each of the dimensional values that were 
relevant for discrimination were presented unambiguously, that is, if the stimuli 
varied only in that dimension during training, whilst the other dimension was 
held at a constant value. It might also become necessary to introduce the two 
cues for each of the tasks one by one. 
Such detailed training, in which each individual component of the discrimination 
tasks is presented in isolation, might change the structure of the paradigm 
sufficiently to counteract any task-switching operations that usually elicit switch 
costs in humans. If pigeons had to be trained on a step-by-step procedure, it 
would have to be demonstrated that this training regime could still elicit the 
desired task-switching effects in humans, thus making it suitable for 
experimental work with pigeons. This issue was addressed in Section 2.1, by 
investigating the effects of very intensive training on the magnitude of switch 
costs and congruency effects in human participants. If, despite extensive 
training on each individual component of the tasks, humans nonetheless 
exhibited switch costs, it could be assumed that the pigeons might also show 
valid task-switching performance even given that they had to undergo such 
training.  
 
Although I was prepared to administer the training in the detailed way described 
above if necessary, I chose to begin the pigeon training with the ambiguous 
stimuli that would ultimately be used in the task-switching paradigm, and to 
introduce both cues of each tasks from the start. I retained the option to restrict 
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the training to stimuli that varied only in the relevant dimension of the currently 
trained task, or to present only one task cue at the time until performance 
reached a stable level, or even to fade in a cue gradually from grey to its full 
saturation if a pigeon refused to respond to the colour of the cue.  
 
A somewhat more complex issue arose in regard to the details of the trial 
procedure; specifically, the way the stimuli were presented to the subjects and a 
response was made. Concurrent to the work reported in this chapter, Maes et 
al. observed severely delayed acquisition rates in a pilot experiment to a study 
that would eventually be published in Maes et al. (2015). Their procedure was 
similar enough to the design intended for my task-switching experiments to 
warrant careful consideration. Section 2.2 describes a systematic comparison I 
conducted of the procedures that were likely the cause of learning success or 
failure in Maes et al.’s unpublished pilot work, and report the implications of that 
comparison for the design of the task-switching paradigm. Details on the trial 
procedure and the training methods that were ultimately employed are reported 
in Section 2.3. 
 
General Methods 
 
The following general aspects apply to all experiments reported in this chapter 
and in Chapter 3. 
 
Subjects 
The pigeons used in the experiments reported in this thesis had been obtained 
as discards from local fanciers and were housed in the Psychology animal 
laboratory at the University of Exeter. During testing, the pigeons were kept 
indoors in two group aviaries (each approximately 4.5m2), and were maintained 
at or above 80% of their free-feeding weight by controlled feeding after tests. 
Pigeons that were not tested at the time were kept in an outdoor aviary 
(approximately 12m2) with unlimited access to food. All aviaries provided ad 
libitum access to water and grit. 
Human participants were drawn from the Psychology undergraduate participant 
pool of the University of Exeter; they took part in the experiments in exchange 
for course credit or monetary reimbursement of £5 per hour. 
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Unless stated otherwise, both humans and pigeons were naïve to the testing 
stimuli at the start of the experiment in which they participated.  
 
Apparatus 
The pigeons were tested in eight identical 71x50.5x43.5cm operant chambers. 
Each pigeon was tested in the same chamber throughout a given experiment. 
One of the long walls of the chamber was fitted with a 31x23.5cm (15") touch 
monitor (Model 1547L 1024x768pxl TFT monitor, 0.3mm per pixel, CarrollTouch 
infrared detector, ELO Touchsystems Inc.) mounted 12cm above the grid floor 
of the chamber. Two 2.8-Watt white houselights were mounted to either side 
above the screen; below the screen, mounted 4cm above the chamber floor and 
directly below each house light, two 6x5cm apertures gave access to grain 
hoppers when solenoids were activated. The food hoppers were illuminated by 
a 2.8-Watt light when activated and contained a 2:1 mixture of hemp seed and 
conditioner. A 50-Ohm loudspeaker mounted between the two food hoppers 
played white noise into the box and also indicated all effective pecks to target 
areas on screen with an immediate feedback beep. The interior of the box was 
monitored by a video camera attached to the short wall of the chamber opposite 
the chamber door. Contingency control and data collection was managed using 
a Dell PC running Whisker (Cardinal & Aitken, 2010), with client programs 
written in Visual Basic 6.0.  
Humans were tested at the University of Exeter either in a sound-proof, single-
occupancy test room that was equipped with an Apple iMac or in a multi-testing 
room fitted with eight sound-proof cubicles, each equipped with a Dell PC. The 
human experiments were written and run in MATLAB® using the Psychtoolbox 
(Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007) add-on.  
 
Cue and Stimulus Material 
Each of the two tasks was associated with two distinct cues, which were circular 
colour-filled disks of 200 pixels (60mm) in diameter. These were a blue or 
yellow disk for one task, and a red or green disk for the other task.  
As shown in Figure 2.1, the stimuli were circular Gaussian patches of 200 pixels 
(60mm) in diameter and consisted of one of four sinusoidal grating patterns. 
They differed from one another in two dimensions: spatial frequency – either 2 
or 12 cycles per 100 pixels – or line orientation – either horizontal or vertical. 
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Each of these two visual dimensions determined the correct response in one 
task. For example, one task might require responding to the spatial frequency of 
the grating pattern, e.g., if a stimulus, regardless of the orientation of the 
pattern, had a low spatial frequency, the correct response towards this stimulus 
was to choose the left reward location, while stimuli with a high spatial 
frequency required the subject to choose the right reward location. Conversely, 
in the other task, stimuli would have to be classified according to the orientation 
of the grating pattern, regardless of its spatial frequency. That is, if a stimulus 
showed a horizontal pattern, it required a response to the left reward location, 
while a vertical pattern indicated a response to the right location as the correct 
one. As each stimulus always contained both spatial frequency and orientation 
information, some stimuli always required the same response, e.g., a horizontal 
pattern of low spatial frequency might always require a left response regardless 
of the current task. In contrast to these congruent stimuli, responses to 
incongruent stimuli depended on the task at hand, for example, a horizontal 
stimulus with a high spatial frequency pattern might require a response to the 
left reward location on the orientation task but a response to the right location 
on the spatial frequency task.  
In every trial, the stimuli were always superimposed onto the cue for that trial, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. Examples of the four stimuli: A) low spatial frequency and horizontal 
orientation, B) high spatial frequency and horizontal orientation, C) low spatial 
frequency and vertical orientation and D) high spatial frequency and vertical orientation. 
Each stimulus was superimposed on one of the four task cues; during test, all four 
stimuli were paired with all four cues, resulting in sixteen different cue-stimulus 
combinations (four of these possible combinations are presented here for illustration). 
This figure appeared in Meier et al. (2016b). 
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2.1  The Influence of Task Training on Task-Switching Performance in 
Humans 
To keep the procedures as similar as possible for humans and pigeons, the 
typical method of providing verbal instructions to human participants was 
discarded in favour of a practical training phase which resembled the 
conditioning procedures employed in animal testing. That is, participants had to 
infer the relevant stimulus-response associations via trial-and-error learning.  
In order to establish sufficient learning in pigeons, their training might have to 
include introducing and training each relevant component of the task-switching 
paradigm individually. However, administering similarly extensive training to 
humans could potentially influence the size of switch costs in human 
participants, or the degree to which participants become aware of the two 
competing task sets (and let their response be guided by the task rules rather 
than stimulus-response contingencies) when completing the task-switching 
paradigm. Therefore, I examined the effects of very extensive training on 
human task-switching performance. If humans suffered from switch costs after 
prolonged experience with all task contingencies, one could be confident that 
such training would similarly not interfere with the expression of task-switching 
effects by pigeons if they employed the same processes as humans. 
Separately, confirming the presence of switch costs in this pilot study would 
help verify the validity of the paradigm and give confidence that it would be an 
adequate method for comparing the performance of humans and pigeons. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
16 Psychology undergraduate students participated in this study.  
 
Trial Procedure 
One of the four colour cues was presented in the centre of the display at the 
beginning of a trial to indicate which task was relevant in that trial. Participants 
had to mouse-click on the cue, upon which a stimulus appeared superimposed 
on the cue to keep both the cue and the stimulus visible. Following a mouse-
click on the cue-stimulus compound in the centre of the screen, two square 
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white response keys (side length of 75 pixels / 22.5mm) appeared to the left 
and the right side of the stimulus. Participants responded by clicking on the 
response key that was associated with the present cue-stimulus combination 
(for example, a green cue paired with a horizontal, low-spatial-frequency 
stimulus might require clicking the left response key). If the correct response 
key was chosen, the cue-stimulus compound and response keys disappeared 
from the screen and, for two seconds, the word "Correct!" appeared in white 
letters in the centre of the screen alongside a golden star presented in the 
location of the correct response key. Then, after an inter-trial interval of three 
seconds, the next trial began. If the wrong response key was clicked, the 
display was replaced by the word "WRONG" in white letters appearing in the 
screen centre for five seconds, followed by the inter-trial interval of three 
seconds.  
 
Training 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions:  
 
No training. Eight participants did not receive any initial training on the tasks but 
were immediately presented with the full task-switching paradigm as described 
below. 
 
Training. Eight participants received detailed training. They went through a 
series of training stages for each task separately before entering the task-
switching procedure. The order in which the tasks (spatial frequency 
discrimination and orientation discrimination) were learned was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Initially, the two cues used in each task were introduced individually. Only the 
task-relevant dimension of the stimulus varied at this stage, while the irrelevant 
dimension was held constant at an intermediate level. That is, participants only 
responded to two distinct cue-stimulus compounds at this point: either a 
horizontal or vertical stimulus with a spatial frequency of 7 cycles per 100 pixels 
(if the first task to be learned was the orientation task), or a stimulus with a 
spatial frequency of either 2 or 12 cycles per 100 pixels with a diagonal line 
orientation of 45° from the horizontal (if the first task to be learned was the 
spatial-frequency task) - each one paired with only one cue colour. Once a 
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participant responded correctly to the two stimuli combined with one cue in at 
least 80% of a sequence of trials that included each stimulus at least twice (i.e., 
since there were two stimuli, this sequence included at least four consecutive 
trials), the procedure was repeated for the second cue. Then, the two task cues 
were combined and again trained to the same 80%-accuracy criterion. In the 
next stage, the training stimuli were replaced by stimuli for which the values of 
both dimensions were varied, in the same manner as they would appear in the 
task switching paradigm. This training stage was continued until participants 
again responded correctly in at least 80% of a sequence of trials that included 
each stimulus at least twice (i.e., at least eight consecutive trials). Then, that 
entire training procedure was repeated for the second task. After learning both 
tasks individually to the 80%-accuracy criterion, participants moved on to the 
task-switching paradigm described below. 
 
Task-Switching Paradigm 
In the task-switching part of the experiment, trials could either switch between 
the two tasks or repeat the previous task. The switches were partially 
randomised to produce a task-switch trial in one third of all trials. In the 
remaining (task-repeat) trials, the two cues indicating the same task alternated 
in successive trials so that no cue was ever presented on two consecutive trials. 
Participants completed 24 blocks of 25 trials. The first trial of each block was 
excluded from analyses as it was neither a switch nor a repeat trial. Trials 
following an incorrect response were also excluded from analysis because it 
was unclear whether the error in the previous trial had been due to performing 
the wrong task or due to choosing the wrong response to the given stimulus in 
the current task - making it impossible to assess whether the trial following the 
error was treated by the participant as a repeat or a switch trial. 
For each pair of consecutive blocks, I analysed the participant's percentage of 
errors, as indicated by the first response key that was chosen (correct or 
incorrect), and the participant's latency to click on a response key. 
 
After completing the task-switching paradigm, I assessed the participant's ability 
to describe the rules by which a correct response was defined. If a participant 
was able to correctly identify the contingencies between a task cue, stimulus 
and correct response, he or she was considered to have understood – and 
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applied – the underlying task rule. If a participant could not explain any 
relationship between stimuli, cues and the correct response, this was taken as 
an indication that he or she had relied on associative learning to successfully 
complete the task. Participants that could not be grouped into either of these 
categories were excluded (see below for details). 
 
Results 
 
Two participants in the no-training condition were unable to verbalise either of 
the two task rules; two further participants could name only one of the two rules. 
The remaining participants were able to name both rules. In the Training 
condition, four participants did not infer any rules, and one person named one of 
the two task rules. These numbers did not differ significantly between training 
conditions, χ2(2)=1.14, p=.57. To assess whether rules awareness influenced 
performance, I included it as a further potential predictor in addition to the type 
of training that had been administered. However, since there was only one 
participant in the Training condition who inferred one rule, I only considered 
those participants who had either inferred both rules or inferred no rules. 
 
As described in Section 1.1, performance in task-switching experiments is 
usually affected by both switch costs and congruency effects, as participants 
make more errors and respond more slowly on trials in which the task switches 
from one trial to the next compared to trials in which the task is repeated, and 
when responding to a response-incongruent stimulus compared to responding 
to a response-congruent stimulus. The extent to which error rates and response 
times of the participants in the current experiment were influenced by switch 
costs or congruency effects was investigated with two repeated-measures 
ANOVAs, using Block Pairs, Trial Type (Task-Switch or Task-Repeat) and 
Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) as within-subjects factors. 
Training (Yes or No) and Rule Awareness (no rule inferred or both rules 
inferred) were considered as between-subjects variables. Where applicable, 
significance levels were subject to Huynh-Feldt corrections. The results of these 
analyses are reported in Table 2.1.1. 
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Table 2.1.1. Effects of training, rules awareness, switch costs, stimulus congruency 
and block pairs (and significant interactions between factors) on response times and 
error rates. Significant p values are highlighted in bold. 
 Response Times Error Rates 
 F df p ηp2 F df p ηp2 
Training 1.09 1,9 .32 .11 1.33 1,9 .28 .13 
Rules Awareness 1.16 1,9 .31 .11 4.07 1,9 .074 .31 
     Training * Rules 0.00 1,9 .99 .00 3.35 1,9 .10 .27 
Trial Type (Switch Costs) 23.88 1,9 .001 .73 187.26 1,9 <.001 .95 
     Rules * Trial Type 0.48 1,9 .51 .05 77.33 1,9 <.001 .90 
Stimulus Congruency 1.50 1,9 .25 .14 37.06 1,9 <.001 .81 
     Rules * Congruency 6.85 1,9 .028 .43 11.84 1,9 .007 .57 
Trial Type * Congruency 0.21 1,9 .66 .02 33.20 1,9 .001 .79 
Block Pairs 2.39 11,99 .052 .21 7.31 11,99 <.001 .45 
     Congruency * Block 0.60 11,99 .72 .06 3.75 11,99 .001 .29 
     Rules * Congruency *   
     Block 
0.60 11,99 .72 .06 2.65 11,99 .010 .23 
     Rules * Trial Type * 
     Congruency * Block 
1.52 11,99 .19 .14 2.53 11,99 .007 .22 
 
 
The participants showed significantly worse performance in task-switch trials 
than in task-repeat trials (switch costs) in both response times (mean for task-
switch trials: 1251ms, for task-repeat trials: 1161ms; shown in Figure 2.1.1) and 
error rates (mean for task-switch trials: 23.8%, for task-repeat trials: 16.0%; 
shown in Figure 2.1.2). Participants also showed worse performance in 
response to incongruent stimuli than to congruent stimuli (means for response 
times: 1176ms for congruent vs. 1237ms for incongruent stimuli, for error rates: 
10.5% for congruent vs. 29.4% for incongruent stimuli). There are also general 
differences between the training groups, with those participants who had 
received training responding faster (mean: 1025ms) and making fewer errors 
(17.1%) than those who had not (means: 1239ms, 23.7%). 
Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 further suggest that participants performed differently 
depending on whether or not they had inferred the rules of the tasks, as 
knowledge of the two rules led to an increase in response times (mean: 
1239ms) and a decrease in error rates (13.7%) compared to not knowing any of 
the two rules (1025ms, 27.1%). Since the purpose of this experiment was to 
assess the effect of training on the presence of task-switching effects, the 
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influence of rules awareness on the participants' performance and the 
magnitude of switch costs and congruency effects are not described in detail 
here but will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
While the effect of switch costs was significant for both measures (see Figures 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2), the effect of stimulus congruency was only significant for error 
rates (Figure 2.1.2), but not for response times (Figure 2.1.1).  
Participants learned to make fewer errors as the experiment progressed, 
indicated by a significant influence of the factor Block Pairs on error rates, and 
somewhat increased in speed, as the marginal effect of Block Pairs on 
response times suggests. Over the course of the experiment, the effect of 
stimulus congruency on error rates became weaker, especially for the 
participants who had inferred both rules; for those participants, the interaction 
between switch costs and stimulus congruency also decreased over time. 
 
Overall, training did not influence performance significantly in either response 
times or error rates (seen in the comparison of the "No training" column to the 
"Training" column in Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). Likewise, participants 
demonstrated similar values in both measures of performance regardless of 
whether or not they were able to verbalise the two task rules (seen in the 
comparison of the rows "No rules inferred" and "Both rules inferred" in Figures 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2). 
 
Importantly, receiving training or not did not significantly alter the size of switch 
costs and congruency effects in participants' response times, although response 
times appeared to vary less overall if participants had received prior training 
(seen in the comparison of the "No training" column to the "Training" column in 
Figure 2.1.1). Training also had no effect on the size of switch costs or 
congruency effects in participants' error rates, or the change in response times 
and error rates over time.  
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Figure 2.1.1. Response times in ms across block pairs depending on rules 
awareness and training. Repeat trials: the task in these trials was the same as in the 
previous trials. Switch trials: the task changed from the previous trial. Congruent 
stimulus: the stimulus required the same response in both tasks. Incongruent 
stimulus: the correct response to the stimulus varied between tasks. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The above results made it evident that a task-switching paradigm employing 
non-semantic stimuli could generate similar task-switching effects as traditional 
paradigms used with human participants. Despite having to infer the correct 
responses from conditioning-like training, participants demonstrated substantial 
switch costs in both response times and error rates, and errors were greatly 
influenced by stimulus congruency. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume 
that introducing a training phase at the start of a task-switching paradigm will 
not disrupt the task-switching effects that are of interest. 
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Figure 2.1.2. Error rates in % depending on rules awareness and training. Repeat 
trials: the task in these trials was the same as in the previous trials. Switch trials: the 
task changed from the previous trial. Congruent stimulus: the stimulus required the 
same response in both tasks. Incongruent stimulus: the correct response to the 
stimulus varied between tasks. 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the error rates generally provided a clearer indication of whether a 
participant had inferred a task rule or not. As seen in Figure 2.1.2, the pattern of 
error rates over the course of the experiment differed in very distinct ways 
between participants who had or had not inferred the two task rules, whilst it 
was less obvious in their response times. Taking this observation into account 
(alongside other methodological limitations when assessing performance in 
pigeons, considered further in Section 2.2), error rates might be a more suitable 
measure to assess task-switching performance comparatively than response 
times. 
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As mentioned above, this section focused on significant differences in the way 
these main factors affected performance depending on whether or not 
participants had received task training prior to the task-switching paradigm. The 
influence of rules awareness on the participants' performance and the 
magnitude of switch costs and congruency effects will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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2.2  Stimulus Location is Included as a Stimulus Feature in Pigeons' 
Conditional Discrimination Learning 
Concurrent to the experiments reported in this section, Maes et al. conducted 
pilot work for studies eventually published in Maes et al. (2015), in which 
pigeons and humans simultaneously learned negative and positive patterning 
problems in a go-left/go-right paradigm that required them to choose one of two 
copies of a target stimulus presented on the left or the right side of a computer 
screen. In the pilot work, the authors observed an unanticipated difference in 
learning rates between pigeons trained under two slightly different conditions. 
The first condition was a conventional go-left/go-right discrimination: a 
discriminative stimulus appeared at a central location; once a response had 
been made to it, two identical white response keys appeared to the left and 
right, and responses to the left or the right key were reinforced depending on 
what stimulus was presented on the centre key. The second condition was 
logically identical, but the response keys were replicas of the discriminative 
stimulus, and the stimulus in the centre disappeared. The subject's task was the 
same under both conditions, but the pigeons trained under the first condition 
learned only very slowly, whereas those trained under the second condition 
learned much faster. 
The conclusion from this pilot work - that a simple alteration in the visual 
appearance of the response display determined pigeons' success or failure to 
acquire a discrimination problem - could have dramatic implications for the task-
switching paradigm as well, as it, too, would incorporate a forced choice in 
response to a target stimulus. Thus, I conducted a systematic comparison 
between the two conditions mentioned above, and their potential influence on 
acquiring the tasks that were chosen for the task-switching paradigm. For 
completeness, and to investigate whether the difficulties in acquiring a task in 
one but not the other condition could be attributed to the pigeons' limited 
cognitive abilities or would occur in humans as well, I assessed not only the 
performance of pigeons but also the performance of human participants in each 
of the two conditions. 
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Methods 
 
Subjects 
Twenty-six Psychology undergraduate students and seven pigeons performed 
one of the two conditional discrimination tasks that would eventually be used in 
the task-switching paradigm. 
 
Procedure 
Trials started by displaying a coloured circle, 200 pixels (60mm) in diameter in 
either red, green, yellow or blue, in the centre of a computer screen. Human 
participants were asked to mouse-click on it, pigeons pecked it on a touch 
screen. Following this action, the stimulus appeared superimposed on the 
colour. Again, a click or peck at the stimulus was required. One of the two visual 
dimensions of the stimuli (spatial frequency or line orientation) determined the 
correct response: two pigeons and twelve human participants had to classify 
stimuli based on their spatial frequency, for the other subjects, discrimination 
was based on the orientation of the grating pattern. That is, a subject might be 
trained to choose left when a vertical pattern was shown and choose right when 
the pattern was horizontal, while another subject was trained to go left when 
seeing a low spatial frequency and go right for stimuli with a high spatial 
frequency.  
Six humans and one pigeon learning the spatial-frequency discrimination and 
six humans and three pigeons learning the orientation discrimination 
experienced condition 'White Keys': the coloured stimulus remained in the 
centre after a response to it, and two white disks of 100 pixels (30mm) in 
diameter appeared to its left and right side (at a distance of 250 pixels (75mm) 
from the display centre to the centre of the white disk) and remained visible until 
a response was made. The stimulus indicated the correct response (click/peck 
the left or right white disk). The remaining six humans and one pigeon learning 
the spatial-frequency discrimination and eight humans and two pigeons learning 
the orientation discrimination experienced condition 'Replicas': in this condition, 
after responding to the stimulus, it was deleted from the display centre and 
reappeared on both the left and right side of the display, at a distance of 250 
pixels (75mm) from the display centre to the centre of a replica. The stimulus 
indicated the correct response (click/peck the left or right image of the stimulus). 
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For pigeons, a trial ended when a correct response was made, upon which 
pigeons received access to a food magazine for 2.5 seconds. For humans, the 
trial ended as soon as they made a response; a correct response was indicated 
by the appearance of the word "Correct!" in the centre of a black display and a 
gold star at the location of the correct response, a wrong response was followed 
by the word "WRONG" in the display centre. 
Pigeons completed a maximum of 20 daily sessions of 73 trials. Acquisition of 
the task was considered successful if a pigeon responded correctly on at least 
80% of trials for three successive 73-trial sessions, and no further training was 
given once the pigeon reached this criterion. Pigeons that failed to reach this 
criterion under their original training condition within 20 sessions were tested on 
the alternative condition. Human participants completed at least 80 trials; task 
acquisition was considered successful when a participant answered 80% or 
more of a sequence of eight trials correctly. At the end of the experiment, 
human participants were asked whether they had noticed any relationship 
between a stimulus and the correct response. If they were able to report the 
relevant discrimination rule (e.g., horizontal stimuli required choosing the right 
key while vertical stimuli indicated a response to the left), it was assumed that 
they had relied on this rule when responding. If participants were unable to 
report a rule, it was assumed that they had relied on the automatic formation of 
stimulus-response associations to respond correctly. 
To measure performance, I assessed both the number of trials required to 
reach the success criterion and average error rates until completing the 
experiment. Data were analysed for each species separately in a multivariate 
ANOVA with Condition (White Keys or Replicas) and Task (Orientation 
Discrimination or Spatial-Frequency Discrimination) as between-subjects 
factors. Where applicable, significance levels were subject to Huynh-Feldt 
corrections. 
 
Results 
 
Performance by pigeons and humans is illustrated in Figures 2.2.1; panel A 
shows average error rates and panel B shows the number of trials to reach the 
success criterion. For pigeons, performance levels differed between condition 
White Keys and condition Replicas.  
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All pigeons in condition White Keys failed to approach the success criterion 
within the 20 training sessions allowed (1460 trials), while the pigeons in 
condition Replicas reached the criterion significantly sooner, in a mean of 608 
trials (8 sessions, SD=329 trials). The individual differences in task acquisition 
are shown in Figure 2.2.2. This difference between conditions was significant, 
F(1,3)=55.1, p=.005, ηp2=.95; for these and subsequent analyses, pigeons that 
failed to reach the criterion were, conservatively, treated as though they had 
reached it in 1460 trials. Similarly, error rates were significantly lower in 
condition Replicas (21%, SD=6%) than in condition White Keys (41%, SD=6%), 
F(1,3)=13.3, p=.035, ηp2=.82. After completion of the 20 training sessions, the 
pigeons that had failed task acquisition in condition White Keys were trained 
under condition Replicas, and learned the relevant discrimination task within 
292 trials (4 sessions). As seen in Figure 2.2.2, they were faster to acquire the 
task and more accurate in condition Replicas than they had been in condition 
White Keys (number of sessions to reach criterion (20 sessions before transfer 
vs. 4 sessions after transfer): Wilcoxon T=0, p=.068 two-tailed; average error 
rate in final five sessions before transfer (37%) vs. first five sessions after 
transfer (22%): Wilcoxon T=0, p=.068 two-tailed). 
 
 
A      B 
  
Figure 2.2.1. A) Error rates for humans and pigeons depending on whether subjects 
made a response by clicking/pecking a replica of the target stimulus (condition 
Replicas) or a white response key (condition White Keys). Error bars represent the 
individual range of errors. B) Trials to reach the success criterion of 80% correct trials 
in a sequence of eight trials for humans/three consecutive training sessions for pigeons 
depending on condition. Error bars represent the individual range in the number of 
trials to reach success criterion. Note: the range for pigeons in condition White Keys is 
not different from the mean. 
This figure appeared in Meier et al. (2016a). 
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Two human participants, both in condition Replicas and performing the 
orientation discrimination, failed to reach the success criterion within 600 trials 
and aborted the experiment, which resulted in the loss of their data. Thus, the 
analyses were based on the data of 24 participants. The two excluded 
participants were unable to report the relevant discrimination rule at the end of 
the experiment; the other 24 were able to name the rule.  
Humans showed no differences in acquiring a discrimination task between 
conditions, either in the number of trials to reach criterion, F(1,20)=0.6, p=.47, 
or in their error rates, F(1,20)=0.9, p=.36. However, they made more errors 
when they had to learn the orientation-discrimination task (mean error rate: 
18%, SD=14%) compared to those humans who learned the spatial-frequency-
discrimination task (mean error rate: 7%, SD=10%), F(1,20)=5.6, p=.028, 
ηp2=.22. This was not the case for pigeons, F(1,3)=1.9, p=.27. Although the 
Condition-by-Task interaction did not reach statistical significance, F(1,20)=3.0, 
p=.097, Figure 2.2.3 illustrates that it was primarily humans who had to learn 
the orientation-discrimination task in condition Replicas who showed increased 
error rates compared to participants in the other conditions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.2. Pigeons' error rates across training sessions when making a response by 
pecking a replica of the target stimulus (condition Replicas; black lines) or a white 
response key (condition White Keys; grey lines). Pigeons in condition White Keys 
switched to condition Replicas after 20 sessions (performance after the switch shown 
as sessions 20+1 to 20+10). Kar and Chioni learned to discriminate spatial 
frequencies, the other pigeons performed the orientation-discrimination task. 
This figure appeared in Meier et al. (2016a).  
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Figure 2.2.3. Individual human error rates depending on the condition that the 
participants completed (Replicas or White Keys) and the discrimination task that had to 
be learned (orientation discrimination or spatial-frequency discrimination). 
This figure appeared in Meier et al. (2016a). 
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The species difference in learning depending on condition was confirmed by a 
significant Condition-by-Species interaction when analysing error rates in a 
univariate ANOVA including Species, Condition and Task as between-subjects 
factors, F(1,23)=5.2, p=.032, ηp2=.19: again, the pigeons' performance was 
heavily impaired in condition White Keys compared to condition Replicas, while 
humans showed no difference in their error rates between the two conditions. 
 
Discussion 
 
As in Maes et al.’s (2015) Experiment 2A, pigeons acquired the task within a 
few sessions in condition Replicas. However, in condition White Keys, in which 
a discrimination task had to be learned by pecking one of two white response 
keys, pigeons had still not progressed much from chance level at the end of the 
twenty training sessions; but these birds progressed quickly to criterion once 
they had the opportunity to peck directly at a replica of the discriminative 
stimulus. Humans, on the other hand, showed no differences in acquiring a 
discrimination task depending on the way the response display was presented. 
This suggests that, firstly, humans and pigeons used different strategies to 
acquire the discrimination task and, secondly, the learning strategy employed 
by pigeons led to a failure to learn the task in condition White Keys. 
 
Condition White Keys may have required pigeons to learn instrumentally, to 
move to the right or the left after seeing a certain stimulus in the display centre. 
Since the two response keys on the left and the right side of the stimulus were 
identical and presented simultaneously, the white key the pigeon was facing 
after performing the orientation behaviour did not hold any additional 
information as to whether the pigeons had indeed moved towards the correct 
location. On the other hand, when the stimulus was replicated in the response 
locations, as in condition Replicas and in Maes et al.’s Experiment 2A, a 
Pavlovian association becomes possible. There might be some intrinsic extra 
difficulty for a pigeon in learning an instrumental response to a stimulus at a 
given location compared to acquiring a Pavlovian approach. Typically, both 
types of learning process are considered to be active during acquisition of most 
tasks, with some researchers going so far as to say that "every instrumental 
situation is a classical conditioning situation" (Sheffield, 1965, p. 317). At least 
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for certain behaviours, classical conditioning results in better response 
formation than instrumental learning (Smith & Moore, 1966, p.138). Therefore, 
pigeons might have been able to acquire the discrimination task easily in 
condition Replicas because this condition involved a more effective classical-
conditioning procedure, while pigeons in condition White Keys had to rely 
almost entirely on instrumental learning.  
 
In contrast to the contingency-dependent processes that guided pigeon 
behaviour, humans almost certainly used verbalised rules to acquire the 
discrimination task in both conditions, as knowledge of the task rule was a 
requirement to succeed within the given time. Previous research (Galizio, 1979; 
Hayes, 1989; Maddox & Ing, 2005; Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & Frank, 2009) 
supports this assumption: although learning shaped by contingencies may 
improve performance, human behaviour is biased to be controlled by rules, 
even when this might be suboptimal. In the present case, simply learning the 
correct behaviour in response to each of the eight experienced stimuli might 
have resulted in more accurate performance than the rule-based approach, but 
nonetheless the participants did not change their approach.  
However, there were some differences in the pattern of human behaviour 
between the two conditions that suggest that the way a response was made 
might have had an influence on the participants' task acquisition rates: 
participants in condition White Keys were able to learn either one of the two 
discrimination tasks quickly by deducing and applying the relevant 
discrimination rule. Participants in condition Replicas however made more 
errors and took longer to acquire the orientation-discrimination task (having to 
discriminate horizontal from vertical patterns) than participants in any other 
group. Perhaps the orientation task was more cognitively demanding, and 
interfered with the participants’ ability to apply the task rule sufficiently in 
condition Replicas.  
Indeed, two people in condition Replicas failed to infer the rule of the orientation 
task altogether (and consequently did not show any improvement in 
performance over the course of the experiment), whereas all participants in 
condition White Keys were able to report the relevant discrimination rule at the 
end of the experiment. Thus, condition White Keys might facilitate rule 
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deduction in some way, making even the apparently more difficult orientation-
discrimination rule obvious to participants at an earlier point.  
Alternatively, the way a stimulus is presented in Condition Replicas might make 
the deduction of the correct discrimination rule more difficult, to the point at 
which it even prevents some participants from inferring the rule within the 
duration of the experiment. Indeed, many participants in Condition Replicas 
reported, when questioned about their strategy for solving the task at the end of 
the experiment, that the presence of two stimulus replicas in the response 
display confused them, and many tried to detect slight differences, for example 
in brightness or hue, in the two identical stimulus copies, hoping that such a 
perceived difference might help them choose the correct response. Obviously, 
this search strategy could not succeed – and participants would continue to be 
unable to solve the task unless they changed their strategy either by 
considering alternative hypotheses about the discrimination rule, or by switching 
to a contingency-based learning approach. Levine (1971) discovered that it can 
be difficult, if not impossible, for humans to discover even an easy sorting rule 
when it is very different from the kind of hypotheses that have worked 
previously to infer a rule. Thus, the participants in Condition Replicas who 
started out searching for differences between the two stimulus replicas might 
have been unable to abandon this unsuccessful hypothesis about the correct 
discrimination rule in favour of a hypothesis that accepts the stimulus replicas 
as being identical. If this is the case, then the only option that remained to 
enable those participants to solve the task correctly was to allow learning to be 
shaped not only by rules but also by the observed contingencies between the 
display and the correct response. Comparable conclusions have been drawn 
previously, e.g. by Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb, and Korn (1986), who 
argued that the assumed bias towards rule-governed behaviour in humans 
(Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Maddox & Ing, 2005; Smith et al., 2010) can possibly 
be overcome more easily than previously thought: human performance may be 
shaped by an interaction between contingency-shaped and rule-governed 
behaviour, especially when the rules originally governing behaviour were 
unreliable or incomplete, as might be the case with self-generated rules. 
Participants in condition Replicas may initially have failed to deduce the 
appropriate task rule, which led to higher errors in responding than in condition 
White Keys, especially in the more difficult orientation-discrimination task. 
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Ultimately, this failure to learn via a rule-governed approach might have caused 
a shift in control of behaviour from rules to contingencies - learning the 
discrimination based on contingencies may then have helped to infer the correct 
task rule later on in the experiment, so that all successful participants were able 
to report the discrimination rule at the end of the experiment. This possibility 
holds an important implication: if condition Replicas can elicit contingency-
based learning in humans - even if this learning system is later replaced by the 
application of rules -, it might be the preferable design when attempting to inhibit 
rules awareness in human participants.  
 
Combining the results from pigeons and humans, a design in which the cue-
stimulus compounds are presented as response keys emerged as the 
preferable design in the quest to investigate associative processes during task 
switching. 
  
64 
 
2.3  Procedures for a Comparative Task-Switching Paradigm 
The experiments reported in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 established that a paradigm 
utilising coloured task cues and stimuli of varying Gaussian grating patterns in 
different spatial orientations could sufficiently elicit typical task-switching effects 
in humans, and that these stimuli were reliably discriminated from each other by 
both humans and pigeons. Further, administering detailed training on each 
component of the stimuli and task cues did not appear to affect humans' task-
switching performance; thus, comparability between the procedures for humans 
and pigeons can be achieved by administering a stepwise conditioning-like 
training (that is, training each task on its own until reliable performance is 
achieved before combining the two tasks in a task-switching setting) to both 
human participants and pigeons. Finally, the most effective way to ensure 
stable acquisition of the two discrimination tasks by pigeons appeared to be 
presenting the stimulus compounds in the place of the response keys (instead 
of the centre of the screen with non-informative response keys). This method 
also seemed suitable for promoting associative learning in human participants. 
The resulting procedure and training regime for both pigeons and humans are 
reported below. 
 
Trial Procedure 
 
Pigeons 
The procedure used for the pigeon experiments is illustrated in Figure 2.3.1. 
Each trial began with the presentation of a white circular start key (100 pixels / 
30mm in diameter) presented in the centre of a black display to focus attention 
on the screen. Following two pecks at the start key, it was replaced by one of 
the four task cues. A red or green key indicated one task, and a blue or yellow 
key signalled the competing task. Although blue and yellow were always 
assigned to a task together, the stimulus attributes (spatial frequency or 
orientation) that were important for classification in that task and the reward 
location that was associated with any cue-stimulus combination were 
counterbalanced across pigeons and across humans.  
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The pigeons had to peck the cue once, after which one of the four stimuli 
appeared superimposed on the cue colour so that both the cue and the stimulus 
were presented simultaneously in the centre of the display, as illustrated above 
in Figure 2.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.1. Procedure of a task-switching trial as experienced by pigeons. Pecking 
the reward key in the final display triggered the release of a food magazine. 
For humans, the start key was omitted. Further, a correct response towards the choice 
display resulted in the word "Correct!" being displayed in the centre of a black screen, 
next to a gold star presented in the correct response location; an incorrect response 
resulted in the word "WRONG" displayed in the centre of a black screen. 
This figure appeared in Meier et al. (2016b). 
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Pecking on the cue-stimulus combination resulted in its deletion from the centre 
of the screen and its immediate reappearance 200 pixels (60mm) to both the 
left and the right side of the display centre. A response was made by pecking at 
the stimulus presented in the location (left or right) that was associated with the 
present cue-stimulus combination. Two successive pecks at the correct location 
resulted in the activation of the corresponding food magazine for 2.5 seconds 
and the end of the trial. Pecks at the stimulus in the incorrect location had no 
scheduled consequences. The inter-trial-interval to the next presentation of the 
observing key lasted 15 to 30 seconds. 
 
Humans 
For humans, a trial started immediately with the presentation of one of the four 
task cues. Participants had to mouse-click once on the cue, after which one of 
the four stimuli appeared superimposed on the cue so that both the cue and the 
stimulus were visible simultaneously in the centre of the display. One mouse-
click on the stimulus resulted in its deletion from the centre of the screen and its 
immediate reappearance 200 pixels (60mm) to both the left and the right of the 
display centre. A response was made by mouse-clicking the stimulus presented 
in the location (left or right) that was associated with the shown cue-stimulus 
combination. If the correct response location was chosen, the stimuli in both 
response locations disappeared from the screen and a golden star appeared in 
the correct location next to the word "Correct!" in white letters for two seconds, 
then the next trial began. If the wrong response location was clicked, the entire 
display turned black and the phrase "WRONG!" in white letters was shown for 
five seconds before the next trial began. 
 
Training 
 
Pigeons 
Seven pigeons received cue-training sessions before the start of the task-
switching training. In these sessions, the observing key was presented and, 
after pecking that key, one of the four cues to be used in the task-switching 
paradigm appeared in the centre of the screen. Upon pecking the cue twice, a 
reward key appeared to either the left or the right side of the display. Pecking 
this reward key delivered 2.5 seconds of access to the food magazine mounted 
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below that key. Cue-training sessions continued until a pigeon reliably pecked 
at the cue in 80% or more trials of a session. Following the cue training, the 
pigeon received training on the first task. For all but one of the seven birds, this 
training took the following form: the saturation of the cue-stimulus compounds 
that had to be discriminated was initially reduced to 20% of the full colour; this 
was done because the pigeons, although responding well to a white key, initially 
refused to respond to the cues when the cue colours were fully saturated. If 
performance in a block of 24 trials exceeded 80%, the cue saturation was 
increased by 20% in the following block in that training session. If performance 
in the entire session of three blocks exceeded 80%, the cue saturation was 
increased by 20% in the following session. For example, if a pigeon's session 
started with a cue saturation of 40%, and the pigeon responded reliably in all 
three blocks of that session (leading to the saturation being increased to 60% in 
the second block and to 80% in the third block of that session), the next session 
would start at a saturation level of 60%. Once the pigeon was able to perform at 
or above 80% accuracy overall (and above 70% for each of the four stimuli) in 
three consecutive sessions that only contained fully saturated cues, training for 
the first task was considered successful. The same procedure was applied to 
train the second task, with the difference that the initial cue saturation for the 
cues of this task was set at 40%. Following the successful acquisition of the 
second task, the pigeon received refresher training on the first task, at full cue 
saturation, until it performed at or above 80% overall accuracy in two 
consecutive sessions. This was repeated for the second task. The alternating 
training of the two tasks continued until the pigeon was able to change between 
the two tasks from one day to the next and perform at 80% accuracy or above 
in each task for four consecutive days. Then, it received at least three further 
sessions in which the two tasks alternated between blocks (there were four 
blocks of 24 trials in each of these sessions). If the pigeon performed to the 
80% criterion in these sessions, it was moved on to the task-switching 
paradigm. 
The seventh pigeon in this group (Nelson) experienced a slightly altered training 
procedure: it responded very well towards the coloured cue-stimulus 
compounds, so that it was not necessary to gradually increase the saturation of 
the cue in order to maintain reliable responses. Thus, this pigeon experienced 
the fully saturated cue-stimulus combinations from the onset of the training; all 
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other criteria for successful completion of a task-training stage were the same 
as described above. 
 
A second group of six pigeons was recruited at a later point. As the previous 
group, these pigeons started their training with cue-training sessions, but the 
brightness of the three red, green and blue colour components of each cue 
were initially set to maximum level (i.e., the RGB code of the cues were set to 
RGB[255,255,255]), which made the cues white. If the pigeon pecked at the cue 
in every trial of a given session, the brightness of the irrelevant colour 
components was reduced exponentially for each cue in the following session, 
so that the real cue colour was faded in across sessions. For example, the red 
cue was faded in by subsequently presenting coloured cues with the following 
RGB values: [255,255,255], [247,247,255], [239,239,255], [223,223,255], 
[191,191,255], [127,127,255], [063,063,255], [000,000,255]. This step-wise 
fade-in procedure applied to all cues at the same time, so that the pigeons 
always experienced the same level of colour brightness for all four cues. 
The cue-training stage was considered successful if the pigeon responded in 
every trial towards the cues when the brightness was set at 100%. Following 
this cue training, the six pigeons received training on their first task; similar to 
Nelson's training regime, the cue saturation was set at 100% from the beginning 
of the training. Training of the two different tasks continued as outlined above 
for the first group of pigeons, and all pass criteria to proceed to the next training 
stage were identical. 
 
Finally, another pigeon (Kili) was recruited for this experiment. It received the 
same gradual cue introduction as the first group in that the saturation of the 
cue-stimulus compounds was increased over training sessions, starting at 20% 
saturation for the first task and 40% saturation for the task that was trained 
second. In addition, it started the training sessions for each task with stimuli that 
only varied in the task-relevant dimension; the second dimension was held 
constant at an intermediate value to the two values that had to be discriminated 
in the competing task. That is, Kili was first trained on the orientation-
discrimination task: it experienced stimuli (at reduced cue saturation) that were 
either horizontally or vertically orientated, and had a spatial frequency of 7 
cycles per 100 pixels. The cue saturation was increased as described for the 
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first group of pigeons until Kili performed accurately in response to these 
training stimuli combined with the two fully saturated task cues in two 
consecutive sessions. Following this training, Kili completed further sessions in 
which the ambiguous stimuli (varying both in orientation and in spatial 
frequency) were presented until it was able to perform at or above 80% 
accuracy in three consecutive sessions. The same procedure applied to the 
training of the second task: initially, the stimuli only varied in spatial frequency, 
whilst the orientation of the grating was kept constant at 45° from the horizontal 
pane. Upon successful performance in response to these stimuli paired with 
fully saturated cues in two consecutive sessions, Kili completed further sessions 
in this task with the ambiguous stimuli until it was able to perform at 80% 
accuracy or above in three consecutive sessions. Then, it received alternating 
training on each task in the same way as the other pigeons. 
 
Humans 
Humans were trained in the two tasks in four blocks within the same session. 
The first training block contained at least 32 trials of one task. Then, the second 
task was trained in the second block for at least 32 trials. After this, the first task 
was repeated in block 3 for a minimum of another 16 trials. In the fourth and 
final training block, participants again experienced at least 16 trials of the 
second task. A block was terminated when subjects reached the criterion of 
80% or more correct responses in a sequence of eight or more consecutive 
trials that included each of the four stimuli at least twice. Humans did not 
experience any adjustments of cue saturation or brightness. The only 
instructions humans received were how to respond (via mouse-clicks) and to try 
to "respond as quickly as possible whilst making as few mistakes as possible". 
 
Data Collection 
 
A final point for consideration was the way in which performance would be 
assessed. The conventional methods of measuring task-switching performance 
in humans had to be adjusted to suit inter-species comparison. Switch costs are 
usually assessed via the time it takes humans to respond, since the delayed 
reaction time on task-switch trials compared to task-repeat trials is seen as 
evidence that time-consuming executive-control processes were in action.  
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With the testing apparatus currently available in Exeter's animal cognition 
laboratories, the recording of reaction times for pigeons could be inaccurate; 
often, the system was not sensitive enough to record every peck that a pigeon 
attempted, so that the pigeon had to peck repeatedly until a response was 
recorded, which would distort actual response times. This made it difficult to 
estimate any differences in pigeons' reaction time in response to task-switch 
versus task-repeat trials. In addition, the time that subjects have to respond to a 
stimulus cannot be restricted in the same way in animal studies as it is generally 
done in conventional human task-switching paradigms (Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et 
al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Forrest, 2012). As a result, reaction 
times can range from milliseconds in humans (Monsell, 2003; Dreisbach et al., 
2006, 2007; Forrest, 2012) to several seconds in animals (Stoet & Snyder, 
2003a, 2003b, 2008; Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011; Avdagic et al., 2014). However, 
in humans, switch costs and congruency effects are equally apparent in the 
accuracy with which the task-appropriate response is made on a given trial, 
because humans generally make more errors in task-switch trials compared to 
task-repeat trials, and in response to incongruent stimuli compared to congruent 
stimuli (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Recording the 
accuracy with which pigeons respond is easily accomplished, and, for the 
reasons stated above, might be a more suitable measure for comparison 
between species than reaction times. Nonetheless, to establish the validity of 
our paradigm, I recorded each subject's latency to make a response, although I 
did not restrict the time that participants had to respond, in an effort to preserve 
the comparability between species. 
 
In summary, by taking into account the findings of the pilot studies reported in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the task-switching paradigm constructed in this section 
can be expected to adequately elicit task-switching effects in humans and 
enable a comparison of such effects between humans and pigeons. 
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CHAPTER 3: DO ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES CAUSE SWITCH COSTS IN A 
TASK-SWITCHING PARADIGM? 
Parts of this chapter have been published as Meier, C., Lea, S.E.G., and 
McLaren, I.P.L. (2016). Task-switching in pigeons: Associative learning or 
executive control? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and 
Cognition, 42(2), 163-176. 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I report the design of a comparative task-switching paradigm to 
investigate whether pigeons, whose behaviour is assumed to be governed 
entirely by associative processes, would suffer the same task-switching effects 
(namely task-switch costs and stimulus-congruency effects) as humans 
reportedly do (Monsell, 2003). 
Forrest (2012) suggested that task-switch costs might be mediated by 
associative processes: in her experiments, participants who learned to perform 
a task-switching paradigm by learning its stimulus-response contingencies 
suffered small but reliable costs to performance when switching between the 
two existing task rules, even when the participants did not apply these rules. But 
is this observation proof that such switch costs are the result of associative 
processes? If they are, will pigeons demonstrate switch costs in their task-
switching performance, as well? So far, only one other research group has 
investigated the task-switching performance of pigeons, and found that pigeons 
showed a lack of switch costs (Castro & Wasserman, 2016), apparently 
contradicting Forrest's (2012; Forrest et al., 2014) assumption. However, their 
sample size was rather small, which may raise some concern about the power 
of their results and how confidently the observed lack of switch costs can be 
accepted. Indeed, small sample sizes might have been the reason for the rather 
inconclusive results following from the studies of Stoet and Snyder (2003a, 
2003b), Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) and Avdagic et al. (2014) regarding the 
expression of switch costs in macaques. Therefore, in order to be able to draw 
any meaningful conclusions from pigeons' performance in the comparative task-
switching paradigm developed in Section 2.3, it had to be shown that it could 
adequately capture any potentially present task-switching effects, even when 
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sample sizes are small, which is often the case in studies of animal cognition 
that require long training periods (as was also the case here).  
One effect that is universally observed in different species during task switching 
is the response-congruency effect (Kiesel et al., 2007; Forrest, 2012; Schneider, 
2015), and it can be assumed that a valid task-switching paradigm would be 
able to generate this effect. The magnitude of a congruency effect was not 
investigated by Castro and Wasserman (2016), which makes it difficult to 
assess whether their pigeons did not express switch costs because of an 
inherent absence thereof in the pigeons' performance, or because their 
paradigm lacked the power to make a reliable statement about any task-
switching effects in general.  
 
To anticipate the results of Section 3.1, the paradigm was successfully acquired 
by pigeons and elicited the common task-switching effects in humans. I 
conducted further systematic investigations of the influence of associative 
processes on task-switching performance in pigeons and humans in an attempt 
to find an explanation for the behavioural patterns that were observed in Section 
3.1: in Section 3.2, I investigated the influence of the perceptual features of task 
cue, stimulus or response of one trial on performance in the next trial to 
establish whether pigeons and humans would express the type of trial-to-trial 
effects that commonly occur in associative learning. In Section 3.3, I tested the 
hypothesis that human participants generally do not solve the task-switching 
paradigm via associative learning, but instead apply some form of abstract rule 
that they extract from the perceived cue-stimulus-response contingencies, even 
if that rule is imperfect or cannot adequately be described by the participant.  
73 
 
3.1  Task-Switching Performance of Pigeons and Humans 
In this section, the task-switching paradigm developed in Section 2.3 was put to 
the test. Firstly, I aimed to verify the occurrence of both switch costs and 
congruency effects in human participants, which have previously been found to 
affect performance of humans regardless of whether their behaviour was based 
on task sets or on stimulus-response contingencies (Forrest, 2012). Although 
the paradigm used in Section 2.1 did elicit robust task-switching effects in 
humans, the final paradigm was sufficiently different from that initial design to 
again raise this concern. Thus, I included a sample of human participants in this 
experiment to confirm that the final paradigm adequately captured task-
switching effects in humans.  
Secondly, I also investigated the occurrence of these effects in pigeons' 
performance. Congruency effects have been reported for both humans and 
macaques tested in a task-switching setting (Monsell, 2003; Stoet & Snyder, 
2003a, 2003b; Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011; Forrest, 
2012; Avdagic et al., 2014), and can be attributed to associative processes 
during stimulus processing (Kiesel et al., 2007); this assumption was discussed 
in more detail in Section 1.1. The logical conclusion here is that congruency 
effects will affect the task-switching performance of all species, regardless of 
their cognitive capacity to apply task rules. More importantly, I investigated the 
extent to which the task-switching performance of pigeons was influenced by 
switch costs, especially in response to incongruent stimuli, to which the correct 
response depends on the currently relevant task (cf. Section 1.1). If the switch 
costs expressed by humans who did not apply task rules to solve the paradigm 
were mediated by the same associative processes that govern pigeon 
behaviour, then the same costs should be observed in the pigeons' 
performance.  
 
Methods 
 
Subjects 
Twenty-seven Psychology undergraduate students and eight pigeons 
completed this experiment.  
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Paradigm 
The apparatus and stimulus material is described in Chapter 2. After completing 
the training procedure described in Section 2.3, subjects completed the full 
task-switching paradigm, in which trials of the two previously separately trained 
tasks were intermingled. The task sequence was partially randomized to 
produce a switch trial in one third of the trials; for trials in which the previous 
task repeated, the two task cues for that task alternated so that the same cue 
was never shown consecutively on two trials. Pigeons received 20 sessions of 
72 trials (three runs of 24 trials, amounting to 1460 trials per pigeon); in each 
run, the four combinations of spatial frequency and orientation were presented 
three times per task. Humans completed 24 blocks of 24 trials (resulting in 576 
trials per person), with each of the four combinations occurring trice per task per 
block. After each block, participants had the option to take a short break. As the 
first trial of each block or session would be neither a task-switch nor a task-
repeat trial, it could not be included in any analysis; thus, a 73rd trial for pigeons 
and a 25th trial for humans was added at the start of each session and block; 
the cue and stimulus of this dummy trial were selected at random. 
 
At the end of the task-switching procedure, human participants were 
interviewed about their ability to describe the rules that defined a correct 
response, to determine the approach they had used to solve the paradigm. The 
interview questions are attached in Appendix A1. If a participant was able to 
correctly identify the contingencies between a task cue and certain stimulus 
characteristics, he or she was considered to have understood and successfully 
applied the underlying rule. If a participant could not explain any relationship 
between stimuli, cues and the correct response, this was taken as an indication 
that he or she had not relied on the corresponding task rules when making a 
response in the task-switching paradigm. Participants who reported that they 
had always applied the same one of the two rules (for example, they said that 
they made a response based on the spatial orientation of the stimulus in all 
trials), or said that they had made up their own solving strategies, were 
excluded from further analyses. 
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Results 
 
Trials immediately following an incorrect response were excluded from analysis 
because it was unclear whether the error in the previous trial had been due to 
performing the wrong task or due to choosing the wrong response to the given 
stimulus in the current task - thus making it impossible to assess whether the 
trial following the error was treated by the subject as a task-switch or a task-
repeat trial. 
 
Table 3.1.1. Results of repeated-measures ANOVAs on error rates of Rules-Aware 
participants, Rules-Ignorant participants and pigeons, using Trial Type (Task Repeat or 
Task Switch), Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) and Test 
Blocks/Sessions as within-subjects factors. Significant p values are highlighted in bold. 
  Error Rates 
  F df p ηp2 
Rules-Aware Participants (n=8)     
 Trial Type 17.38 1, 7 .004 .713 
 Stimulus Congruency 51.84 1, 7 <.001 .881 
 Trial Type * Stimulus Congruency 7.27 1, 7 .031 .510 
 Test Blocks 7.31 23, 161 <.001 .511 
 Blocks * Trial Type 2.86 23, 161 .008 .290 
 Blocks * Stimulus Congruency 2.74 23, 161 .003 .282 
 Blocks * Trial Type * Stimulus 
Congruency 
1.16 23, 161 .317 .142 
Rules-Ignorant Participants (n=9)     
 Trial Type 17.43 1, 8 .003 .685 
 Stimulus Congruency 267.02 1, 8 <.001 .971 
 Trial Type * Stimulus Congruency 16.28 1, 8 .004 .671 
 Test Blocks 1.30 23,184 .178 .140 
 Blocks * Trial Type 1.03 23,184 .432 .114 
 Blocks * Stimulus Congruency 1.00 23,184 .461 .111 
 Blocks * Trial Type * Stimulus 
Congruency 
1.08 23,184 .377 .118 
Pigeons (n=8)     
 Trial Type 0.10 1, 7 .766 .014 
 Stimulus Congruency 75.62 1, 7 <.001 .915 
 Trial Type * Stimulus Congruency 0.49 1, 7 .508 .065 
 Test Sessions 1.06 19, 133 .399 .132 
 Sessions * Trial Type 0.78 19, 133 .725 .100 
 Sessions * Stimulus Congruency 1.60 19, 133 .064 .186 
 Sessions * Trial Type * Stimulus 
Congruency 
1.17 19, 133 .311 .143 
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The subject species and the human participants' rule use had a main effect on 
performance, F(2,22)=46.78, p<.001, ηp2 =.81, and influenced the expression of 
the two task-switching effects of interest and their interaction significantly, all 
p≤.004. Therefore, all analyses were carried out separately for humans (split 
according to the number of rules participants could name) and for pigeons. The 
extent to which humans and pigeons were influenced by any task-switching 
effects was investigated in repeated-measures ANOVAs using Trial Type (Task-
Repeat or Task-Switch trial), Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) 
and Blocks/Sessions as within-subjects factors. Where appropriate, significance 
levels were subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. The results of these analyses 
are summarised in Table 3.1.1 and illustrated in Figure 3.1.1. 
 
Pigeons 
Pigeons' error rates were generally low (8.8%, SD=3.1), since the pigeons had 
received substantial training. This overall error rate was significantly better than 
expected by chance, t(7)=37.57, p<.001, ηp2 =.99. 
 
As seen in Figure 3.1.1, pigeons demonstrated no indication of suffering switch 
costs in their error rates (task-repeat: 9.1% vs. task-switch: 8.9%). However, the 
influence of Stimulus Congruency on performance was greatly visible, as 
pigeons showed increased error rates when responding to an incongruent 
stimulus compared to responding to a congruent stimulus (incongruent: 14.3% 
vs. congruent: 3.6%). 
This observation was confirmed by a non-significant effect of the factor Trial 
Type and a significant influence of Stimulus Congruency (Table 3.1.1). The two 
factors did not interact with each other - pigeons showed no indication of 
increased error rates when switching tasks in response to stimuli of either 
congruency (switch costs on congruent trials: -0.6%, p=.301; on incongruent 
trials: 0.2%, p=.850). 
The pigeons also did not show any significant changes in their error rates 
across sessions, nor did the progression in the experiment affect the magnitude 
of switch costs or congruency effects. 
 
As expected, the response times of pigeons were slow and too variable to show 
consistent congruency effects (6919ms for incongruent stimuli vs.7109ms for 
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congruent stimuli, F(1,7)=2.17, p=.184) or switch costs (7047ms for task-repeat 
trials vs. 6981ms for task-switch trials, F(1,7)=3.27, p=.113). 
 
In light of the remarkable absence of any switch costs in the pigeons' 
performance, the accuracy data were also examined using the Bayesian 
repeated-measures ANOVA function in JASP (Love, Selker, Marsman et al., 
2015). The estimated Bayes factor (Congruency / (Trial Type + Congruency)) 
suggested that the data are 0.091:1 in favour of the null hypothesis, that is, the 
data are 11.04 times more likely to occur under a model assuming only an 
effect of Stimulus Congruency than under a model including Trial Type as a 
second factor. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.1. Switch costs (difference in error rates of switch trials and task-repeat 
trials) and congruency effect (difference in error rates of trials containing a congruent 
stimulus and trials containing an incongruent stimulus) for pigeons, humans who were 
unaware of any underlying task rules (Rules-Ignorant) and humans who inferred the 
task rules (Rules-Aware). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
Humans 
Twenty-three of the 27 human participants completed the training phase 
described in Section 2.3 and proceeded to the task-switching phase after an 
average of 131 training trials (the other four participants did not reach the pass 
criterion of the training in 600 training trials and aborted the experiment). Eight 
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participants were able to verbalize the rules for both tasks (orientation and 
spatial frequency) at the end of the experiment, and it can be assumed that they 
had relied on these rules to solve the paradigm (the 'Rules-Aware' group). A 
further six participants reported having discovered one of the two rules (for 
example, they said that horizontal stimuli generally required clicking the left 
response key, but that sometimes this strategy did not succeed) or having made 
up their own solving strategies. Because of the ambiguity as to what cognitive 
strategy these participants relied on to solve the tasks, their data were not 
included in any further analyses. The remaining nine participants stated that 
they had not been aware of any relationships between specific stimuli and the 
correct response, or that the relations they had assumed appeared to change 
throughout the experiment; these participants claimed that their responses had 
not been governed by any specific rules throughout the experiment (this group 
will therefore be referred to as the 'Rules-Ignorant' group). Note that, although 
the definition of what constituted a Rules-Aware person was quite strict in 
comparison to the relatively relaxed definition of what constituted a Rules-
Ignorant participant, the behavioural differences between two groups that are 
reported below seem substantial enough to validate the definitions. 
 
Overall error rates were significantly lower for the Rules-Aware group (9.5%, 
SD=5.0) than the Rules-Ignorant group (30.3%, SD=5.5), t(15)=8.16, p<.001, 
ηp2=.82. Both groups made significantly fewer errors than expected by chance, 
Rules-Aware: t(7)=22.85, p<.001, ηp2 =.99; Rules-Ignorant: t(8)=10.82, p<.001, 
ηp2=.94. 
 
The effect of the factor Trial Type was consistently present in both human 
groups (errors in task-repeat vs. task-switch trials: Rules-Aware: 8.4% vs. 
17.2%; Rules-Ignorant: 26.4% vs. 39.4%). Stimulus Congruency strongly 
influenced performance of humans, as both groups showed increased error 
rates when responding to an incongruent stimulus compared to responding to a 
congruent stimulus (Rules-Aware participants: 17.6% vs. 8.0%; Rules-Ignorant 
participants: 51.5% vs. 14.2%). Numerically, the stimulus-congruency effect on 
error rates was equally large as the effect of a task switch for Rules-Aware 
participants (both were around 9%), and about three times larger than switch 
costs for Rules-Ignorant participants; previous literature found that the 
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congruency effect on error rates could be two to three times larger numerically 
than switch costs if participants employed task rules (Forrest, 2012; Schneider, 
2015) and around three to eight times the size of switch costs if humans based 
their response on stimulus-response contingencies (Forrest, 2012). The two 
factors interacted significantly in Rules-Ignorant and Rules-Aware participants; 
as seen in Figure 3.1.2, switch costs were mainly present when responding to 
an incongruent stimulus rather than to a congruent stimulus. Most notably, 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons show that, for Rules-Ignorant participants 
(much like Forrest's, 2012, participants learning cue-stimulus-response 
contingencies), the difference in errors between task-repeat and task-switch 
trials was only significantly different from zero when responding to an 
incongruent stimulus (switch costs on incongruent trials: 26.8%, p=.002; on 
congruent trials: -0.8%, p=.771); for Rules-Aware participants, performing a task 
switch produced higher error rates both on trials with an incongruent stimulus 
and a congruent stimulus (switch costs on incongruent trials: 12.7%, p=.006; on 
congruent trials: 4.8%, p=.022).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2. Switch costs (difference in error rates of switch trials and task-repeat 
trials) for those trials in which a congruent stimulus or an incongruent stimulus was 
presented, for pigeons, humans who were unaware of any underlying rules (Rules-
Ignorant) and humans who inferred the rules (Rules-Aware). Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
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Figure 3.1.3. Error rates across the 20 test sessions for pigeons and the 24 test blocks 
that human participants (both Rules-Ignorant and Rules-Aware) completed. Rep: 
Repeat trials; the task in these trials was the same as in the previous trials. Sw: Switch 
trials; the task changed from the previous trial. C: Congruent stimulus; the stimulus 
required the same response in both tasks. IC: Incongruent stimulus; the correct 
response to the stimulus varied between tasks. 
 
 
The sequence of Test Blocks had a reliable effect on error rates for the Rules-
Aware group, as they learned to make fewer mistakes over the course of the 
experiment. This improvement led to a significant reduction over blocks in both 
switch costs and congruency effects. Participants in the Rules-Ignorant group 
did not show any significant changes in their error rates across test blocks, nor 
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did the progression in the experiment affect the magnitude of switch costs or 
congruency effects. This result also supports the idea that Rules-Aware and 
Rules-Ignorant participants approached the paradigm differently. The 
differences across test blocks (and sessions for pigeons) between the three 
groups of subjects are illustrated in Figure 3.1.3. 
 
To verify the external validity of the paradigm, I also examined participants' 
latency to click on a response key. Following convention, only trials that 
followed a correct response and were also answered correctly were considered 
in this analysis. The effects reported above for error rates were replicated in the 
participants' response times: Rules-Aware participants were slower to respond 
in task-switch trials versus task-repeat trials (986ms vs. 840ms; F(1,7)=12.08, 
p=.010, ηp2 =.633) and to incongruent stimuli versus congruent stimuli (956ms 
vs. 869ms; F(1,7)=15.82, p=.005, ηp2 =.693). Unlike for error rates, switch costs 
in response times did not differ when responding to incongruent stimuli versus 
congruent stimuli (switch costs: 138 vs. 155ms; F(1,7)=0.30, p=.60). Rules-
Ignorant participants also showed impairments due to a task switch compared 
to a task repeat in response times (820ms vs. 772ms; F(1,8)=12.69, p=.007, ηp2 
=.613). Surprisingly, the effect of stimulus congruency was not sufficiently 
reliable in their reaction times (848ms for incongruent stimuli vs. 744ms for 
congruent stimuli; F(1,8)=5.08, p=.054); however, responding to incongruent 
stimuli significantly enhanced switch costs compared to responding to 
congruent stimuli (switch costs: 81ms vs. 16ms; F(1,8)=6.86, p=.031, ηp2 =.462). 
The human task-switching literature reports that the effect of stimulus 
congruency on response times can be between 0.5 to three times the numerical 
value of task-switch costs if the participants are employing task rules (e.g., 
Forrest, 2012; Schneider, 2015), and were found to be about six to ten times 
the magnitude of switch costs in reaction times if the participants based their 
responses on stimulus-response contingencies (Forrest, 2012). In the two 
groups of participants in this experiment, the numerical difference in response 
times due to the congruency effect was around 1.5 times the difference in 
response times between task-repeat and task-switch trials. Although the main 
focus of my experiments were error rates, and not response times as in 
conventional task-switching studies on humans, these results confirm that the 
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paradigm used in this experiment can reliably detect task-switching effects in 
humans across several measures of performance.  
 
To confirm that there were reliably different patterns in error rates between the 
three groups of subjects, a Kruskal-Wallis Test estimating the influence of the 
Group (Rules-Aware participants, Rules-Ignorant participants, pigeons) on the 
dependent variables Switch Costs and Congruency Effect was carried out. It 
revealed a significant difference between groups regarding Switch Costs, 
χ2(2)=8.51, p=.014. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons confirmed that switch 
costs were similar in size in Rules-Aware and Rules-Ignorant participants, 
p=.236, and differed between Rules-Aware participants and pigeons, p=.003. 
However, this difference was not statistically reliable when comparing pigeons 
and Rules-Ignorant participants, p=.059. The Congruency Effect also differed 
across groups, χ2(2)=18.05, p<.001, in that Rules-Ignorant humans were 
affected to a greater extend by stimulus congruency than the other two groups 
(both p≤.003 compared to either group; pigeons compared to Rules-Aware 
participants: p=.083). 
 
Discussion 
 
A major concern in developing a comparative task-switching paradigm was 
ensuring that the paradigm could successfully be acquired by pigeons whilst 
preserving validity when tested with human participants. The human 
participants in this study demonstrated persistent switch costs, and they did so 
regardless of whether or not they had been aware of the underlying task rules. 
The confirmation of switch costs in humans supported the validity of this 
paradigm to accurately assess task-switching performance even when subjects 
were not verbally instructed and were not restricted in the time they had to 
respond. It provides some confidence that there is value in the observation that 
pigeons, on the other hand, did not suffer from switch costs in the task-
switching paradigm despite being able to perform at a high level of accuracy. 
The fact that the congruency of a stimulus persistently affected performance in 
both humans and pigeons further confirmed that the paradigm was able to 
capture task-switching effects in both species. Thus, the task-switching 
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paradigm developed in Section 2.3 appears to be a useful tool for comparing 
task-switching performance across species. 
 
Humans who were able to report the rules underlying the two tasks experienced 
substantial switch costs. This result is in line with the conventional assumptions 
(Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al., 2010) about task-switching performance 
in humans: these Rules-Aware participants relied on identifying and shifting 
between the competing task rules in order to make a response, and the switch 
costs observed in their performance likely resulted from their reliance on 
executive control. Although both Rules-Aware and Rules-Ignorant participants 
showed similar levels of performance in the first task-switching block, the 
performance of Rules-Aware participants improved drastically and had reached 
a high level of accuracy by the final block; this process probably resulted from 
the discovery of the two task rules.  
Pigeons performed at a very high level of accuracy without incurring any costs 
to performance on switch trials. This observation supports Dreisbach et al.'s 
(2006, 2007) claim that an associative acquisition of task-switching paradigms 
leads to a lack of switch costs. By acquiring information about the correct 
behavioural response to each experienced combination of cue and stimulus via 
associative learning, pigeons succeeded in this paradigm despite their assumed 
inability to organise stimuli in task sets. 
 
Although it is appealing to claim that the observed switch costs in humans 
indicate the application of task sets while a lack of switch costs in pigeons 
implies a reliance on associative processes, matters may not be this simple. In 
assuming that rule-based and contingency-governed learning are clearly 
dissociable processes and that humans are able to apply either one flexibly 
depending on current cognitive demands, one would expect to find persistent 
switch costs in the data of some humans - those who could verbalise task rules 
- and a lack of switch costs in other humans - those who were unaware of rules 
-, in the same way as switch costs were sometimes present or absent in rhesus 
macaques (Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b; Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011; Avdagic et 
al., 2014), who are believed to possess a comparable dissociation of an explicit 
and an implicit learning mechanism (Smith et al., 2012). This is indeed the case 
in the human participants - but only when considering switch costs in response 
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to congruent stimuli, which are only present in Rules-Aware participants but not 
in Rules-Ignorant participants. Similar to the univalent stimuli used by Dreisbach 
et al. (2006, 2007), the congruent stimuli in the paradigm always signalled the 
same unambiguous correct response, regardless of the task that was currently 
cued. 
However, both Rules-Aware and Rules-Ignorant participants showed reliable 
switch costs when responding to incongruent stimuli, to which the correct 
response depended on the currently relevant task - so these costs occurred not 
only in participants who knew of the existence of the two different task rules, but 
also in those who stated they had been unaware of any tasks and had 
presumably relied on implicit, contingency-driven learning to solve the 
paradigm. This is an extraordinary observation - and it combines the seemingly 
contradictory findings of Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) and Forrest (2012) in an 
impressive way. Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) explained a lack of switch costs 
in response to univalent stimuli (that require only one response) as being the 
result of contingency learning: Rules-Ignorant participants were sensitive to the 
consistent stimulus-response contingencies of the congruent stimuli, which 
enabled them to perform accurately without having to incorporate the presented 
task cue, or having to "switch tasks". Complementary to this idea, Forrest 
(2012) argued that switch costs could appear in response to incongruent stimuli, 
and express the closer associative connection between cues that indicate the 
same task: if the same stimulus-response links in an associative network are 
repeatedly activated in the presence of certain cues, this activation can 
strengthen the link between these cues themselves, resulting in an associative 
cue equivalence. This equivalence in turn selectively facilitates the retrieval of a 
stimulus-response link on trials with equivalent cues, i.e., task-repeat trials. It 
might be puzzling that an associative cue equivalence would only affect 
performance in trials with incongruent stimuli but not extend to congruent 
stimuli, but this issue could be addressed by arguing that the associative 
strength between a congruent stimulus and the correct response sufficed to 
elicit a fast, correct response, so that the presentation of the task cue did not 
hold any additional information in these trials (i.e., there was a ceiling effect), 
whereas the task cue was crucial to learning the correct response to an 
incongruent stimulus.  
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In summary, the lack of any switch costs in response to congruent stimuli 
(shown by both Rules-Ignorant humans and pigeons) supports Dreisbach et 
al.'s (2006, 2007) claim that an associative acquisition of task-switching 
paradigms can eliminate switch costs for univalent stimuli. However, Forrest's 
(2012; Forrest et al., 2014) claim that switch costs could appear in response to 
incongruent stimuli when associative learning was in play seems to apply only 
to associatively learning humans - pigeons showed no switch costs in response 
to incongruent stimuli. This inconsistency is even more puzzling considering 
that Forrest provided simulations to back up her claim. Does it have to be 
assumed that the associative processes determining human behaviour differed 
from those in pigeons, since they evoked switch costs in humans but not in 
pigeons? This seem irrational; there are other explanations for this discrepancy 
that seem more plausible. 
One possibility is that pigeons do in fact suffer switch costs, but that some 
aspect of the design of the paradigm is masking it. Perhaps the differences in 
switch and repeat trials were counteracted by a preference for novelty that is 
often observed in pigeons (e.g., in matching to sample, see Wright & Delius, 
2005). Pigeons might have preferentially responded to trials in which there is 
some change in stimulation (either in the form of a different stimulus or a 
different response) compared to the previous trial, and avoided those in which 
both the stimulus and the response location were the same as in the preceding 
trial. The latter, for incongruent stimuli, is only possible on repeat trials, so, other 
things being equal, performance on those trials should then on average be 
worse than on switch trials. A disadvantage for repeat trials over switch trials for 
incongruent stimuli could cancel out any switch costs in those trials, which by 
definition comprise a disadvantage for switch trials over repeat trials. This 
possible explanation for the lack of switch costs in the pigeons' data is 
addressed in Section 3.2, by examining a range of sequential effects, such as 
cue-repetition, stimulus-repetition and response-repetition effects that occur 
with the given task-switching paradigm. 
However, a much more interesting possible cause for the pigeons' lack of switch 
costs is that pigeons simply do not suffer any such costs. That is, they do not 
exhibit any difficulty in switching from one hypothetical task to another, even 
when the discrimination involves incongruent stimuli. This possibility would in 
turn have other implications: for example, pigeons might lack switch costs 
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because they do not develop the associative cue equivalence that Forrest 
(2012) and Forrest et al. (2014) held responsible for causing switch costs in the 
associatively mediated performance of humans. This possible explanation is 
investigated in more detail in Section 3.2. Alternatively, one might have to 
assume that there are genuinely no switch costs in associatively-mediated task 
switching, and that the switch costs in both human groups were due to rule use 
in some sense, perhaps if humans form rules that they cannot verbalise but 
which still control behaviour. This would fit rather well with theories that explain 
switch costs in terms of task-set reconfiguration (Monsell & Mizon, 2006) but 
would go against any theories that attempt to explain switch costs in associative 
terms (e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003, Forrest et al., 2014). This explanation is 
considered in Section 3.3.  
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3.2  Why do Pigeons Show an Absence of Switch Costs? 
In Section 3.1, pigeons performed at a high level of accuracy without suffering 
any switch costs. In contrast to this, humans were persistently impaired by 
switch costs when information from task cues was needed to make a correct 
response, even when they reported not to have "switched" between different 
tasks. This obvious difference in the magnitude of switch costs in response to 
incongruent stimuli expressed by Rules-Ignorant participants and pigeons 
required further investigation. If Rules-Ignorant participants and pigeons both 
acquired the task-switching paradigm based on the same associative 
mechanisms, both groups would be expected to show similar task-switching 
effects in their performance, plausibly in the way hypothesised by Forrest 
(2012) and Forrest et al. (2014).  
 
There are a number of potential causes for the discrepancy observed in Section 
3.1. It might be the case that participants in the Rules-Ignorant group did not 
rely on associative learning to acquire the contingencies of each cue-stimulus-
response pairing. Even though Rules-Ignorant participants did not describe the 
correct classification rules during the post-experiment interview, they might 
have relied on other rule-based solving strategies to make a response (and 
perhaps the way in which the questionnaire was structured discouraged them 
from mentioning those strategies). Alternatively, if Rules-Ignorant participants 
did solve the paradigm via associative learning, it is possible that the apparent 
lack of switch costs in the pigeons' performance was in fact due to the specifics 
of the paradigm. Although the current paradigm might have reliably detected 
switch costs that occur as a consequence of associative processes in humans, 
it might have led to an absence of the same in the performance of pigeons. In 
this section, I investigate the lack of associatively mediated switch costs in 
pigeons despite their apparent presence in humans. Complementary to this, in 
Section 3.3 I address the potential causes of switch costs in humans despite a 
lack of them in pigeons.  
 
The study design in Section 3.1 was carefully controlled to adhere to what is 
thought to be best practice in the task-switching literature. For example, a 
common issue is that of separating the costs of switching a task from the costs 
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of switching a cue. If a given task is indicated by the same cue on each trial, 
every task-repeat trial coincides with a repetition of the relevant task cue, while 
every task-switch trial also implies a change of the task cue. This is a major 
contributor to the magnitude of switch costs (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 2004; Schneider & Logan, 2005; Altmann, 
2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006) and as a result every effort is made nowadays to 
avoid presenting the same cue on consecutive trials. However, Forrest (2012) 
demonstrated that, even when cue repetitions are avoided, humans might still 
learn to equate the different cues that signal the same task, which in turn 
facilitates the associative retrieval of a stimulus-response link on trials with 
equivalent cues. The establishment of cue equivalence might be paralleled by a 
kind of within-category association referred to as "clumping" in the concept-
learning literature (cf. Bateson & Chantrey, 1972; Delius, Ameling, Lea, & 
Staddon, 1995); pigeons acquire it, if at all, with great difficulty (cf. Fersen & 
Lea, 1990). 
Consequently, if an associative equivalence of the two task cues is the effective 
cause of switch costs, pigeons might not express any costs because, to them, 
the two cues remain distinct features with separable informational value. If this 
is the case, then it might be possible to facilitate the retrieval of a stimulus-
response association by increasing the perceptual similarity of the current trial 
to the previous trial; allowing the cue to repeat on subsequent trials might lead 
to better performance on task-repeat over task-switch trials and the emergence 
of switch costs in the performance of pigeons. If so, there should also be a 
notable difference in performance between task-repeat trials in which the cue 
repeats, and task-repeat trials in which the cue changes. Accordingly, this 
chapter examines the pigeons' task-switching performance when the task-
switching paradigm is extended to include task-repeat trials involving cue 
repetitions. 
 
Any benefit of immediate repetition might also extend to other features of the 
cue-stimulus compound – for example, trials in which not only the same cue but 
also the same stimulus as in the previous trial are presented. Similarly, 
performance might peak in trials in which the stimulus and the correct response 
location are the same as in the immediately preceding trial, especially 
compared to performance in task-switch trials in which the stimulus is the same 
89 
 
as in the previous trial but the required response changes - which is only 
possible for incongruent stimuli.  
It has to be noted that, although in associative terms it is more plausible to 
assume that a repetition of the features of a cue-stimulus compound would lead 
to a benefit for performance, the opposite effect might occur, as well, and might 
in fact contribute to the lack of switch costs for pigeons. As noted in Section 3.1, 
pigeons might show an absence of switch costs in this paradigm due to a 
preference for novel cue-stimulus-location combinations. For example, after 
pecking the correct location of a stimulus and receiving a reward, pigeons might 
show a tendency to avoid responding to that location in the following trial, which 
would induce errors if the same task and stimulus are repeated. The resulting 
performance benefit of task-switch trials over task-repeat trials might cancel out 
any otherwise observable benefits of repeat trials over switch trials. 
These two contrasting hypotheses about the influence of repetitions during 
associatively mediated task-switching are also addressed in this section: I 
investigate the effect (if any) that repeating the same incongruent stimulus (and 
repeating or changing the correct response location) on two consecutive trials 
has on the performance of pigeons and Rules-Ignorant participants. 
 
 Methods 
 
Subjects 
Thirty-seven Psychology undergraduate students and fourteen pigeons took 
part in the experiment. Eight of the pigeons were those that had previously 
taken part in the experiment reported in Section 3.1. They had proceeded to a 
similar experiment (reported in Appendix A5.A) before entering this experiment. 
The other six pigeons had also experienced both of these experiments, but in 
reversed order (which excluded them from being part of the sample of Section 
3.1), before entering this experiment.  
 
Paradigm 
The apparatus and stimulus material is described in Chapter 2. The procedure 
for this experiment was almost identical to that reported in Section 3.1, with the 
difference that, for the 2/3 of trials that were repeat trials, the relevant task cue 
was picked randomly so that in half of the repeat trials the cue changed from 
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the previous trial (task-repeat trials) and in the other half the cue repeated (cue-
repeat trials). Pigeons received 10 sessions of 72 trials each. Humans 
completed 20 blocks of 24 trials. 
 
After completion of the task-switching procedure, human participants completed 
an on-screen questionnaire (Appendix A2) that assessed their ability to describe 
the rules that defined a correct response. The questions were open, asking 
participants to explain whether they had used a particular stimulus dimension 
when choosing a response and how this dimension (or the combination of 
several, if participants indicated that they had paid attention to more than one 
stimulus dimension) helped to determine the required response. Participants 
who responded that they had not attended to any of the suggested stimulus 
dimensions were asked to describe any solution strategy they might have used. 
Participants who were able to correctly identify the contingencies between the 
task cues and stimulus dimensions were considered to have inferred the 
underlying rules. If a participant could not explain a correct relationship between 
stimuli, cues and the correct response, this was taken as an indication that he 
or she had not relied on task rules to solve the paradigm. Participants who 
reported that they had always applied the same one of the two rules (for 
example, they said that they made a response based on the spatial orientation 
of the stimulus in all trials) or that they had made up their own solving strategies 
were excluded from further analyses. 
 
Results 
 
The subject species and the human participants' rule use had a main effect on 
performance, F(2,34)=41.51, p<.001, ηp2 =.71, and influenced the expression of 
the two task-switching effects of interest and their interaction significantly, all 
p<.001. Therefore, as in Section 3.1, all analyses were carried out separately 
for Rules-Ignorant participants, Rules-Aware participants and pigeons. The 
same trial-exclusion criteria as reported in Section 3.1 applied to this 
experiment. The data were analysed by means of repeated-measures ANOVAs 
using Trial Type (Cue-Repeat, Task-Repeat or Task-Switch trial), Stimulus 
Congruency and Test Blocks/Sessions as within-subjects factors. Where 
applicable, significance levels were subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. The 
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results of these analyses are summarised in Table 3.2.1 and illustrated in 
Figure 3.2.1. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2.1. Results of repeated-measure ANOVAs on error rates of Rules-Aware 
and Rules-Ignorant participants and pigeons, using Trial Type (Cue Repeat, Task 
Repeat or Task Switch), Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) and Test 
Blocks/Sessions as within-subjects factors. Significant p values are highlighted in 
bold. 
  Error Rates 
  F df p ηp2 
Rules-Aware Participants (n=12)     
 Trial Type 14.31 2, 22 <.001 .565 
 Stimulus Congruency 45.28 1, 11 <.001 .805 
 Trial Type * Stimulus Congruency 9.64 2, 22 .002 .467 
 Test Blocks 7.32 19, 209 <.001 .400 
 Blocks * Trial Type 1.06 38, 418 .398 .088 
 Blocks * Stimulus Congruency 2.32 19, 209   .014 .174 
 Blocks * Trial Type * Stimulus 
Congruency 
1.45 38, 418 .140 .117 
Rules-Ignorant Participants (n=11)     
 Trial Type 7.55 2, 20 .005 .430 
 Stimulus Congruency 62.45 1, 10 <.001 .862 
 Trial Type * Stimulus Congruency 21.96 2, 20 <.001 .687 
 Test Blocks 1.21 19, 190 .252 .108 
 Blocks * Trial Type 1.01 38, 380 .466 .091 
 Blocks * Stimulus Congruency 0.76 19, 190 .756 .070 
 Blocks * Trial Type * Stimulus 
Congruency 
0.60 38, 380 .968 .057 
Pigeons (n=14)     
 Trial Type 0.62 2, 26 .525 .046 
 Stimulus Congruency 42.20 1, 13 <.001 .764 
 Trial Type * Stimulus Congruency 0.75 2, 26 .480 .055 
 Test Sessions 1.44 9, 117 .177 .100 
 Sessions * Trial Type 1.05 18, 234 .410 .074 
 Sessions * Stimulus Congruency 1.07 9, 117 .388 .076 
 Sessions * Trial Type * Stimulus 
Congruency 
1.14 18, 234 .321 .081 
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Stimulus-repetition effects were analysed via a repeated-measures ANOVA 
including only incongruent stimuli, using Stimulus Repeat (repeating the same 
incongruent stimulus or switching from one incongruent stimulus to the other 
incongruent stimulus) and Trial Type (Cue-Repeat, Task-Repeat or Task-Switch 
trial) as within-subjects factors. Where applicable, significance levels were 
subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1. Error rates on cue-repeat, task-repeat and task-switch trials, for pigeons, 
humans who were unaware of any underlying rules (Rules-Ignorant) and humans who 
inferred the rules (Rules-Aware). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
Pigeons 
Pigeons' error rates were low (11.8%, SD=5.8), and this overall performance 
was significantly better than expected by chance, t(13)=24.74, p<.001, ηp2 =.98. 
 
Figure 3.2.1 shows that, once again, pigeons did not suffer switch costs. As in 
Section 3.1, pigeons demonstrated no decrease in performance on task-switch 
trials (cue-repeat: 11.1%, task-repeat: 11.9%, task-switch: 11.9%). However, 
Stimulus Congruency strongly influenced performance, with increased error 
rates when an incongruent stimulus was presented compared to when a 
congruent stimulus was shown (16.4% vs. 6.8%); this effect was entirely 
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unaffected by a change in tasks or cues, difference between task-switch and 
task-repeat (cue-repeat) trials in response to incongruent vs. congruent stimuli: 
0.9% vs. -0.8% (0.7% vs. 1.0%). Pigeons also did not experience any significant 
changes in their error rates, congruency effects or switch costs across sessions. 
 
As in Section 3.1, the accuracy data were examined using the Bayesian 
repeated-measures ANOVA function in JASP (Love et al., 2015). The estimated 
Bayes factor (Congruency / (Trial Type + Congruency)) suggested that the data 
are 0.024:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 41.78 times 
more likely to occur under a model assuming only an effect of Stimulus 
Congruency than under a model including Trial Type as a second factor. 
 
Stimulus-repetition effects are illustrated in Figure 3.2.2. There was a highly 
significant interaction between the two factors Stimulus Repetition and Trial 
Type, F(2,26)=13.6, p<.001, ηp2 =.51, but no significant main effect of either 
factor, both p>.26. Pigeons showed very low error rates in cue-repeat trials in 
which the incongruent stimulus repeated (and the required response was also 
the same as in the previous trial), and elevated error rates in task-switch trials in 
which the incongruent stimulus repeated (and the required response changed 
from the previous trial). Conversely, when the stimulus on the previous trial 
shared no elements with the current stimulus (i.e., when the two different 
incongruent stimuli were shown on subsequent trials), error rates were very low 
when the task switched (and thus the required response was the same as in the 
previous trial), and increased when the task repeated (and thus the required 
response changed) in cue-repeat and task-repeat trials. This pattern of 
responding indicates that the pigeons had a bias to repeat the response that 
was correct in the previous trial. 
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Figure 3.2.2. Pigeons' error rates in trials in which an incongruent stimulus is 
presented and is the same as in the immediately preceding trial (Stimulus Repeat) or 
follows a trial in which the other incongruent stimulus appeared (Stimulus Change), 
depending on Trial Type. 
This figure appeared in Meier et al. (2016b). 
 
 
 
Humans 
Twenty-five of the 37 human participants completed the training phase outlined 
in Section 2.3 and proceeded to the task-switching test phase after a mean of 
196 training trials (the other 12 participants did not reach the pass criterion 
during 600 trials of training and aborted the experiment). Twelve participants 
were able to verbalise the rules for both tasks (orientation and spatial 
frequency) at the end of the experiment and it was assumed that they had relied 
on the rules to solve the paradigm (the Rules-Aware group). Eleven participants 
claimed that their responses had not been governed by the application of any 
specific rules (the Rules-Ignorant group). The remaining two participants 
reported having discovered one of the two rules or having made up their own 
solution strategies. Their data were not included in any further analyses. 
 
Overall error rates were significantly lower for the Rules-Aware group (14.5%, 
SD=8.0) than the Rules-Ignorant group (34.3%, SD=5.7), t(21)=6.80, p<.001, 
ηp2=.69. These error rates were significantly lower than expected by chance for 
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both groups, Rules-Ignorant: t(10)=9.13, p<.001, ηp2=.89; Rules-Aware: 
t(11)=15.47, p<.001, ηp2=.96. 
 
The effect of the factor Trial Type was clearly present in both human groups. 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed a considerable increase in error 
rates in both human groups in response to task-switch trials compared to task-
repeat trials (Rules-Aware: 22.6% vs. 15.3%, p=.004; Rules-Ignorant: 44.1% vs. 
34.7%, p<.001), and for Rules-Aware participants also compared to cue-repeat 
trials (22.6% vs. 14.8%, p=.004; Rules-Ignorant: 44.1% vs. 35.8%, p=.086). 
Cue-repeat and task-repeat trials yielded comparable performance rates (p=1.0 
for both groups), which somewhat contradicts previous findings in the literature 
(e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 2004; 
Schneider & Logan, 2005; Altmann, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006), though 
admittedly the procedures used here were rather different to those of standard 
task-switching experiments. 
 
Stimulus Congruency strongly influenced performance, as both human groups 
showed increased error rates when an incongruent stimulus was presented 
compared to when a congruent stimulus was shown (Rules-Aware: 24.2% vs. 
10.9%; Rules-Ignorant: 50.9% vs. 25.4%). The factors Trial Type and Stimulus 
Congruency interacted significantly in both human groups; that is, switch costs 
were present almost exclusively when a response had to be made to an 
incongruent stimulus, difference between task-switch and task-repeat (cue-
repeat) trials: Rules-Aware: 14.1%, p<.001 (13.8%, p=.006); Rules-Ignorant: 
22.6%, p<.001 (21.7%, p=.006), but were absent when subjects responded to a 
congruent stimulus, difference between task-switch and task-repeat (cue-
repeat) trials: Rules-Aware: 0.5%, p=1.0 (1.8%, p=1.0); Rules-Ignorant: -3.7%, 
p=.691   (-5.1%, p=.070). 
 
The sequence of blocks had a reliable effect on error rates for the Rules-Aware 
group only. Those participants learned to make significantly fewer mistakes as 
the experiment progressed, while participants belonging to the Rules-Ignorant 
group did not show any significant changes in their error rates over time (Group-
by-Block interaction: F(19,399)=3.16, p<.001, ηp2=.13). In Rules-Aware 
participants, the congruency effect decreased significantly over the course of 
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the experiment, while it remained similar across time for Rules-Ignorant humans 
(Group-by-Block-by-Congruency interaction: F(19,399)=1.70, p=.034, ηp2=.08). 
The magnitude of switch costs remained unchanged over time in both groups. 
 
Stimulus-repetition effects are shown in Figure 3.2.3. Regardless of whether or 
not humans were aware of task rules, they consistently showed a main effect of 
Trial Type (Rules-Ignorant group: F(2,20)=41.6, p<.001, ηp2=.81; Rules-Aware: 
F(2,22)=25.8, p<.001, ηp2=.70). In both groups, this difference was due to 
increased error rates in response to task-switch trials (in the case of Rules-
Ignorant participants to above the 50% chance level) compared to cue-repeat 
and task-repeat trials (Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: all p≤.001). For Rules-
Aware participants, performance was similar in cue-repeat and task-repeat 
trials, p=.35, while Rules-Ignorant participants made significantly fewer errors in 
cue-repeat trials, p=.008. Although the main effect on performance of the factor 
Stimulus Repeat only reached significance for Rules-Ignorant participants, 
F(1,10)=5.35, p=.043, ηp2=.35 (Rules-Aware group: F(1,11)=0.03, p=.88; Group-
by-Stimulus-Repeat interaction: F(1,21)=1.55, p=.23), both groups were 
influenced by a significant Stimulus-Repeat-by-Trial-Type interaction, Rules-
Ignorant group: F(2,20)=14.81, p≤.001, ηp2=.60; Rules-Aware: F(2,22)=10.15, 
p=.001, ηp2=.48. This interaction was visible in higher error rates in task-switch 
trials in which an incongruent stimulus was repeated compared to task-switch 
trials in which a change in stimulus occurred, whereas stimulus repeats yielded 
lower error rates than stimulus changes in both cue-repeat and task-repeat 
trials. 
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Figure 3.2.3. Rules-Ignorant and Rules-Aware participants' error rates in trials in which 
an incongruent stimulus was presented and was the same as in the immediately 
preceding trial (Stimulus Repeat) or follows a trial in which the other incongruent 
stimulus appeared (Stimulus Change), depending on Trial Type. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this chapter, the paradigm of Section 3.1 was extended to include cue-repeat 
trials. Even though cue repetitions on task-repeat trials normally contribute 
considerably to switch costs in both response times and error rates (e.g., 
Altmann, 2006; Forrest, 2012; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006), this 
was not the case in this experiment: overall switch costs in human participants 
did not differ in size when subtracting error rates in task-repeat trials or cue-
repeat trials from error rates in task-switch trials (and the difference was in fact 
numerically smaller for cue-repeat trials). This result was not entirely 
unforeseeable; for example, Altmann (2006) reported that, although cue-
repetitions largely increased switch costs in response times, such an increase 
was only observed in error rates if the cue-stimulus interval was rather long, but 
was absent when the cue-stimulus interval was short. Mayr (2006) even 
reported reduced switch costs in error rates due to cue-repetitions, whereas 
they increased switch costs in the participants' response times. 
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Just as in Section 3.1, pigeons did not show any switch costs, and Bayesian 
analyses confirmed that it is highly unlikely that switch costs were present but 
undetected. Instead, pigeons showed a reliable pattern of responding more 
accurately on Cue-Repeat/Stimulus-Repeat, Task-Repeat/Stimulus-Repeat and 
Task-Switch/Stimulus-Change trials, and of making more errors on Cue-
Repeat/Stimulus-Change, Task-Repeat/Stimulus-Change and Task-
Switch/Stimulus-Repeat trials. Taken together, pigeons primarily showed 
increased error rates on those trials in which the correct response was opposite 
to the one required in the previous trial; conversely, they benefitted when a 
repetition of the previously emitted response was required. Such an outcome 
would be expected if there was a tendency to return to the same response 
location that produced reinforcement in the previous trial rather than change to 
a different response alternative. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that 
pigeons might avoid approaching the same stimulus-location combination in 
subsequent trials, and instead leads to suggest that pigeons might in fact have 
a tendency to repeat a rewarded response (cf. Stubbs, Fetterman, & Dreyfus, 
1987; Schneider & Davison, 2005; Schneider, 2008; Morgan, 1974, had earlier 
shown a similar result with rats).  
In the light of such a strong response-repetition effect, it is plausible that the 
response location in itself became integrated into the cue-stimulus compound 
that pigeons associated with a reward; instead of instrumentally learning the 
correct behaviour (go left or right) afforded by a stimulus, pigeons might have 
associated the perceived combination of cue, stimulus and location as a whole 
with reinforcement (Lea, 2016), an idea that is consistent with instance-theory 
explanations of task switching (Logan, 1988) and the idea of event files 
(Hommel, 1998). As a consequence, the two response locations in which the 
stimulus was simultaneously presented in the choice display became aversive 
or appetitive depending on the opportunity to receive a reward by avoiding or 
approaching them. Indeed, the spatial location of the reinforced stimulus in the 
previous trial might become as strong a determinant of behaviour as other 
elements like the cue colour, or the spatial frequency or orientation of the 
stimulus (Iversen, Sidman, & Carrigan, 1986; Lipkens, Kop, & Matthijs, 1988; 
Lionello & Urcuioli, 1998; Sidman, 2009; Campos, Debert, da Silva Barros, & 
McIlvane, 2011). This is especially likely considering that, while spatial 
frequency or orientation can change depending on the visual angle from which 
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they are perceived (for example, spatial frequencies decrease as one 
approaches them), the spatial position in which a pigeon held its head 
immediately before it received a reward is not so susceptible to variation.  
Moreover, this explanation gives insight into whether the pigeons could develop 
the level of cue equivalence that Forrest (2012) hypothesised and modelled for 
her associatively learning participants. Forrest's explanation relies on the 
assumption that task cues are encoded as one of several separable 
components of a trial - as are the stimuli, or even the separate stimulus 
dimensions. But if, to pigeons, even the precise location in which a stimulus is 
presented is a discriminative part of that stimulus, then pigeons may also 
perceive every combination of a cue and stimulus as a single cue-stimulus 
compound. To the eye of a pigeon, a horizontal, low-spatial-frequency stimulus 
presented on a green task cue may be very different from a horizontal, low-
spatial-frequency stimulus presented on a red cue, even though both 
combinations require the same response. Thus, in a way, even Forrest's 
associative algorithms obey a task structure in that the cues are regarded as 
providing separable information from the stimuli - to the pigeon, cues and stimuli 
may be indivisible elements of the same image.  
 
Although switch costs had the greatest impact on the performance of humans, 
both Rules-Ignorant and Rules-Aware participants on average made fewer 
errors on trials that required that the previously correct response was repeated 
compared to the same trial type but with a change in the correct response (i.e., 
Cue-Repeat/Stimulus-Repeat trials led to better performance than Cue-
Repeat/Stimulus-Change trials, Task-Repeat/Stimulus-Repeat trials led to 
better performance than Task-Repeat/Stimulus-Change trials and Task-
Switch/Stimulus-Change trials led to better performance than Task-
Switch/Stimulus-Repeat trials); that is, they benefitted from a response 
repetition on both task-repeat and task-switch trials. While a response-repetition 
benefit on task-repeat trials is reliably observed in human task-switching, 
repeating the same response as before on a task-switch trial usually imposes a 
cost to accuracy or speed (i.e., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Kleinsorge, 1999; 
Schuch & Koch, 2004; Hübner & Druey, 2006). One might wonder as to why 
this established effect was not replicated in this experiment, at least by the 
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Rules-Aware participants, but this issue will be returned to later - for the 
moment, the results of the Rules-Ignorant participants are of greater interest. 
 
On the one hand, like Rules-Aware humans, the Rules-Ignorant participants 
exhibited pronounced switch costs in response to incongruent stimuli - but, 
unlike Rules-Aware participants, their error rates on task-switch trials were 
much higher than expected by chance, implying that Rules-Ignorant participants 
systematically chose the wrong response in these trials. On the other hand, 
Rules-Ignorant participants showed a huge performance benefit when both the 
task cue and the stimulus were repeated in two consecutive trials compared to 
repeat trials in which either the cue or the stimulus (or both) changed, which 
makes it possible that their behaviour may have been partly guided by 
associative processes. These findings confirm that, although they had not 
learned the cue-stimulus-response contingencies as well as the pigeons had, it 
is unlikely that Rules-Ignorant participants based their responses on the same 
task rules (albeit without being able to verbalise them) as those used by Rules-
Aware subjects, to whom it was irrelevant for performance whether the same or 
the other task cue was shown on a task-repeat trial.  
A likely explanation for the observed behaviour of Rules-Ignorant participants is 
that responses were based on the perceived changes in the visual aspects of 
the stimulus seen on the current trial compared to the stimulus seen on the 
previous trial. More precisely, if the present stimulus shared many visual 
features with the stimulus seen on the preceding trial, the response that was 
previously labelled as correct was repeated. The more the visual features of the 
stimulus changed from one trial to the next, the more likely the response 
opposite to the one that was correct on the previous trial was to be chosen. A 
strategy of responding that is based on tracing the similarity of stimuli from one 
trial to the next would lead to the wrong response in Task-Switch/Stimulus-
Repeat trials (which afforded a response change but would, according to the 
afore-mentioned heuristic, be answered with a response repeat) and Task-
Switch/Stimulus-Change trials (which afforded a response repeat but would, if 
following this heuristic, be answered with a response change), whilst producing 
the correct response in all other trials (cf. Kleinsorge, 1999; Ruthruff, Remington 
& Johnston, 2001). As a consequence, Rules-Ignorant humans would express 
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persistent switch costs, even if participants were unaware of the existence of 
different tasks. 
 
Apart from the possibility that Rules-Ignorant participants were guided by a 
heuristic sensitive to the particular sequence of trials, there are other 
explanations for the observed results, and it is very well plausible that the 
pattern found at the group level is the result of a multitude of strategies. For 
example, many participants reported that they suspected that either the 
orientation of the pattern or its spatial frequency determined the correct 
response at times, but that it was impossible to predict when a certain 
dimension was relevant, leading these participants to, as they claimed, respond 
"randomly" or change their strategy frequently throughout the experiment (which 
ultimately led to their classification as "Rules-Ignorant"). Almost all Rules-
Ignorant participants reported that the colour of the stimulus seemed irrelevant 
to them - a good indication that, even though they might have noticed that 
orientation and spatial frequency determined which response was required, 
Rules-Ignorant participants were unable to infer when a switch in the 
determining dimension would occur. A clue as to why participants might have 
considered the relevance of the stimulus dimensions but not the cues might lie 
in the training that was administered prior to the task-switching phase: during 
training, participants had a more direct exposure to the two task sets, but the 
cues were irrelevant at that stage. As long as the participants focussed on the 
relevant stimulus dimension, performance during training would be adequate 
and possibly discourage any analysis of the task cues. It could even be argued 
that the subjects would not need to be aware of the precise response 
requirements for each dimensional value (e.g., horizontal patterns require a left 
response and vertical ones a right response): as long as they are focussing on 
the correct stimulus dimensions, participants would be able to correctly adjust 
their responses according to the experienced stimulus-response combination of 
the previous trial.  
 
Regardless of what precisely caused Rules-Ignorant participants to 
systematically choose the wrong response on task-switch trials, it is apparent 
that the presence of switch costs in their performance was not the result of a 
mental task-set reconfiguration on task-switch trials. Nonetheless, the sensitivity 
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to a switch in "tasks" could imply that the behaviour of these participants was 
guided by a rule rather than by the experienced cue-stimulus-response 
contingencies. Rules-Ignorant participants might have based their responses on 
a self-generated heuristic, even when this strategy led to suboptimal 
performance. This possibility is explored in the experiment reported in Section 
3.3, in which I investigated the precise nature of the solving strategy that Rules-
Ignorant participants developed to solve the task-switching paradigm. 
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3.3  Why do Humans Show Switch Costs? 
In Section 3.2, I investigated the lack of switch costs in pigeons despite their 
presence in humans and concluded that Rules-Ignorant participants likely did 
not depend on the same associative strategies to solve the task-switching 
paradigm as pigeons. This section addresses potential causes for the 
expression of switch costs by Rules-Ignorant humans. 
 
As stated in Section 3.2, it is possible that the performance of Rules-Ignorant 
participants was not determined by the experienced contingencies of the 
paradigm: it might be that, due to a failure to infer a rule that would predict the 
correct responses sufficiently well, the Rules-Ignorant participants continued to 
test different hypotheses as to what the underlying task rule might be, instead of 
responding to the experienced stimulus-response contingencies. The rule-
based learning system of humans might generally be so pre-potent that 
participants find it difficult to overcome it. Striking evidence for this has been 
reported by Levine (Levine, 1971; Fingerman & Levine, 1974), who observed 
that humans were unable to detect even a very simple classification rule after 
experiencing a number of more complex rules, a phenomenon Levine referred 
to as "non-learning". This trait might even be unique to humans compared to 
other primate species. Even the most optimistic view of the capabilities of 
rhesus macaques does not grant monkeys the full capacity of executive control 
available to humans (Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b; Smith et al., 2010; Caselli 
& Chelazzi, 2011; Smith et al., 2012). Thus, some of the task-switching 
paradigms used in primate studies could have been too complex to be solvable 
by means of their limited hypothesis-testing learning strategy, allowing the (in 
their case) more successful process of associative learning to dominate 
behaviour. The cognitive limitations of macaques’ rule-based approach might in 
fact enable macaques to utilise the two strategies very flexibly, whereas 
humans might have to overcome a predisposed tendency to rely on their highly 
optimised rule-based approach.  
 
The behaviour of Rules-Ignorant participants might be explained by a simple 
heuristic: "repeat the response that was correct on the previous trial if the 
current stimulus (possibly ignoring the cue) looks similar to the previous one, 
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and change the response if the current stimulus looks different from the 
previous one". As illustrated in Table 3.3.1, this heuristic would apply to all 
congruent-to-congruent-stimulus transitions (25% of all trials) and to 
incongruent-to-incongruent-stimulus transitions on cue- and task-repeat trials 
(16.7% of all trials), and it would lead to chance performance in congruent-to-
incongruent-stimulus and incongruent-to-congruent-stimulus transitions 
(resulting in a correct response on approximately 25% of all trials). Thus, even if 
participants memorised the correct response to congruent stimuli, when 
considering only incongruent stimuli, applying the heuristic to trials in which an 
ambiguous incongruent stimulus was presented would generate an average 
accuracy of approximately 67%.  More importantly, it would lead to large task-
switch costs despite an absence of separate task sets. 
 
Alternatively, Rules-Ignorant participants, though stating that they had not 
noticed any reliable connections between a stimulus dimension and the correct 
response, might nonetheless have been aware of the predictive nature of the 
two separate stimulus dimensions, but failed to use the information provided by 
the task cues to deduce when a certain dimension would be relevant for 
categorisation, so that a switch in tasks would always occur unexpectedly. 
Without this information, both of the stimulus dimensions are unreliable 
predictors. However, each one predicts the correct response in 75% of all trials 
(i.e., in all congruent trials, which make up 50% of all trials, and in half of the 
incongruent trials, which make up another 25% of all trials). Additionally, since a 
task switch occurred on only a third of trials, the task sequence was biased 
towards task repetitions, so that focussing on the same stimulus dimension 
would be more successful than frequently changing ones focus from one to the 
other dimension. Some participants only inferred one of the two task rules (the 
data of those participants were previously discarded), which indicates that this 
success rate might be sufficient for participants to abandon the search for a 
further, possibly more effective, response strategy. It is remarkable that 
participants might have nonetheless detected that each stimulus dimension was 
relevant at times (in such a way as that they suspected that sometimes the 
spatial frequency and sometimes the orientation of a stimulus determined which 
response was correct), but were unable to utilise them optimally.  
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 Table 3.3.1. Success of a sequential heuristic (see text for details) for each transition 
from a certain cue-stimulus combination in trial N-1 to a certain combination in trial N. 
Key: cues: a/A - cues indicating one task (red/green); b/B - cues indicating the 
competing task (blue/yellow); congruent stimuli (requiring the same response in the 
two tasks): H/L - Horizontal Orientation/Low Spatial Frequency; V/H - Vertical 
Orientation/High Spatial Frequency; incongruent stimuli (requiring a different 
response in the two tasks): V/L - Vertical Orientation/Low Spatial Frequency; H/H - 
Horizontal Orientation/High Spatial Frequency; R1/R2 - the two required responses 
(left/right);  - heuristic would result in correct responding; X - heuristic would result 
in wrong responding; O - heuristic would result in 50% accuracy. 
 
   Trial N-1 
Cue a A a A b B b B a A a A b B b B 
Stimulus 
H/
L 
H/
L 
V/
H 
V/
H 
H/
L 
H/
L 
V/
H 
V/
H 
V/
L 
V/
L 
H/
H 
H/
H 
V/
L 
V/
L 
H/
H 
H/
H 
Correct  
Response 
R1 R1 R2 R2 R1 R1 R2 R2 R1 R1 R2 R2 R2 R2 R1 R1 
Trial N                 
a H/L R1         O O O O O O O O 
A H/L R1         O O O O O O O O 
a V/H R2         O O O O O O O O 
A V/H R2         O O O O O O O O 
b H/L R1         O O O O O O O O 
B H/L R1         O O O O O O O O 
b V/H R2         O O O O O O O O 
B V/H R2         O O O O O O O O 
a V/L R2 O O O O O O O O     X X X X 
A V/L R2 O O O O O O O O     X X X X 
a H/H R1 O O O O O O O O     X X X X 
A H/H R1 O O O O O O O O     X X X X 
b V/L R1 O O O O O O O O X X X X     
B V/L R1 O O O O O O O O X X X X     
b H/H R2 O O O O O O O O X X X X     
B H/H R2 O O O O O O O O X X X X     
 
 
 
A clue as to how participants accomplished this might be found in the training 
administered ahead of the task-switching phase. Before participants engaged in 
the task-switching paradigm, they were exposed to both tasks separately for at 
least 48 trials on each. Although the training did not influence the magnitude of 
task-switching effects in the experiment reported in Section 2.1, it might have 
increased attention to both task dimensions prior to the test phase. But since 
the task cues that were simultaneously presented with each task during training 
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did not hold any information at that point, they might not have been processed, 
and might have been too ambiguous during test to be considered informative. 
Some evidence for this possibility might be found in the results of the 
experiment reported in Section 2.2, in which only one task had to be learned: 
only those participants who inferred the discrimination rule of the task 
performed at a good level of accuracy. This leads to the suggestion that the 
participants in the task-switching experiments in this chapter might also have 
inferred the relevant dimension of at least the first discrimination task they 
encountered (the training of each task was methodologically identical to the 
paradigm in Section 2.2), which enabled them to complete the training of that 
task at high accuracy. Given that none of the participants explicitly reported the 
contingencies of the first task, it is plausible that the introduction of the second 
task (requiring attention to the so far ignored stimulus dimension) in subsequent 
training blocks led participants to abandon the initially inferred task rule and 
searched for a more applicable rule. Perhaps, after realising that both 
dimensions determined the correct response at different times, the participants 
started applying the "choose the opposite response" heuristic to a single 
stimulus dimension at the time - and when the comparison failed, they changed 
the focal dimension in the subsequent trial. 
 
In an attempt to pinpoint the causes of switch costs in the performance of 
Rules-Ignorant humans, I considered the two potential causes for increased 
error rates in task-switch trials mentioned above in this section.  
Firstly, to investigate the influence of the initial training phase on rule deduction, 
I included a no-training group that did not receive any task-specific training 
before the task-switching phase. Separate exposure to the two relevant tasks 
prior to the task-switching test might facilitate awareness of the tasks but not the 
task cues, enabling participants to flexibly apply both rules – although the switch 
occurs unpredictably. Without an initial training phase, the opportunities to infer 
the task rules are reduced, which might eliminate switch costs that are caused 
by an unexpected failure of the previously relevant rule.  
Secondly, to explore the possibility that participants base their responses on the 
visual similarity of the stimuli of two subsequent trials, the sequence of trials 
was controlled in such a way that performance would be at chance level if 
participants were guided by a heuristic like "choose the opposite response to 
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the one that was previously correct if the current stimulus looks different from 
the previous one". If switch costs in the performance of Rules-Ignorant 
participants are the consequence of comparing the visual similarity of two 
consecutive stimuli, controlling the sequence in which stimuli are presented 
would lead to performance at 50%, and might discourage the use of this 
response strategy.  
If switch costs are caused by trial-to-trial comparisons, administering an initial 
training phase should have no consequences on the behaviour of Rules-
Ignorant participants. Likewise, if training leads to increased task awareness, 
the specifics of the trial-to-trial sequence should not influence performance (nor 
lead to a change in the strategy developed during the training phase). 
 
Methods 
 
Subjects 
A total of 106 Psychology undergraduate students completed this experiment. 
 
Procedure 
The apparatus and stimulus material is described in Chapter 2. 56 participants 
went through the training phase outlined in Section 2.3 before entering the task-
switching test phase (Training condition); the other 50 participants received no 
training but proceeded straight to the test phase (No-Training condition). 
For 27 participants in the Training and 25 participants in the No-Training 
condition, the test phase was the same as described in Section 3.2 (henceforth 
called the Standard design). The test phase was comprised of 22 blocks of 24 
trials each, 528 trials in total. 
The remaining participants experienced what will henceforth be referred to as 
the Sequence design. The only difference to the Standard design was that in 
this condition the sequence of trials was generated in such a way as to produce 
performance at chance level if responses are based on a strategy following the 
heuristic "choose the opposite response to the one that was correct in the 
previous trial when the current stimulus (ignoring the cue) changes from one 
trial to the next". This heuristic would lead to an average error rate of 
approximately 33%, mainly because it would produce a correct response in all 
trials with congruent-to-congruent-stimulus transitions. Removing transitions of 
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this type would produce an average error rate nearer to 50% if that heuristic 
was followed consistently. Thus, unlike in the Standard design, in the Sequence 
design, a congruent stimulus was never repeated on two subsequent trials, and 
was never followed by the other congruent stimulus. However, an incongruent 
stimulus could repeat (this happened on 12.5% of all trials) or could be followed 
by the other incongruent stimulus (on another 12.5% of trials) on the 
subsequent trial. Details of the exact number of trial-to-trial transitions can be 
found in Table 3.3.2.  
 
 
 Table 3.3.2. Sequence design: Number of transitions from a certain cue-stimulus 
combination in trial N-1 to a certain combination in trial N. There were a total of 512 
transitions. Key: cues: a/A - cues indicating one task (red/green); b/B - cues indicating 
the competing task (blue/yellow); congruent stimuli (requiring the same response in the 
two tasks): H/L - Horizontal Orientation/Low Spatial Frequency; V/H - Vertical 
Orientation/High Spatial Frequency; incongruent stimuli (requiring a different response 
in the two tasks): V/L - Vertical Orientation/Low Spatial Frequency; H/H - Horizontal 
Orientation/High Spatial Frequency; R1/R2 - the two required responses (left/right). 
 
   Trial N-1 
Cue a A a A b B b B a A a A b B b B 
Stimulus 
H/
L 
H/
L 
V/
H 
V/
H 
H/
L 
H/
L 
V/
H 
V/
H 
V/
L 
V/
L 
H/
H 
H/
H 
V/
L 
V/
L 
H/
H 
H/
H 
Correct  
Response 
R1 R1 R2 R2 R1 R1 R2 R2 R1 R1 R2 R2 R2 R2 R1 R1 
Trial N                 
a H/L R1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
A H/L R1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
a V/H R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
A V/H R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
b H/L R1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
B H/L R1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
b V/H R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
B V/H R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
a V/L R2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
A V/L R2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
a H/H R1 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
A H/H R1 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
b V/L R1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
B V/L R1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
b H/H R2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
B H/H R2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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A third of the transitions between congruent and incongruent stimuli, and half of 
the transitions from one incongruent stimulus to the other incongruent stimulus, 
were switch trials; half of the remaining trials were task-repeat trials with 
changing cues, and the other half were cue-repeat trials. 
 
The overall probability of a switch trial was 37.5%. As a result of these 
adjustments, following the sequential heuristic would produce a correct 
response in 50% of incongruent-to-incongruent stimulus transitions (12.5% of all 
trials), and, as before, also in approximately 50% of the transitions from a 
congruent to an incongruent stimulus and from an incongruent to a congruent 
stimulus. Participants might detect that congruent stimuli always afford the 
same response and thus only apply this heuristic to trials with an incongruent 
stimulus; however, doing so should yield an average accuracy of 50% in those 
trials. 
Participants in the Sequence group completed 16 blocks of 32 trials each. To 
ensure that participants experienced all possible trial-to-trial transitions, the first 
trial of each block was a repeat of the last trial in the previous block, but 
performance in that trial was not included in any further analyses. This 
procedure resulted in 512 analysable trial-to-trial transitions per participant. 
 
After completing the task-switching phase, all participants filled out an on-
screen questionnaire (Appendix A3) to assess their ability to describe the rules 
that defined a correct response and accordingly classify them as Rules-Ignorant 
or Rules-Aware subjects. In addition to the open questions used in the 
questionnaire of the experiment reported in Section 3.2, participants were asked 
whether their solving strategy included memorising the correct response to the 
stimulus presented in the immediately preceding trial and basing their current 
answer on that information. Following the questionnaire, participants were 
shown a sample trial showing an incongruent stimulus-cue combination and its 
correct response. They were then presented with the opposite incongruent 
stimulus combined with a cue signalling the opposite task as the sample trial, 
and asked to indicate and explain the response they would give (left or right) to 
this cue-stimulus combination. 
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Results 
 
Fifty-one participants who were part of the Training condition completed the 
training and proceeded to the task-switching test phase after a mean of 144 
training trials (two participants in the Training/Standard group and three 
participants in the Training/Sequence group did not reach the pass criterion of 
the training in 600 training trials and aborted the experiment). Of those who 
completed the experiment, 16 participants given the Standard and 17 
participants given the Sequence design were able to verbalise the rules for both 
tasks (orientation and spatial frequency) at the end of the experiment. It was 
assumed that they had relied on these rules to solve the paradigm (the Rules-
Aware participants). Eight participants in the Standard and eight participants in 
the Sequence group claimed that their responses had not been governed by the 
application of any specific rules (the Rules-Ignorant participants). One 
participant in each the Sequence group and the Standard group reported having 
discovered one of the two rules or having made up their own solution strategies. 
Their data were not included in any further analyses.  
A further fifty participants completed the task-switching paradigm without any 
prior training. Of these, 16 participants in the Standard and 12 participants in 
the Sequence group were classified as Rules-Aware participants, and five 
participants in the Standard and eight participants in the Sequence group were 
categorised as Rules-Ignorant participants. The data of the remaining four 
participants in the Standard and five participants in the Sequence group were 
excluded by the same criteria as stated above. In total, 61 participants were 
classified as Rules-Aware and 29 participants were labelled Rules-Ignorant. It is 
the latter group who is of particular interest in determining the effects of training 
and of the trial sequence on task-switching performance. 
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Table 3.3.3. Results of repeated-measure ANOVAs on error rates of Rules-Aware 
and Rules-Ignorant participants, using Training (Yes or No) and Design (Sequence 
or Standard) as between-subjects factors and Trial Type (Cue Repeat, Task Repeat 
or Task Switch) and Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) as within-
subjects factors. Significant p values are highlighted in bold. 
  Error Rates 
  F df p ηp2 
Rules-Aware Participants (n=61)     
 
Training 
8.33 1, 57 .006 .127 
 Sequence/Standard Design 0.02 1, 57 .898 <.001 
 Training * Design 1.51 1, 57 .224 .026 
 Trial Type  56.39 2, 114 <.001 .497 
 Trial Type * Training 1.50 2, 114 .229 .026 
 Trial Type * Design 1.26 2, 114 .289 .022 
 Trial Type * Training * Design 0.56 2, 114 .572 .010 
 Stimulus Congruency 58.25 1, 57 <.001 .505 
 Congruency * Training 1.85 1, 57 .179 .031 
 Congruency * Design 23.23 1, 57 <.001 .290 
 Congruency * Training * Design 0.017 1, 57 .897 <.001 
 Trial Type * Congruency 37.82 2, 114 <.001 .399 
 Trial Type * Congruency * Training 0.54 2, 114 .586 .009 
 Trial Type * Congruency * Design 2.18 2, 114 .118 .037 
 Trial Type * Congruency * Training * Design 0.72 2, 114 .491 .012 
Rules-Ignorant Participants (n=29)     
 Training 16.06 1, 25 <.001 .391 
 Sequence/Standard Design 0.11 1, 25 .749 .004 
 Training * Design 0.01 1, 25 .914 <.001 
 Trial Type  21.76 2, 50 <.001 .465 
 Trial Type * Training 1.39 2, 50 .259 .053 
 Trial Type * Design .679 2, 50 .512 .026 
 Trial Type * Training * Design 0.08 2, 50 .927 .003 
 Stimulus Congruency 32.89 1, 25 <.001 .568 
 Congruency * Training 5.98 1, 25 .022 .193 
 Congruency * Design 2.613 1, 25 .119 .095 
 Congruency * Training * Design 1.09 1, 25 .307 .042 
 Trial Type * Congruency 14.66 2, 50 <.001 .370 
 Trial Type * Congruency * Training 4.33 2, 50 .018 .148 
 Trial Type * Congruency * Design 0.03 2, 50 .969 .001 
 Trial Type * Congruency * Training * Design 0.90 2, 50 .415 .035 
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The participants' rule use had a main effect on performance in that Rules-Aware 
participants showed lower error rates than Rules-Ignorant participants, 
F(2,98)=121.93, p<.001, ηp2=.71. Rule use also significantly influenced the 
expression of the two task-switching effects of interest and their interaction, all 
p<.001. Therefore, all analyses were carried out separately for Rules-Aware 
and Rules-Ignorant participants. The same trial-exclusion criteria as reported in 
Section 3.1 were applied in this experiment. For each group, a repeated-
measures ANOVA using Trial Type (Cue Repeat, Task Repeat or Task Switch) 
and Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) as within-subjects factors 
and Design (Standard or Sequence) and Training (Yes or No) as a between-
subjects factor was conducted. Where applicable, significance levels were 
subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. The results of these analyses are 
summarised in Table 3.3.3.  
The following analyses included data from all task-switching blocks. However, 
those participants who had not received any training were still unfamiliar with 
the stimuli and procedure at the start of the experiment, and it was possible that 
this influenced the magnitude of task-switching effects. To allow for this 
possibility, the analyses were repeated excluding the first half of blocks; the 
task-switching effects reported below were present in both sets of analyses. 
 
Rules-Aware participants in the Training/Sequence group performed better than 
those in the two No-Training groups, Design-by-Training interaction: 
F(3,57)=2.91, p=.042, ηp2=.13 (Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: 
Training/Sequence vs. No-Training groups: both p≤.046; Training/Standard vs. 
No-Training/Sequence: p=.059; all other p≥.21). Performance was better than 
expected by chance in all four experimental groups (overall errors in the 
Training/Sequence group: 8.8%, t(16)=26.92, adjusted p.<008, ηp2=.98; 
Training/Standard: 10.6%, t(15)=27.34, adjusted p<.008, ηp2=.98; No-
Training/Sequence: 15.6%, t(11)=15.02, adjusted p<.008, ηp2=.96; No-
Training/Standard: 13.6%, t(15)=20.31, adjusted p<.008, ηp2=.97).  
Similarly, Rules-Ignorant participants who had received training performed 
better overall than those in the two No-Training groups, F(3,25)=5.49, p=.005, 
ηp2=.40 (Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: Training groups vs. No-Training 
groups: all p≤.036; No-Training/Sequence vs. No-Training/Standard: p=.84; 
Training/Sequence vs. Training/Standard: p=.52). Performance was better than 
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chance in the two Training groups (Training/Sequence: 36.6%, t(7)=6.31, 
adjusted p<.008, ηp2=.85; Training/Standard: 34.6%, t(7)=7.37, adjusted p<.008, 
ηp2=.89), but not in the No-Training groups (No-Training/Sequence: 45.1%, 
t(7)=3.07, adjusted p=.14, ηp2=.57; No-Training/Standard: 44.4%, t(4)=1.41, 
adjusted p=1.0, ηp2=.33).  
Overall, receiving training improved performance both for participants who had 
inferred the rules and those who had not. 
 
As before, Rules-Aware participants expressed significant switch costs (errors 
in cue-repeat trials: 9.4%, task-repeat trials: 10.8%, task-switch trials: 15.2%) 
and congruency effects (errors in response to congruent stimuli: 9.3%, 
incongruent stimuli: 14.3%). The factors Trial Type and Stimulus Congruency 
interacted significantly; switch costs were increased when responding to 
incongruent stimuli compared to congruent stimuli: the difference in errors 
between task-repeat (cue-repeat) and task-switch trials, i.e., switch costs, for 
incongruent stimuli was 6.9%, p<.001 (9.0%, p<.001), for congruent stimuli it 
was 2.0%, p=.011 (2.6%, p=.002). Task-repeat and cue-repeat trials yielded 
comparable error rates when congruent stimuli were presented (difference: 
0.6%, p=.96), but Rules-Aware participants made fewer errors when an 
incongruent stimulus was accompanied by a cue repeat rather than merely a 
task repeat (difference: 2.1%, p=.007). 
Rules-Aware participants who had been trained on both tasks individually 
before the start of the task-switching test generally performed better than those 
who had not received any training (9.3% vs. 14.3% errors), but the training did 
not significantly affect the magnitude of switch costs or congruency effects. 
There was no significant main effect of the Design; however, the specific 
sequence of trials that participants experienced affected the size of the 
congruency effect: the effect was smaller in the Sequence group compared to 
the Standard group (1.8% vs. 8.1%). Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed 
that the effect of stimulus congruency was not significantly different from zero in 
the No-Training/Sequence condition (mean congruency effect in errors: -0.9%, 
p=.487; all other comparisons: mean congruency effect above 2.8%, p≤.008). 
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Figure 3.3.1. Error rates when responding to incongruent stimuli on Cue-Repeat, Task-
Repeat and Task-Switch trials, for participants who were unaware of any underlying 
rules (Rules-Ignorant) and participants who inferred the rules (Rules-Aware) under the 
Sequence and Standard design and had received training or had not received training 
prior to the test. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
Rules-Ignorant participants expressed both switch costs (errors in cue-repeat 
trials: 35.4%, task-repeat trials: 35.7%, task-switch trials: 45.3%) and 
congruency effects (errors responding to congruent stimuli: 32.4%, incongruent 
stimuli: 45.2%) in their performance. However, switch costs were only present 
when responding to incongruent stimuli, but absent in responses to congruent 
stimuli; the difference in errors between task-repeat (cue-repeat) and task-
switch trials for incongruent stimuli was 16.8%, p<.001 (18.5%, p<.001), for 
congruent stimuli it was 2.0%, p=.763 (2.2%, p=1.0). Task-repeat and cue-
repeat trials yielded comparable error rates for both incongruent (difference: 
1.7%, p=1.0) and congruent stimuli (difference: 1.0%, p=1.0). The interaction 
effect was further enhanced for participants who had received training (switch 
costs on trials with congruent vs. incongruent stimuli: -1.2% vs. 22.6%) 
compared to those who had not (5.7% vs. 11.1%).  
For Rules-Ignorant participants, receiving training positively impacted 
performance (Training group: 33.8% errors overall, No-Training group: 43.8%). 
While added training did not affect the size of switch costs, those participants 
who had received training showed a numerically larger congruency effect 
(congruency effect for Training group: 18.2%, No-Training group: 7.3%). 
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Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that stimulus congruency 
significantly affected performance only in those groups that had received 
training (congruency effect in the Training/Sequence group: 12.3%, p=.010; 
Training/Standard group: 24.1%, p=.002); in the two No-Training groups, the 
effect was not significantly different from zero (No-Training/Sequence: 6.0%, 
p=.103; No-Training/Standard: 8.6%, p=.228). The Design did not have any 
effect on overall performance or the magnitude of switch costs or congruency 
effects for Rules-Ignorant participants.  
 
Since switch costs were most pronounced in response to incongruent trials, 
Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the magnitude of errors in each trial type in response to 
incongruent stimuli only. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons were used to assess 
whether these error rates differed significantly between trial types in each of the 
four experimental groups. For Rules-Aware participants, the difference between 
task-switch and task-repeat (cue-repeat) trials was significant in all four groups; 
Training/Standard: mean difference: 8.7%, p<.001 (10.5%, p<.001); No-
Training/Standard: 7.6%, p<.001 (9.9%, p<.001); Training/Sequence: 7.0%, 
p=.002 (6.8%, p<.001); No-Training/Sequence: 4.3%, p=.035 (8.9%, p<.001). 
Performance of Rules-Ignorant participants when responding to incongruent 
stimuli on task-repeat (cue-repeat) trials was reliably different from their 
performance on task-switch trials in the two Training groups, but did not reach 
significance for either of the No-Training groups; Training/Sequence: 26.1%, 
p=.001 (27.4%, p=.001); Training/Standard: 19.1%, p=.014 (23.5%, p=.001); 
No-Training/Sequence: 10.7%, p=.14 (11.9%, p=.24); No-Training/Standard: 
11.4%, p=1.0 (11.4%, p=1.0). The effects of the experimental condition on the 
expression of switch costs in incongruent trials differed significantly between 
Rules-Aware and Rules-Ignorant participants, Group-by-Condition-by-Trial-Type 
interaction: F(6,164)=2.63, p=.018, ηp2=.09. 
 
Rules-Ignorant participants reportedly applied different strategies to generate 
the most correct responses. Four strategies were extracted from the post-test 
questionnaire and defined as follows:  
- followed the sequential heuristic described above;  
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- thought that sometimes the stimuli had to be classified based on their 
spatial frequency and sometimes based on their orientation, but that the 
relevant rule changed frequently;  
- tried to memorise all stimuli and their correct responses;  
- thought there was no pattern between any stimulus and the correct 
response. 
 
There was no significant prevalence of any one specific solving strategy in any 
of the four experimental groups, χ2(9)=15.6, p=.075, although, as can be seen 
in Figure 3.3.2, none of the participants in the No-Training/Standard condition 
used the sequential heuristic. Solving strategies based on a rule of some sort 
("followed sequential heuristic" and "thought that different rules applied which 
changed frequently" combined) were more common than chance would allow in 
the Training groups, while other approaches ("tried to memorise all stimuli" and 
"thought there was no pattern at all" combined) were more prevalent in the two 
No-Training groups, χ2(3)=10.2, p=.017.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.2. Switch costs in error rates responding to incongruent stimuli of Rules-
Ignorant participants who reportedly had followed a sequential heuristic as described in 
the text or had developed a different solving strategy. Numbers on the x-axis are 
participant ID numbers. Error bars represent standard errors. 
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
3
8
3
7 1 9 3
9
2
1
3
9
9
1
1
3
4
2
6
2
8
5
2
1
9
6
9
4
4
3
0
8
8
1
0
0
9
6
6
4
2
4 4
5
7
6
6
1
5
8
5
1
0
4
6
Sequence - Training Sequence - No Training Standard - Training Standard -
No Training
Sw
it
ch
 C
o
st
s 
in
 E
rr
o
rs
followed sequential heuristic
thought that different rules applied which changed frequently
tried to memorise all stimuli
thought there was no pattern at all
117 
 
Overall error rates differed significantly between strategies, F(3,28)=6.07, 
p=.003, ηp2=.42. Post-hoc tests showed that error rates were comparable (all 
p≥.61) for those participants who had followed the sequential rule (mean error 
rate: 38.8%; comparison to 50% chance performance: t(10)=5.59, adjusted 
p<.004, ηp2=.76; mean error rates for Sequence condition: 40.0%, N=7, 
Standard condition: 36.8%, N=4; difference between Sequence and Standard: 
U=10.5, p=.53), those who thought that the relevant rule changed frequently 
(mean error rate: 34.3%; comparison to 50% chance performance: t(6)=8.82, 
adjusted p<.004, ηp2=.93; Sequence: 34.3%, N=3, Standard: 34.3%, N=4; 
difference between Sequence and Standard: U=4.0, p=.63) and those 
participants who had tried to memorise all stimuli (mean error rate: 40.0%; 
comparison to 50% chance performance: t(5)=3.10, adjusted p=.11, ηp2=.66; 
Sequence: 44.3%, N=4, Standard: 31.5%, N=2; difference between Sequence 
and Standard: U=0.0, p=.13). Those participants who had assumed that there 
was no pattern (mean error rate: 49.2%; comparison to 50% chance 
performance: t(4)=0.67, adjusted p=1.0, ηp2=.10; Sequence: 47.0%, N=2, 
Standard: 50.7%, N=3; difference between Sequence and Standard: U=0.0, 
p=.20) differed significantly in their overall error rate from the participants in the 
first two groups, both p≤.023, but not from those participants who had tried to 
memorise the stimuli, p=.11. 
Additionally, the error rate when responding to incongruent stimuli were of 
particular interest in determining whether the Sequence manipulation affected 
the participants' success when employing a sequential heuristic. Errors in trials 
with incongruent stimuli did not differ significantly between the Sequence 
(M=44.4%, N=7; comparison to 50% chance performance: t(6)=2.34, adjusted 
p=.116) and Standard condition (M=50.3%, N=4; comparison to 50% chance 
performance: t(3)=0.09, p=.94), U=6.5, p=.16.  
 
The magnitude of congruency effects differed only marginally between the 
different solving strategies, F(3,25)=2.73, p=.065, ηp2=.25, and the interaction 
between switch costs and stimulus congruency differed significantly between 
the four strategies, F(6,50)=4.06, p=.002, ηp2=.33. Both effects were significant 
(in that performance was better in response to congruent than to incongruent 
stimuli, and switch costs were more pronounced when responding to 
incongruent stimuli) for those participants who had used the sequential 
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heuristic, both p≤.007, and those who assumed that the rules changed 
frequently, both p=.001. Participants who had tried to memorise the stimulus-
response contingencies were significantly affected by stimulus congruency, 
p=.024, but the magnitude of switch costs did not differ significantly between 
congruent and incongruent stimuli, p=.087. Participants who had found no 
pattern did not show a significant congruency effect, p=.98, nor did stimulus 
congruency affect the magnitude of switch costs, p=.72. 
 
Figure 3.3.2 illustrates the magnitude of switch costs in response to incongruent 
trials for each Rules-Ignorant participant, and the specific strategy that that 
participant reportedly applied to generate the most correct responses. Switch 
costs among the four solving strategies differed in size, Kruskal-Wallis 
χ2(3)=11.5, p=.009. Mann-Whitney post-hoc comparisons revealed that those 
participants who reportedly thought that there had not been any pattern linking 
any stimuli to a certain response showed lower switch costs than participants 
who had applied a sequential heuristic, U=15.2, N1=5, N2=11, adjusted p=.014, 
and to some degree than participants who had assumed that the rules for 
responding changed frequently, U=11.2, N1=5, N2=7, adjusted p=.087.  
 
As in Section 3.2, the effect of stimulus repetition on performance was analysed 
via a repeated-measures ANOVA including only incongruent stimuli, using 
Stimulus Repeat (repeating the same incongruent stimulus or switching from 
one incongruent stimulus to the other incongruent stimulus) and Trial Type 
(Cue-Repeat, Task-Repeat or Task-Switch trial) as within-subjects factors, and 
Solving Strategy (applied the two task rules, followed sequential heuristic, 
thought that different rules applied which changed frequently, tried to memorise 
all stimuli, thought there was no pattern) as between-subjects factor. Where 
applicable, significance levels were subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. 
As previously found, there was a main effect of Trial Type, F(2,170)=130.29, 
p<.001, ηp2=.61, and of Stimulus Repeat, F(1,85)=38.31, p<.001, ηp2=.31, and a 
significant Stimulus-Repeat-by-Trial-Type interaction, F(2,170)=12.08, p≤.001, 
ηp2=.12. The Solving Strategy of participants also had a main effect on 
performance, F(4,85)=66.94, p<.001, ηp2=.76, and interacted significantly with 
the factors Trial Type, F(8,170)=27.54, p<.001, ηp2=.56, and Stimulus Repeat, 
F(4,85)=5.42, p=.001, ηp2=.20. The interaction effect between Trial Type and 
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Stimulus Repeat also differed significantly depending on the participants' 
strategy, F(8,170)=2.87, p=.006, ηp2=.12; as shown in Figure 3.3.3, participants 
who had not detected a pattern were differently affected by that interaction than 
Rules-Aware participants, p=.002, and those who believed the rules changed 
frequently, p=.035. All other group comparisons were nonsignificant, all p≥.26. 
When considering the patterns for each solving strategy individually, those 
participants who had not noticed any pattern expressed no significant switch 
costs, F(2,8)=0.18, p=.82, but all other participants did, all p≤.009. Further, 
Stimulus Repeat did not significantly affect the performance of those 
participants who believed that the rules for classification changed frequently, 
F(1,6)=0.73, p=.42; the effect was marginally significant for participants who 
had found no pattern, F(1,4)=7.03, p=.057, and for those who tried to memorise 
the contingencies, F(1,5)=5.30, p=.07, and significant for participants who were 
Rules-Aware, F(1,60)=4.77, p=.033, ηp2=.07, and those who reported following 
the sequential heuristic, F(1,10)=11.95, p=.006, ηp2=.54.  
 
The interaction between Trial Type and Stimulus Repeat was not significant for 
any strategy, all p≥.27. This result is in contrast to the strong interaction effect 
reported in Section 3.2, which suggested a universal benefit of response 
repetitions; the participants in the current experiment mainly experienced a 
benefit of response repetitions in task-repeat trials, but not in task-switch trials. 
Interestingly, despite the nonsignificant interaction effect, Figure 3.3.3 suggests 
that participants that had not noticed any pattern showed performance benefits 
of a task switch in trials in which the stimulus changed (that is, they performed 
better in task-switch trials than in task-repeat or cue-repeat trials). The other 
four groups (applied the two task rules, followed sequential heuristic, thought 
that different rules applied which changed frequently, tried to memorise all 
stimuli) experienced switch costs in trials in which the same incongruent 
stimulus was repeated and also in trials in which the incongruent stimulus 
changed.  
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Figure 3.3.3. Error rates in trials in which an incongruent stimulus is presented and 
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Trial Type and split by solving strategy. Note the different scale for Rules-Aware 
participants. 
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Discussion 
 
In the experiment reported in this section, I investigated some potential causes 
for switch costs in the task-switching performance of Rules-Ignorant 
participants. First, Rules-Ignorant participants might have solved the test by 
comparing the stimulus of a given trial to the one that was presented in the 
previous trial, and then either repeated or changed the response that was 
required on that previous trial depending on the visual similarity of the two 
subsequent stimuli. Such a heuristic should be less successful under the 
Sequence design, and any Rules-Ignorant participants in that condition who 
employed this heuristic would be expected to perform at chance level, at least in 
response to trials with incongruent stimuli (irrespective of whether or not they 
had received any task training prior to the test phase). This was indeed the 
case: the participants in the Sequence condition (four of eight in the 
Training/Sequence group, three of eight in the No-Training/Sequence group) 
who mentioned in the post-test questionnaire and when explaining their 
response to the post-test probe that they would choose the opposite response 
to the one that was correct for the previous stimulus when the current stimulus 
looked very dissimilar performed at chance level in response to incongruent 
stimuli. However, so did the participants reporting this strategy under the 
Standard condition (four of eight in the Training/Standard group, none of five in 
the No-Training/Standard group; see Figure 3.3.2), indicating that a sequential 
heuristic did not successfully generate a correct response to incongruent stimuli 
in the Standard condition, either.  
Furthermore, those eleven participants showed observable switch costs in their 
performance. But they were not alone: other Rules-Ignorant participants, who 
had used a different strategy to guess the correct response, also expressed 
reliable switch costs in their data. In fact, when faced with incongruent stimuli, 
all strategies that were based on any kind of systematic approach benefitted 
performance mainly in task-repeat trials, but impaired performance in task-
switch trials (see Figure 3.3.3). Interestingly, the emergence of switch costs 
likely had different causes depending on the strategy that participants 
employed. The occurrence of switch costs in the Rules-Ignorant participants 
who employed a sequential heuristic is explained in detail in Section 3.2. As 
seen in Figure 3.3.3 Panel B, this strategy would benefit performance more in 
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task-repeat and cue-repeat trials in which the stimulus repeats than in task-
repeat trials in which the stimulus changes, because the paradigm included not 
only stimulus changes from an incongruent stimulus to the other incongruent 
stimulus (which afforded a response change on task-repeat trials), but also 
changes from an incongruent to a congruent stimulus (and vice versa), which 
might afford a response repetition; thus, stimulus changes were somewhat 
more ambiguous than stimulus repetitions (which always afforded a response 
repetition on task-repeat trials).  
For the seven participants who had suspected that several rules were at play 
that changed frequently, the explanation for why switch costs occurred is 
equally straightforward, if it can be assumed that the participants had a notion of 
what these changing rules were (for example, a participant might have noticed 
that line orientation or spatial frequency determined the correct response on 
some trials, but remained unable to predict when each feature was relevant). 
After probing which rule determined the correct response in one trial, this rule is 
applied to all following trials, until a trial occurs in which applying that rule no 
longer leads to the correct response. Consequently, trials in which the same 
rule as in the trial before applies (task-repeat and cue-repeat trials) will be 
answered correctly, whereas trials in which the rule changes from the one that 
was relevant in the previous trial (task-switch trials) will elicit a wrong response, 
leading to large switch costs. This strategy should be largely insensitive to 
stimulus repetitions, and the pattern shown in Figure 3.3.3 Panel C could give 
an indication that this might be the case (although the pattern does not differ 
significantly from those in Figure 3.3.3 Panels A, B and D). 
Even the six participants who had attempted to memorise all presented cue-
stimulus-response combinations experienced small but noticeable switch costs 
in their performance (see Figure 3.3.3 Panel D). The behaviour of these 
participants might be the most interesting; it is discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.4.  
In fact, the only participants who were entirely unaffected by a task switch (and 
even somewhat showed a switch benefit) were the five participants who 
reported that they had not been able to find any pattern that determined a 
correct response but who instead thought that the required response to a given 
stimulus changed randomly (see Figure 3.3.3 Panel E). If these participants 
thought that everything was random, it can be assumed that they also 
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responded randomly - as evident by their overall performance being not better 
than chance. Interestingly, their pattern of behaviour is not dissimilar to the 
pattern of pigeons (shown in Figure 3.2.2). Like pigeons, the participants who 
had found no pattern showed improved performance in stimulus-repeat trials 
that were accompanied by a response repetition (i.e., cue-repeat and task-
repeat trials), but performed worse when a stimulus repetition incurred a change 
in the required response (i.e., task-switch trials). That is, participants who saw 
no pattern greatly benefitted from a response repetition on all trials. However, 
unlike the highly accurate pigeons, their performance was well above 50%-
chance level in trials in which the response changed, and the participants were 
not affected by stimulus congruency. The possible approach that might have 
resulted in this pattern of performance is considered further in Section 3.4. 
 
All the other Rules-Ignorant participants benefitted from a response repetition 
only in task-repeat and cue-repeat trials. Rules-Aware humans even showed a 
small impairment to performance when the response repeated in task-switch 
trials (see Figure 3.3.3 Panel A). As mentioned in Section 3.2, this response-
repetition effect (a benefit of response repetitions in task-repeat trials but a cost 
in task-switch trials) is often found in human task switching (e.g., Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Kleinsorge, 1999; Schuch & Koch, 2004; Hübner & Druey, 
2006). It is most logically explained by the influence of task sets (i.e., 
Kleinsorge, 1999): a change in a relevant task dimension that requires a 
recoding operation will generalise to response selection, and in effect facilitate 
response alteration rather than response repetition. The fact that no such costs 
were found in the data of Rules-Ignorant participants seems to confirm this 
hypothesis.  
It has to be noted that the effect was very small (and statistically not reliable) in 
the Rules-Aware participants in this experiment, and the Rules-Aware people in 
the experiment in Section 3.2 did in fact show a benefit to performance when 
repeating a response in task-switch trials. However, this might be a result of 
including the data of all trials into the analysis; the effect would only emerge 
once participants had inferred the rules of the two competing tasks. Indeed, in 
the analysis that included only the last half of the experiment, the effect was 
highly visible in the performance of Rules-Aware participants in the current 
experiment, and it also emerged in the performance of participants towards the 
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end of the experiment in Section 3.2, so it can be assumed that participants in 
both experiments inferred the task rules some time after the beginning of the 
experiment and, once they were able to consistently apply the two rules in each 
trial, were affected by the phenomena that accompany the application of task-
sets. 
 
Another interesting point is that the majority of Rules-Ignorant participants who 
attempted to memorise the cue-stimulus-response contingencies, or were 
convinced that there simply were no discernible patterns, had received no 
training (see Figure 3.3.2), while almost all participants who had received 
training developed a heuristic of some sort. This connection between training 
and the development of heuristics suggests that experiencing the entire set of 
cue-stimulus-response combinations of one task at once, and separated from 
the competing task, can provide an opportunity for participants to search for a 
general rule.  
For example, it is plausible that the training that all participants in Sections 3.1 
and 3.2 (and the Training groups in this section) had received prior to engaging 
in the task-switching studies led to an initial consideration of the underlying task 
rules, but because participants failed to detect a reliable predictor of when each 
task applied, they dismissed the relevance of these rules in the test phase. It 
might be that participants, despite reaching a certain level of task awareness 
during the training of each task, failed to incorporate the task cues as an 
informative part of the stimulus. Without the information from the cue, task 
changes in the later test phase appeared to occur at random, and might lead a 
large number of participants to suspect that "different rules applied that changed 
frequently". Consequently, even though those participants might have been 
unable to infer what caused a change in the currently relevant stimulus-
response mappings in a task-switch trial, as explained above, they were able to 
react to the change and choose the correct response on subsequent task-
repeat trials. Thus, it might be more accurate to label those participants not as 
"rules-ignorant" but as "cues-ignorant". 
The training phase could also facilitate the development of the sequential 
heuristic. Provided that participants noticed that only a single dimension 
determined the correct response in the training phase of each task, applying the 
heuristic to the correct dimensions in each training block would result in 
125 
 
accurate performance without the need to memorise the exact stimulus-
response contingencies (e.g., during the training of the orientation 
discrimination, participants could have learned that the correct response 
location changed if the stimulus changed from a vertical orientation to a 
horizontal orientation). As long as the participants attended to the relevant 
dimension in each training block, the sequential heuristic would be successful. 
In the subsequent task-switching phase, the currently relevant dimension 
became unpredictable, but the participants might have nonetheless continued to 
apply the heuristic, potentially regularly changing the dimension to which they 
paid attention. It is possible that at least part of those participants who reported 
that "the rules changed frequently" employed this strategy, which would explain 
why they did not report the task rules (e.g., horizontal - left response, vertical - 
right response). 
 
In summary, altering the sequence of trial-to-trial transitions did not prevent 
participants from following a sequential heuristic of “repeating the response that 
was correct in the previous stimulus if the current stimulus looked similar to the 
previous one, or changing the response if otherwise”. As before, participants 
who had adopted this heuristic suffered considerable switch costs, because this 
strategy benefits performance in task-repeat trials, in which the repetition of an 
incongruent stimulus is accompanied by a response repetition, but impairs 
performance in task-switch trials, in which the repetition of an incongruent 
stimulus affords a response change (and vice versa). Other Rules-Ignorant 
participants reportedly noticed that different tasks were at play but failed to 
predict which of these tasks would be relevant in a given trial. It is likely that this 
level of task awareness without cue awareness was mediated by receiving task 
training prior to the task-switching test. These participants also suffered 
measurable switch costs in response to incongruent stimuli, arguably because 
they were able to use the feedback from a given trial to infer which rule had 
been relevant in that trial, and applied that task rule in all subsequent task-
repeat trials and the next task-switch trial. Then, the (incorrectly answered) 
task-switch trials provided the necessary information that the rule was no longer 
successful and enabled the participants to change to the other deduced rule in 
the subsequent trial. Participants who had not noticed any correspondence 
between stimuli and required response showed performance at chance level 
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and an absence of switch costs. They also, like the pigeons, benefitted greatly 
from a response repetition; therefore, their likely strategy is examined further in 
Section 3.4. Finally, some participants claimed that they had tried to memorise 
the experienced cue-stimulus-response contingencies - thus seemingly followed 
an associative approach - and suffered noticeable switch costs in response to 
incongruent stimuli. The potential mechanisms that may have caused these 
participants to suffer switch costs when pigeons, which also solved the 
paradigm associatively, did not are discussed in Section 3.4. 
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3.4  Discussion - Associative Processes in a Task-Switching Paradigm 
The main question that is addressed in this chapter is whether task-switching 
and the commonly observed costs of performing a task switch are necessarily 
the product of executive-control functions such as task-set reconfiguration, or 
whether task-switch costs can occur when performance is primarily mediated by 
associative learning.  
 
Previous work suggested that, when human participants solve a task-switching 
paradigm by learning cue-stimulus-response contingencies, switch costs are 
eliminated when responding to response-congruent stimuli (Dreisbach et al., 
2006, 2007; Dreisbach, 2012). Indeed, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, pigeons did not 
show any switch costs when responding to such congruent stimuli, and human 
participants showed strongly reduced or absent switch costs in this case in all 
three experiments in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Since a congruent stimulus 
signals the required response unambiguously, no information about the 
currently relevant task is required to perform accurately - therefore, congruent 
stimuli should predominantly elicit stimulus-response learning rather than the 
costly retrieval and reconfiguration of task sets. 
 
More interestingly though, Forrest (2012; Forrest et al., 2014) noticed that 
humans consistently suffered from switch costs when responding to response-
incongruent stimuli, even when they were informed about stimulus-response 
contingencies instead of task rules. The human participants in the experiments 
in Chapter 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 also showed reliable switch costs in response to 
incongruent stimuli to about the same magnitude as reported by Forrest, 
regardless of whether or not they had been aware of the task rules. Simulations 
in associative computational models equally predict small but reliable switch 
costs under pure associative-learning conditions, which led Forrest (2012) and 
Forrest et al. (2014) to conclude that performance costs in task-switch trials 
might not necessarily be mediated by complex executive-control processes but 
could emerge as a product of the automatic retrieval of cue-stimulus-response 
associations.  
Unfortunately, research on the task-switching abilities of animals has been 
equivocal with respect to this assumption - none of the several independent 
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studies on rhesus macaques could convincingly demonstrate switch costs in the 
monkeys’ performance (Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009; Avdagic et 
al., 2014) - and the experiments with pigeons in this chapter and by Castro and 
Wasserman (2016) found no evidence that associative processes may lead to 
switch costs in response to incongruent stimuli.  
 
Therefore, an alternative explanation may be required for the occurrence of 
switch costs despite an absence of task sets in human performance. One 
possibility is of course that switch costs emerge only when executive-control 
processes, such as task-set reconfiguration, are afforded by subjects relying on 
abstract task rules, but that when performance is governed by associative 
processes and subjects do not rely on task sets, no task-switch costs ensue. 
The implication of this would be that, while pigeons behaved entirely 
associatively and thus lacked switch costs, any switch costs that were present 
for humans indicate that the performance of those participants was governed by 
executive-control processes, or at least different processes to those used by the 
pigeons, even when they failed to verbalise the task rules.  
 
In the case of the pigeons, there is some evidence that this assumption is true: 
solving the paradigm associatively does not have to incur switch costs. And 
there is unambiguous evidence that the behaviour of pigeons was indeed 
governed by associative processes: in every experiment in this chapter, the 
pigeons were strongly affected by stimulus congruency. It has previously been 
suggested (i.e., Kiesel et al., 2007, Schneider, 2015) that this congruency effect 
is governed by an automatic retrieval of stimulus-response contingencies rather 
than executive-control processes. In the current context, it shows that the 
pigeons' behaviour was controlled by specific stimulus features, and that 
interference between the competing cue-stimulus-response contingencies did 
affect their performance more than abstract task-sets. Further evidence for this 
fact is the clear benefit of response repetitions for pigeons found in Section 3.2: 
having to repeat the same response that was correct in the previous trial 
facilitated the performance of pigeons much more than any other aspect of a 
given trial. Response-repetition effects have also been shown by task-switching 
humans, although it affected their performance to a far lesser degree than 
switch costs. In Section 3.3, participants only benefitted from repeating the 
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previously correct response on task-repeat trials, but on task-switch trials, 
having to repeat the previous response did not help - in fact, it often incurs a 
cost to humans (Kleinsorge, 1999; Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999; Mayr & Bryck, 
2005; Hübner & Druey, 2006). As mentioned in Section 3.2, the enormous 
benefit for pigeons most likely stems from associative processes (such as 
response priming) and the integration of stimulus location as a feature of the 
perceived cue-stimulus compound. In contrast, the often observed costs of 
response repetitions in task-switch trials for humans are most logically 
explained by the influence of task sets (e.g., Kleinsorge, 1999): a change in a 
relevant task dimension that requires a recoding operation will generalise to 
response selection, and in effect facilitate response alteration rather than 
response repetition.  
 
As for humans, the results of Section 3.3 might be seen as evidence that 
humans suffer switch costs predominantly as a result of executive-control 
processes and the systematic application of rules or heuristics. Only those 
Rules-Ignorant participants who had been oblivious to any pattern were 
unaffected by a switch in tasks, whereas all those who had assumed some kind 
of connection between the stimuli and the required response showed persistent 
switch costs. As stated in Section 3.3, participants reported a multitude of rule-
based strategies, which affected performance in different ways, but each of 
them selectively impaired performance in task-switch trials and thus created 
"switch costs" for those participants, despite an absence of task sets. However, 
if the switch costs in human participants are always due to executive control, 
why did those participants who reported that they had tried to memorise the 
individual stimulus-response associations also experience significant switch 
costs? What's more, computational-modelling accounts (Forrest, 2012; Forrest 
et al., 2014) also confirm the possibility of switch costs emerging under 
associative-learning conditions - so might there be some associative component 
that leads to switch costs after all?  
 
In order to address this question, it is worth looking back at the likely cause for 
an absence of switch costs in pigeons: in Section 3.2, I argue that the 
mechanism that Forrest (2012) held responsible for the presence of switch 
costs in her associative models might not apply to pigeons. Forrest argues that 
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switch costs could in part be an expression of the closer associative connection 
between cues that indicate the same task: if the same stimulus-response links 
in an associative network are repeatedly activated in the presence of certain 
task cues, this activation can strengthen the link between these cues 
themselves, resulting in an associative cue equivalence. This equivalence in 
turn selectively facilitates the retrieval of a stimulus-response link on trials with 
equivalent cues, that is, task-repeat trials. But the data of Section 3.2 indicate 
that pigeons might represent the various components of a trial quite differently 
to humans. Forrest's explanation relies on the assumption that task cues are 
encoded as one of several components of a trial - as are the stimuli, or even the 
separate stimulus dimensions. Pigeons, however, may perceive the 
presentation of cue and stimulus as a single cue-stimulus compound, making 
each cue-stimulus pairing a unique stimulus to the pigeon's eye. Thus, in a way, 
even Forrest's associative algorithms obey a task structure in that the cues are 
regarded as providing separable information from the stimuli, whereas to the 
pigeons, cues and stimuli may be indivisible elements of the same image.  
Keeping in mind the response-repetition effects on the pigeons' performance, I 
postulate in Section 3.2 that what the pigeons may do is not only to represent 
cue colour, stimulus orientation and spatial frequency as a compound, but also 
to encode whether this compound is to the left or right side of the centre of the 
screen. A cue-stimulus compound in one location might then become appetitive 
in that approaching (and pecking) it is followed by a reward, whereas the same 
compound in the opposite location might become aversive (or at best neutral) 
because approaching it is not rewarded. This assumption can most elegantly be 
summarised as follows: the pigeons employed Pavlovian processes to learn the 
task-switching paradigm, and the trial-to-trial sequential effects brought about 
by the application of these processes resulted in an absence of switch costs.  
 
This idea can be verified by applying a simple, yet well validated model of 
conditioning, specifically, that due to Pearce (1987), to perform a perturbation 
analysis of the sequential effects that would be expected under the model. In 
Pearce's model, pigeons (and other animals) learn by associating configurations 
of stimuli with outcomes, and these associations then generalise to other 
configurations that share elements with the trained configuration. Pearce gives 
a simple rule for generalisation, which is: 
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Equation 1. G(generalization) = NS/TA x NS/TB 
 
where NS is the number of elements shared by stimulus configurations A and B, 
TA is the total number of elements in A and TB the total number of elements in 
B. In essence, generalisation between two configurations, A and B, is governed 
by the product of the proportion of A elements in B and the proportion of B 
elements in A. 
 
Since the effects of interest are sequential effects, i.e., the influence of trial N-1 
on performance for trial N, assayed after the problem has been learned to a 
considerable extent, the learning rule specified by Pearce was adapted to 
accommodate the assumption that all incongruent stimuli are at approximately 
the same level of associative strength at the beginning of a trial, so that 
increments in this strength as a result of a trial will be approximately equal. 
Congruent stimuli are not considered in the analysis; as observed earlier in 
Chapter 3, performance is typically at or near asymptotic levels for congruent 
stimuli, making any increment in associative strength very small for those 
stimuli. Thus, the focus is on incongruent stimuli, for which it can be assumed 
that the increment in associative strength is small but non-negligible.  
 
To illustrate how Pearce's model estimates performance, it will be assumed that 
the task requires subjects to learn the correct response to a configuration that 
includes a cue, a stimulus with different visual features, and a location. The 
task-switching paradigm developed in Section 2.3 makes use of four cues, A, a, 
B and b: cues A and a denote one task and B and b the other. The paradigm 
also includes two incongruent stimuli that are each made up of two visual 
dimensions, one with the values W and w, the other with the values X and x. 
The incongruent stimuli differ from each other in both stimulus dimensions; 
therefore, the two stimulus configurations that are considered are WX and wx 
(for example, WX might be a stimulus with a horizontal orientation and a low 
spatial frequency and wx would be a stimulus with a vertical orientation and a 
high spatial frequency). The spatial location of a stimulus is denoted by L and R, 
where L denotes the left stimulus location and R denotes the location on the 
right-hand side. All these elements are, for simplicity, assumed to have equal 
salience.  
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In a Pavlovian setting, one might assume that the pigeons learn to approach the 
correct cue-stimulus-location configuration - say AWXL - and avoid the wrong 
configuration - which in this case would be AWXR. The two configurations occur 
together in a given trial, but only one of them, AWXL, is the correct choice, 
which will be represented as AWXL+. As this combination becomes more 
strongly associated with reward, its associative strength with reward would 
increase from its current value V to V+∂, where ∂ is the small increment to 
associative strength that occurred on that trial. According to Pearce's (1987) 
model, this increment to associative strength will generalise to other cue-
stimulus configurations that share features with AWXL; following Equation 1, the 
effective increment to the other configuration in this trial, AWXR (sharing 3 of a 
total of 4 elements with AWXL), will be 3/4 x 3/4 x ∂ = 9/16 x ∂. If the next trial is 
a repeat of the one that has just occurred, the pigeon's improvement in 
performance in that trial as a result of this increment can be estimated. The 
increase in associative strength for the correct stimulus configuration AWXL is 
∂, the increase for the incorrect stimulus AWXR is 9∂/16, resulting in a net gain 
in performance of 7∂/16 in the following cue-and-stimulus-repeat trial. Table 
3.4.1 shows this calculation, and the net gain for the other possible trial-to-trial 
transitions that begin with AWXL+ on trial N-1.  
 
Table 3.4.1. Perturbation analysis of a Pavlovian account of task-switching based 
on Pearce (1987). Please refer to the text for details on how to calculate the 
difference values in the last column. Key: A, a, B - task cues; WX, wx - incongruent 
stimuli; L, R - response locations. 
This table appeared in Meier et al. (2016b). 
 
Previous 
configuration 
Correct choice 
in current trial 
Incorrect 
choice in 
current trial 
Difference 
(correct-
incorrect) 
Cue Repeat + 
Stimulus Repeat 
AWXL+ AWXL AWXR 7∂/16 
Task Repeat + 
Stimulus Repeat 
AWXL+ aWXL aWXR 5∂/16 
Task Switch + 
Stimulus Repeat 
AWXL+ BWXR BWXL -5∂/16 
Cue Repeat + 
Stimulus Change 
AWXL+ AwxR AwxL -3∂/16 
Task Repeat + 
Stimulus Change 
AWXL+ awxR awxL -∂/16 
Task Switch + 
Stimulus Change AWXL+ BwxL BwxR ∂/16 
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Figure 3.4.1. Error rates in trials in which an incongruent stimulus is presented and is 
the same as in the immediately preceding trial (Stimulus Repeat) or follows a trial in 
which the other incongruent stimulus appeared (Stimulus Change), depending on Trial 
Type, A) for pigeons taking part in the experiment in Section 3.2 (this graph is identical 
to Figure 3.2.2), B) for those Rules-Ignorant participants taking part in the experiment 
in Section 3.3 who reportedly had found no pattern between the stimuli and the correct 
response, and C) for the last half of trials for those Rules-Ignorant participants in the 
experiment in Section 3.3 who reportedly tried to memorise the cue-stimulus 
contingencies. Note the different scale for pigeons. 
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Figure 3.4.2. A) Plot of the perturbation analysis of a Pavlovian account of task-
switching (AWXL+). The dependent variable is the negative of the difference score 
reported in Table 3.4.1. B) Error rates as predicted by a "win-stay/lose-shift" strategy, 
by which the response that was correct on the previous trial is repeated until the 
feedback changes. C) Perturbation analysis of an instrumental account of task-
switching (AWX→L). The dependent variable is the negative of the difference score 
reported in Table 3.4.2. D) Perturbation analysis of an instrumental account of task-
switching that assumes cue equivalence. For all graphs, higher scores mean more 
errors. 
 
 
 
The calculations in Table 3.4.1 can be illustrated in a graph equivalent to Figure 
3.2.2 (this figure is replicated in Figure 3.4.1 Panel A for easier accessibility), 
which has been done in Figure 3.4.2 Panel A. To simulate error rates, this figure 
shows the negative of the values in the final column of Table 3.4.1, because a 
positive value in the table equates to fewer errors on that trial. The graph in 
Figure 3.4.2 Panel A does not look unlike the pattern expressed by pigeons in 
Figure 3.4.1 Panel A.  
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In summary, by incorporating the findings of Section 3.2 into Pearce's (1987) 
model of stimulus categorisation, it becomes evident that the absence of switch 
costs in the pigeons' task-switching performance occurred because the pigeons 
acquired the paradigm via Pavlovian processes, and incorporated the cue and 
the stimulus dimensions (including the stimulus location) into one indivisible 
cue-stimulus compound, a possibility that is confirmed by previously research 
that found that pigeons might not readily analyse the separate features of a 
stimulus (Lea et al., 2009; Wills et al., 2009). These processes produce 
observable effects of the previous trial on the pigeons' performance on the next 
trial (as evident by a pronounced response-repetition effect) but no costs to 
performance when switching from one task to another. 
 
As noted in Section 3.3, the performance of Rules-Ignorant participants who 
had found no pattern to responding showed some striking similarities to that of 
the pigeons. For easier comparability, the figure showing the performance of 
those participants is replicated in Figure 3.4.1 Panel B. Like the pigeons, those 
participants were mainly influenced by a response repetition, responding with 
greater accuracy to trials that afford a repetition of the previously correct 
response, and with accuracy at or above 50% chance level in trials affording a 
response change; and they showed no consistent switch costs. However, those 
participants did not show a congruency effect, and showed the highest error 
rates in Cue-Repeat/Stimulus-Change trials, and not, like the pigeons (and as 
predicted by the perturbation analysis above), in Task-Switch/Stimulus-Repeat 
trials. Overall, the pattern in their performance suggests that the main factor that 
influenced their response was whether the correct response of the previous trial 
was repeated or not. The Rules-Ignorant participants who had not found any 
pattern might have chosen to repeat any response that was indicated as correct 
on the previous trial, irrespective of the attributes of the current cue or stimulus, 
and to change to the other response location if the one chosen on the previous 
trial had been marked incorrect. The consistent application of such a 'win-
stay/lose-shift' strategy, illustrated in Figure 3.4.2 Panel B, would result in 
perfect performance on Cue-Repeat and Task-Repeat trials with a stimulus 
repetition and in Task-Switch trials with a stimulus change, whereas the other 
three trial types would always be answered incorrectly. As seen in Figure 3.4.1 
Panel B, the performance of the participants did not show such extremes, and 
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these participants also never acknowledged using this strategy but instead 
assumed that the correct response was chosen at random in each trial. For 
pigeons, it has been shown that, when the exact response requirements are 
unpredictable, there is a bias to perform the response that had been given more 
recently (and led to a reward) than to perform the response that had been given 
less recently (e.g., Stubbs et al., 1987; Schneider & Davison, 2005; Schneider, 
2008). Humans might also have a bias to do so (cf. Bendig, 1951; Senders, 
1953; Wiegersma, 1982), and the participants might have implicitly preferred 
the previously correct response despite assuming randomness. 
 
Of particular interest are also those Rules-Ignorant participants in the 
experiment in Section 3.3 who attempted to memorise the stimulus-response 
contingencies of the task-switching paradigm, and who might most closely 
resemble those participants in Forrest (2012) who were instructed in the cue-
stimulus-response contingencies of the paradigm. Switch costs reliably 
occurred in the performance of all of those participants, and, beyond that, in the 
simulations using an associative learning algorithm used by Forrest (2012). It 
can be assumed that the participants were learning to associate the 
combination of the cue and the stimulus dimensions with making a left or right 
response, and did not (like the pigeons) encode the response location as part of 
the stimulus compound. Conceptually, this makes the paradigm an 
instrumental-conditioning task, and the perturbation analysis based on Pearce's 
(1987) model of stimulus categorisation can be adapted to allow inferences 
about the occurrence of switch costs in this case. As before, there are two cues 
per task, A, a, B and b, the two incongruent stimuli WX and wx, and the 
response locations L and R. The functional relationship between the cue, the 
stimulus dimensions and the correct response shall be illustrated as AWX→L, 
to indicate that the combination of cue A and stimulus WX evokes a response of 
clicking the left response location L. According to Equation 1, the association of 
AWX→L would generalise to the cue-stimulus configurations in subsequent 
trials: for example, if the trial following AWX is a cue-repeat and stimulus-repeat 
trial (sharing all elements with the previous trial), the model predicts an increase 
in the association of AWX with L of 3/3 x 3/3 x ∂ = 9∂/9 = ∂. Conversely, if the 
trial following AWX incurs a repetition of the cue but a change of stimulus, 
namely Awx (sharing one of three elements with AWX), the estimated increase 
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in the association of Awx→L would be 1/3 x 1/3 x ∂ = ∂/9. Since the correct 
response to Awx is R, the net gain in performance for that trial would be 
negative, i.e., -∂/9. These calculations, and the net gain for the other trial-to-trial 
transitions following AWX→L in trial N-1, are reported in Table 3.4.2. The 
model's predictions for performance are illustrated in Figure 3.4.2 Panel C.  
 
 
 
Table 3.4.2. Perturbation analysis of an instrumental account of task-switching 
based on Pearce (1987). Please refer to the text for details on how to calculate the 
increment values. A, a, B - cues; WX, wx - stimuli; L, R - response locations. 
 
Previous 
configuration 
and its correct 
response 
Current 
configuration 
Correct 
response to 
current 
configuration 
Increment in 
difference 
between 
correct and 
incorrect 
choice 
Cue Repeat + 
Stimulus Repeat 
AWX→L AWX L ∂ 
Task Repeat + 
Stimulus Repeat 
AWX→L aWX L 4∂/9 
Task Switch + 
Stimulus Repeat 
AWX→L BWX R -4∂/9 
Cue Repeat + 
Stimulus Change 
AWX→L Awx R -∂/9 
Task Repeat + 
Stimulus Change 
AWX→L awx R 0 
Task Switch + 
Stimulus Change AWX→L Bwx L 0 
 
 
 
It is possible to work out the expected switch costs for each model by 
subtracting the average of cue-repeat and task-repeat trials from the average of 
task-switch trials. For the model assuming Pavlovian conditioning and 
responding to a cue-stimulus compound AWXL, the difference (the "switch 
costs") is predicted to be 0.25∂. Given that ∂ is itself a small increment, and this 
is multiplied by a factor considerably less than 1, the switch costs in the pigeon 
data are expected to be small to negligible, even though there are measurable 
sequential effects in both the observed data and the model. The estimated 
switch costs for an instrumental account associating AWX→L comes to 0.55∂, 
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which is more than twice the estimate for the pigeons. Thus, an important clue 
in trying to explain the differential expression of switch costs may well lie in the 
fact that pigeons solve task-switching problems using Pavlovian processes and 
humans instead solve them instrumentally when they are unable to infer any 
task rules or heuristics.  
 
Following Forrest's (2012) argument, a large proportion of the "switch costs" in 
the performance of associatively learning participants may be attributed to the 
formation of a conceptual equivalence between the two cues that signalled the 
same task. That is, with repeated activation of the same stimulus-response link 
in the presence of either cue A or cue a, it is thought that both cues can come to 
activate the same mental representation of that stimulus-response link, which in 
turn would facilitate the retrieval of that stimulus-response link in subsequent 
trials of the same task. If a total equivalence is achieved, cues A and a should 
retrieve the stimulus-response associations that are connected to either cue to 
the same degree. Performance in such a case can be estimated by assuming 
that there are only two types of cues in the task-switching paradigm: those 
signalling task A and those signalling task B. This has the effect that task-repeat 
trials take on the values of cue-repeat trials (for trials with both a stimulus repeat 
and a stimulus change), which, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.2 Panel D, leads to 
an increase in the difference between task-repeat trials and task-switch trials.  
 
Finally, it is now possible to compare the models in Figure 3.4.2 Panel C and D 
to the data observed for Rules-Ignorant humans who reportedly memorised the 
contingencies of the paradigm, which was illustrated in Figure 3.3.3 Panel D. 
The pattern in that figure does not seem to indicate an equivalence of task 
cues. However, that pattern changed in the latter half of the experiment. As 
reported in Section 3.3, all analyses were carried out including all test blocks 
and again for the last half of blocks to account for the fact that those participants 
who had not had a training phase had to get acquainted with the paradigm and 
its contingencies in the earlier blocks of the actual experiment. Figure 3.4.1 
Panel C shows the pattern of responding towards a stimulus repeat and 
stimulus change that emerged in the last half of the experiment for the 
participants who memorised the cue-stimulus-response contingencies. And 
indeed, towards the end of the experiment, these participants appeared to treat 
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the two cues that signalled the same task rather equally, as evident by the very 
similar performance in cue-repeat and task-repeat trials, both when the 
incongruent stimulus changed and (although to a lesser degree) when it 
repeated. Arguably, cue equivalence would facilitate performance more in task-
repeat trials in which the stimulus also repeats, since the perceptual similarity of 
the two subsequent trials is greater than when the stimulus changes. Thus, the 
observed performance of those participants who memorised the contingencies 
of the paradigm seems to match the modelled results shown in Figure 3.4.2 
Panel D, which incorporate the possibility of task-cue equivalence - but with one 
obvious, important difference. 
The model estimates that "switch costs" should only occur in trials in which the 
stimulus repeats, whereas performance in stimulus-change trials should at best 
be equal in task-repeat and task-switch trials. In fact, the perturbation analysis 
according to Pearce's (1987) model, illustrated in Figure 3.4.2 Panel D, 
estimates that the acquisition of full cue equivalence would actually produce 
(small) negative switch costs in stimulus-change trials. This prediction goes very 
much against the argument of Forrest (2012, Forrest et al., 2014) - to reiterate, 
she hypothesised that the closer associative proximity of cues signalling the 
same task would facilitate performance in trials in which these two cues occur 
consecutively, compared to a sequence of trials in which cues of the two 
opposing tasks are presented, regardless of whether the same or a different 
stimulus is presented in subsequent trials. And this is also where the observed 
data from the contingencies-learning participants differ from the estimated 
performance in Pearce's model: as seen in Figure 3.4.1 Panel C, participants 
showed persistent switch costs both in trials in which the incongruent stimulus 
repeated and in those trials in which it changed, very much in line with Forrest's 
assumptions. 
This finding is intriguing, as it may hint at just how prevalent the human 
tendency to apply rules (e.g., Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Maddox & Ing, 2005; 
Smith et al., 2010)  might be. Consider the assumptions of Pearce's model 
about performance in task-switch/stimulus-change trials: following from the 
perturbation analysis in Table 3.4.2, generalisation from experiencing the 
configuration AWX affording the response L is estimated to lead to an increment 
in associative strength between the subsequent configuration Bwx and its 
correct response L of zero. That is, the configuration AWX→L should not affect 
140 
 
the associative strength of Bwx→L, because the two cue-stimulus compounds 
share no elements with each other. But undeniably, the Rules-ignorant 
participants memorising contingencies were affected by the previous trial, as 
the higher error rates in Task-Switch/Stimulus-Change trials confirm. The 
apparent lack of associative content that is predicted by Pearce’s model might 
in fact have prompted participants to search for alternative information that 
could be gathered from comparing the two cue-stimulus configurations of both 
trials - previous research suggests that, even when learning shaped entirely by 
contingencies would improve performance, human behaviour might be biased 
to be controlled by rules (Galizio, 1979; Hayes, 1989; Maddox & Ing, 2005; Doll 
et al., 2009). For example, they might have returned to testing the hypothesis 
that only stimuli that share a common visual element demand the same 
response. Importantly, the data provide evidence that, as Hayes et al. (1986) 
suggested, human performance can be shaped by an interaction between 
contingency-shaped and rule-governed behaviour - especially when the rules 
originally governing behaviour are unreliable or incomplete, as would be the 
case here.  
 
In conclusion, the lack of any detectable switch costs in pigeons in the 
experiments in this chapter are most accurately estimated by a Pavlovian-
conditioning model that assumes that subjects respond to appetitive and 
aversive cue-stimulus-location compounds. Conversely, the switch costs that 
affected the performance of those participants who learned the stimulus-
response contingencies may plausibly be attributed to an interplay between an 
instrumental approach (and, as hypothesised by Forrest, 2012, the 
establishment of an associative equivalence between the cues that signal the 
same task, which further elevated the difference in performance in task-repeat 
and task-switch trials) and continued hypothesis testing. Importantly, the rule-
based approach can explain switch costs in response to stimuli that share no 
perceptual features with the stimulus on the previous trial, whilst instrumental 
conditioning may contribute greatly to the switch costs in response to stimulus-
repetition trials. Thus, it appears that switch costs can occur under associative 
conditions.  
 
141 
 
The final question that remains to be answered is: how can the switch costs due 
to executive control and the "switch costs" caused by associative processes be 
distinguished? Monsell (2003) postulated that switch costs reflect the executive 
processes that govern the application of the relevant task set. Dreisbach (2012) 
added that the switch costs caused by executive-control processes allow 
subjects to improve performance, by shielding their responses from interference 
from the competing task set. Thus, switch costs that occur at the level of the 
task structure but are independent of any perceptual stimulus elements (e.g., 
switch costs in response to response-congruent stimuli, see Section 3.1; 
response-repetition costs in task-switch trials, see Section 3.3) can be attributed 
to executive control; they exist to ensure correct response selection and the 
inhibition of inappropriate responses. Indeed, those effects were only confirmed 
for Rules-Aware participants, but did not affect the performance of Rules-
Ignorant participants or pigeons. Conversely, trial-to-trial effects that are based 
on perceptible stimulus features (e.g., stimulus-repetition and response-
repetition benefits in task-repeat trials, see Section 3.2) are due to associative 
processes; those effects were visible (though in different guises) in the 
performance of pigeons and humans responding on the basis of cue-stimulus-
response contingencies, but did not affect the performance of rules-using 
participants. 
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CHAPTER 4: ARE ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES SUFFICIENT TO INHIBIT A 
RESPONSE IN A RESPONSE-INHIBITION PARADIGM? 
Parts of this chapter have been submitted for publication as Meier, C., Lea, 
S.E.G., & McLaren, I.P.L. (under review). Pigeons in Control of their Actions: 
Learning and Performance in Stop-Signal and Change-Signal Tasks. 
 
 
Chapter 3 concluded with the postulation that switch costs might be an 
expression of executive-control processes involved in ensuring correct 
response selection and the inhibition of inappropriate responses (cf. Dreisbach, 
2012). Reversing this logic, can it be assumed that the mechanisms of 
response selection and inhibition require executive control, i.e., are only those 
individuals capable of executive control able to inhibit a prevalent response, or 
"control an impulse"? The literature on inhibitory control seems to agree that it is 
indeed executive control that governs the inhibition of prevalent responses 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a, 2015; Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen & 
McLaren, in preparation). However, as described in detail in Section 1.2, 
response inhibition in Stop-Signal paradigms, in which subjects perform a 
simple, speeded response towards a stimulus, but are sometimes, by the 
appearance of a stop signal, instructed to withhold that response, might be (at 
least in part) governed by associative mechanisms (cf. van Gaal et al., 2009).  
 
As laid out in Section 1.2, the mechanisms of response inhibition in Stop-Signal 
paradigms are adequately described by the independent horse-race model 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b), which makes no statement about the 
involvement of executive control in response inhibition. In fact, the assumption 
that the two processes of response initiation and inhibition are triggered 
automatically by the appearance of the relevant stimulus or signal implies that 
associative processes might be involved (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 2009a; 
Verbruggen et al., 2014; Best et al., 2016).  
Therefore, the influence of executive control on response inhibition might not be 
present at the trial level. As previously shown for task-switching performance in 
Chapter 3, the effect of executive-control processes might primarily be observed 
at the task level, in trial-to-trial effects reflecting a change in the activation of a 
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specific task goal (e.g., the goal to execute or inhibit a response), whereas 
effects that relate to stimulus-specific aspects might most readily be attributable 
to associative processes (cf. Section 1.2). It is thus necessary to examine such 
effects in the performance of pigeons and humans; in particular, I assessed the 
occurrence of post-signal response-slowing and the extent to which the subjects 
utilised information about the likelihood of having to inhibit a response. 
 
Although the Stop-Signal paradigm is the most prominent response-inhibition 
paradigm, it is also worth considering the Change-Signal paradigm, in which the 
occurrence of the signal indicates that an alternative response has to be 
executed instead of the usual Go response. The Stop-Signal and Change-
Signal tasks can use the same stimuli and very similar procedures, so it seems 
logical to assume that they both involve the same inhibition mechanisms. 
Alternatively, as stated in Section 1.2, it can be argued that Change-Signal 
tasks, which require the selective stopping of one response and the selection of 
an alternative response, afford a more cognitively demanding inhibition 
mechanism and a higher level of behavioural control than merely stopping an 
action, possibly comparable to the mechanisms involved in task-set 
reconfigurations during task-switching (cf. Monsell, 2003). However, since 
pigeons succeeded in the task-switching paradigm reported in Chapter 3, I 
assumed that, if response inhibition did not rely on executive processes, 
pigeons would be able to acquire a Change-Signal task to the same level as a 
Stop-Signal task. In fact, there is the interesting possibility that pigeons in 
particular might perform better if they are given the option to execute an action 
instead of having to withhold a response. As detailed in Section 1.2, Change-
Signal tasks might in fact be accomplished without inhibitory control, whereas 
Stop-Signal tasks might require a mechanism to suppress inappropriate 
responses. 
These considerations have an important implication for the success of any 
comparative response-inhibition paradigm, for example if pigeons acquire a 
Change-Signal paradigm easily but fail in a Stop-Signal paradigm (or vice 
versa). Therefore, it is essential to establish whether pigeons can learn to inhibit 
a prepared response both in a Stop-Signal task, in which the occurrence of a 
signal indicates the requirement to inhibit any response, and also in a Change-
Signal task, in which the appearance of a signal affords the execution of an 
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alternative response instead of the one that was initially prepared. I took this 
issue into account in the pilot work described in Section 4.1, in order to develop 
a response-inhibition paradigm that can adequately assess the performance of 
different species, the methods of which are reported in Section 4.2. 
 
Using the response-inhibition paradigm established in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the 
experiments reported in the subsequent sections were carried out to answer the 
following questions: firstly, do the predictions made by the independent horse-
race model of response inhibition (see Section 1.3) apply to performance that is 
governed purely by associative processes? And are there marked differences in 
the performance of associative pigeons and humans, who would be assumed to 
rely on executive processes to perform response inhibition? These questions 
are addressed in Section 4.3. Secondly, do pigeons (and humans) integrate 
information about the likelihood that inhibition will be required in an upcoming 
trial to improve their ability to inhibit a response? This question is addressed in 
Section 4.4. 
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4.1  Developing a Comparative Response-Inhibition Paradigm 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, developing a paradigm suitable for use with 
multiple species requires a series of methodological adaptations. 
Firstly, considering the potential cognitive mechanisms underlying different 
response-inhibition paradigms, outlined above, I examined whether pigeons 
show a difference in the acquisition of a Change-Signal paradigm and a Stop-
Signal paradigm, or whether the two paradigms are acquired at a comparable 
rate, which would speak for the possibility of one common cognitive mechanism 
governing performance in both paradigms. 
Secondly, on a more methodological level, the way in which behaviour is 
reinforced might influence pigeons' ability to acquire a response-inhibition 
paradigm. Positive reinforcement would be the preferred method, because 
reward maintains a stable level of responding towards the stimuli, whereas 
negative reinforcement might lead to an overall reduction in responding. 
Change-Signal paradigms do often reward the correct shift from executing a 
prevalent response to executing an alternative response, but in conventional 
Stop-Signal paradigms, it is often the case that wrongly responding when 
inhibition is required is punished, for example by inducing a timeout period 
between trials. In the pilot work reported in this section, I assessed whether 
pigeons would acquire either response-inhibition task more easily when they 
are being rewarded for successful inhibition or when they are being punished 
for unsuccessful inhibition. 
 
In summary, the experiment reported in this section was carried out to 
investigate pigeons' general ability to inhibit a response, either by stopping any 
action or by performing an alternative action. For this purpose, the pigeons 
completed a simplified version of either a Stop-Signal or a Change-Signal task, 
in which the signal to either stop a response or change to another response was 
presented from the beginning of a trial, that is, the pigeons were not first 
exposed to a stimulus associated with the target Go response before the signal 
to inhibit appeared in these "Signal" trials. In contrast to trials in which such a 
stimulus is initially presented, it would be expected that the execution of the Go 
response would not be prepared in these trials, and performing the correct 
behaviour (i.e., withholding any response or performing an alternative response) 
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should be accomplished without the necessity to inhibit an already activated Go 
response. 
Furthermore, the experiment aimed to establish the relative effectiveness of two 
different reinforcement methods on task acquisition rates - rewarding correct 
behaviour with food access, or punishing incorrect behaviour by imposing a 
delay to the start of the next trial. 
 
Methods 
  
Subjects 
Ten pigeons took part in this experiment. The pigeons had previously taken part 
in unrelated studies but were naïve to the stimuli and the procedure of this 
experiment. Five pigeons were assigned to the Go/Stop group; the other five 
pigeons were assigned to the Go/Change group.  
 
Procedure 
In both tasks, a trial began with the presentation of a circular white start key (75 
pixels / 22.5mm in diameter) presented in the centre of a black display to focus 
attention to the screen. Two pecks at the start key were required to replace it by 
two circular response keys (each 50 pixels / 15mm in diameter), the centres of 
which were offset by 50 pixels (15mm) to the left and the right side of the 
display centre. One of these keys was filled in red or green; the other key was 
yellow and served, as explained below, as a pecking alternative to the red or 
green stimulus. The locations of the stimulus and the alternative key (left or 
right) were randomised across trials. 
The colour of the stimulus (green or red) indicated whether the current trial was 
a Go trial or a Stop or Change trial; for example, a pigeon might have to learn to 
associate a green stimulus with Go, and a red stimulus with Change. The colour 
that indicated a Go trial shall henceforth be referred to as the Go stimulus; the 
colour that indicated a Stop or Change trial will be referred to as Stop or 
Change signal, respectively. The assignments of colours to trial type were 
counterbalanced across subjects. Reinforcement contingencies varied for each 
trial type, as explained below. 
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Go Training 
The pigeons initially received Go-training sessions, each consisting of 64 Go 
trials. In Go trials, a single peck at the Go stimulus resulted in the deletion of the 
stimulus display from the screen and the presentation of a white reward key (75 
pixels / 22.5mm in diameter), which was centred 100 pixels (30mm) from the 
lower edge of the screen and 100 pixels (30mm) from the side of the screen 
that was closest to the Go stimulus. One peck at the reward key led to 
immediate access to the food magazine mounted below and to the side of that 
reward key for 2.5 seconds; then the next trial started after an inter-trial interval 
of 10 seconds. If no pecks at the stimulus were made during the display 
presentation interval, the trial was terminated and the next trial started. Any 
pecks at the yellow alternative key in Go trials were ineffective and had no 
scheduled consequences. 
In the first session of the Go training, the response display containing the Go 
stimulus and alternative key was presented for 20 seconds in each trial. When 
overall performance in a session reached 85% or above, the presentation time 
of the stimulus display was decreased in the following session; this was 
repeated systematically to reduce the presentation time from 20 seconds to 2.5 
seconds as the lowest value in the Go/Stop task and, to account for any 
additional time needed to perform the alternative response, to 4 seconds as the 
lowest value in the Go/Change task. Pigeons passed the Go training phase by 
responding to the Go stimulus on at least 80% of trials in three consecutive 
training sessions with the lowest presentation time. 
 
Go/Stop and Go/Change Task 
Once the Go-training criterion was met, pigeons completed twenty Go/Stop or 
Go/Change sessions. These sessions each consisted of 32 Go trials and 32 
Stop or Change trials, presented in random order. Only one peck was required 
for the presentation of the reward key during the Go training, to facilitate task 
acquisition; this was still the case for the Go/Change task. It was increased to 
two pecks for the pigeons in the Go/Stop task, to account for the possibility that 
presenting any image on screen might have automatically triggered a pecking 
response (even before the image was sufficiently processed by the pigeon); due 
to the ballistic nature of the pigeon's peck, once it was initiated, the execution of 
the peck might not be stoppable but had to be completed. If this was the case, 
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pigeons might find it difficult to withhold a response altogether in Stop trials, but 
they might be able to withhold the second peck at the stimulus. If fewer than two 
pecks were made at the Go stimulus within the stimulus-presentation interval, 
the trial was terminated and the next trial started after an inter-trial interval of 10 
seconds. As before, any pecks at the yellow alternative key were ineffective on 
Go trials.  
For pigeons in the Go/Stop task, the stimulus-presentation interval was 2.5 
seconds by default (for three pigeons, this interval was increased to 3 or 4 
seconds to ensure that the stimulus was pecked twice within this time); for 
pigeons in the Go/Change task, the stimulus display was presented for a 
maximum of 4 seconds by default (for one pigeon, it was increased to 5 
seconds to ensure continued responding). 
 
The way in which behaviour was reinforced in Stop and Change trials was 
varied in two conditions: two pigeons in the Go/Stop task experienced the 
Reward condition, the other three pigeons in that task entered the Delay 
condition. Similarly, three pigeons in the Go/Change task experienced the 
Reward condition, and the other two pigeons completing that task were put into 
the Delay condition. The procedures of each condition were as follows: 
- Go/Stop - Reward: 
Any pecks that were made at the Stop signal during the stimulus 
presentation interval in Stop trials were counted. If a pigeon made no or 
only a single peck at the Stop signal within this interval, the reward key 
was presented and, upon pecking this key once, the pigeon received 
access to the food magazine for 2.5 seconds, before the next trial began 
after an inter-trial interval of 10 seconds. If a pigeon made two or more 
pecks to the Stop signal, the trial terminated after completion of the 
stimulus presentation interval; the next trial started after the inter-trial 
interval. 
- Go/Stop - Delay:  
If a pigeon made no or only a single peck at the Stop signal during the 
stimulus presentation interval, the trial terminated after completion of this 
interval and a new trial started after the inter-trial interval. As soon as the 
pigeon made a second peck at the Stop signal, it entered a delay period 
in which the Stop signal remained on screen for four times the duration of 
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the stimulus presentation interval (i.e., if the pigeon's stimulus 
presentation interval was 2.5 seconds, the delay period was set to 10 
seconds), before the trial was terminated and a new trial started after the 
inter-trial interval. During this delay period, pecking the Stop signal had 
no effect.  
- Go/Change - Reward: 
A peck at the yellow alternative key resulted in the immediate deletion of 
the response display and the presentation of the reward key closest to 
the alternative key, followed by access to the respective food magazine 
for 2.5 seconds. Any pecks at the Change signal were ineffective; if no 
pecks at the alternative key were made during the stimulus presentation 
interval, the trial was terminated and the next trial started after the inter-
trial interval.  
- Go/Change - Delay: 
If a pigeon made a peck at the Change signal, it entered a delay period 
in which the Change signal remained on screen for four times the 
duration of the stimulus presentation interval (i.e., if the pigeon's stimulus 
presentation interval was 4 seconds, the delay period was set to 16 
seconds), before the trial was terminated and a new trial started after an 
inter-trial interval of 10 seconds. During this delay period, pecking the 
Change signal had no effect. Alternatively, a peck at the alternative key 
immediately terminated the trial; if no pecks at either the Change signal 
or the alternative key were made during the stimulus presentation 
interval, the trial was terminated and the next trial started after the inter-
trial interval. 
 
Data Collection 
To assess the pigeons' performance, I collected the percentage of errors that 
the pigeons made overall and in response to Go trials and Stop or Change 
trials.  
Further, to estimate the pigeons' acquisition of the contingencies in the Stop 
and Change trials under the different reinforcement conditions, I examined the 
pecking rates in Stop and Change trials: the number of incorrect pecks at the 
Go stimulus and the rate of pecking at the alternative key. 
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For the Go/Stop task, if a pigeon pecked the Go stimulus twice in a Go trial or if 
pecked the signal in a Stop trial only once or less, that trial was marked as 
correct. In the Go/Change task, if the first peck was made towards the Go 
stimulus in Go trials or towards the yellow alternative key in Change trials, that 
trial was marked as correct. All other responses were coded as incorrect. 
I compared average error rates overall, in response to Go trials, and in 
response to Stop or Change trials, and also the number of pecks made in Stop 
and Change trials at the Go stimulus and the alternative key, between the four 
experimental groups in a series of repeated-measures ANOVAs using Sessions 
(1 to 20) and Trial Type (Go or Stop/Change) as within-subjects factors, and 
Condition (Go/Stop-Reward, Go/Stop-Delay, Go/Change-Reward, Go/Change-
Delay) as between-subjects factor.  
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for each of the variables are summarised in Table 4.1.1. 
Overall error rates differed between groups, in that the pigeons in the 
Go/Change-Delay group produced more errors overall in the twenty test 
sessions than the pigeons in any of the other three groups, F(3,6)=18.81, 
p=.002, ηp2=.90, Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: p≤.028, all comparisons 
between the other three groups: p≥.25. As shown in Figures 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, 
this difference was mainly due to an inability of the subjects in the Go/Change-
Delay group to perfrom the correct response in Change trials, which the 
subjects in the other three groups learned reliably over the course of the 
training, and which was accomplished fastest by the Go/Stop-Delay group. 
However, the subjects in the Go/Change-Delay group were fastest to learn the 
correct performance in Go trials, performing consistently at or above 80% 
accuracy from the first session, while the other three groups only approached 
this criterion towards the end of the 20 training sessions (see Figure 4.1.1). 
To assess whether this difference was task-specific or caused by an innate 
group difference, I compared the error rates in the first session of the Go/Stop 
and Go/Change tasks; they did not differ significantly between groups, 
F(3,6)=0.32, p=.81, Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: all p=1.0. 
As shown in Figure 4.1.1, performance on Go trials differed significantly 
between the four groups, F(3,6)=7.42, p=.019, ηp2=.79; Bonferroni post-hoc 
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comparisons revealed that error rates were significantly lower in the 
Go/Change-Delay than in the Go/Change-Reward condition, p=.021; all other 
comparisons: p≥.11. The performance in Stop and Change trials also differed 
significantly between groups (shown in Figure 4.1.2), F(3,6)=37.35, p<.001, 
ηp2=.95; in these trials, performance of the Go/Change-Delay group was 
significantly worse than that of the other three groups, Bonferroni post-hoc 
comparisons: p≤.005, all comparisons between the other three groups: p≥.11. 
 
 
  
Table 4.1.1. Mean performance and standard errors of the four experimental groups in 
terms of overall errors, errors in Go trials, errors in Stop/Change trials, and number of 
incorrect pecks at the Go stimulus and alternative key, for all 20 sessions and for the last 
half (10 sessions) of the experiment. 
  Go/Stop - 
Reward 
Go/Stop - 
Delay 
Go/Change - 
Reward 
Go/Change - 
Delay 
Overall errors 
Mean 23.4% 11.1% 19.7% 46.5% 
SD 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.7 
last half of 
experiment 
Mean 19.7% 8.7% 15.0% 49.7% 
SD 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.4 
Errors in Go trials 
Mean 17.8% 20.7% 27.4% 6.0% 
SD 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.6 
last half of 
experiment 
Mean 18.6% 17.2% 21.9% 3.9% 
SD 5.3 4.4 4.4 5.3 
Errors in 
Stop/Change trials 
Mean 29.0% 1.5% 11.9% 87.0% 
SD 6.6 5.4 5.4 6.6 
last half of 
experiment 
Mean 20.9% 0.2% 8.1% 95.4% 
SD 4.4 3.6 3.6 4.4 
Number of incorrect 
pecks at Go 
stimulus in 
Stop/Change trials 
Mean 0.72 0.07 0.16 0.04 
SD 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.18 
last half of 
experiment 
Mean 0.76 0.03 0.03 0.05 
SD 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.21 
Number of pecks at 
alternative key in 
Stop/Change trials 
Mean 4.34 0.26 0.93 0.07 
SD 1.09 0.89 0.89 1.09 
last half of 
experiment 
Mean 4.38 0.14 0.95 0.46 
SD 1.16 0.95 0.95 1.16 
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Figure 4.1.1. Error rates in Go trials, depending on experimental condition. An error in 
a Go trial is defined as, for the Go/Stop task, making fewer than two pecks at the Go 
stimulus and, for the Go/Change task, pecking the alternative key or not pecking any 
key. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.2. Error rates in Stop trials (for the pigeons in the Go/Stop task) and 
Change trials (for the pigeons in the Go/Change task), depending on experimental 
condition. An error in a Stop trial is defined as making two or more pecks at the Go 
stimulus, an error in a Change trial is defined as pecking the Go stimulus or not 
pecking any key. 
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Despite the differences in error rates, the number of pecks that pigeons made in 
Stop and Change trials were not significantly different between conditions; 
neither in the number of incorrect pecks at the Go stimulus, F(3,6)=3.31, 
p=.099, nor in the number of pecks at the yellow alternative key, F(3,6)=3.52, 
p=.089. 
 
To account for the fact that the pigeons had to learn how to respond to the Stop 
and Change stimulus in the first few sessions of the task, the analyses were 
repeated using only the last half of sessions. 
Overall errors remained significantly different between groups, F(3,6)=65.92, 
p<.001, ηp2=.97. This difference was still caused by pigeons in the Go/Change-
Delay group performing significantly worse than those in any other group, 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: relevant p≤.001, comparison between 
Go/Stop-Delay and Go/Stop-Reward: p=.068, other comparisons: p≥.37. The 
difference between groups in response to Go trials disappeared entirely in the 
second half of the experiment (see Figure 4.1.1); in the last ten sessions, 
accuracy levels in Go trials were not significantly different across the four 
conditions, F(3,6)=2.43, p=.16. The differences between groups in Stop and 
Change trials however remained (see Figure 4.1.2), F(3,6)=106.85, p<.001, 
ηp2=.98; the pigeons in the Go/Change-Delay group performed significantly 
worse than those in the other three groups, all p<.001; the pigeons in the 
Go/Stop-Reward group performed marginally worse than the pigeons in the 
Go/Stop-Delay group, p=.068; all other comparisons: p≥.41. 
Pecking rates in Stop and Change trials did not differ between groups in the 
second half of the experiment, neither in the number of pecks directed at the Go 
stimulus, F(3,6)=3.16, p=.11, nor the pecks directed at the alternative key, 
F(3,6)=3.28, p=.10. 
 
Discussion 
 
In this section, I aimed to establish the most efficient method of training pigeons 
in a response-inhibition paradigm. Specifically, I investigated the following 
questions: can pigeons acquire either a Stop-Signal task or a Change-Signal 
task, or might there be a bias towards learning one task more readily than the 
other? And does the ease of acquisition of either task depend on whether the 
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pigeons are rewarded for successful response inhibition or punished for a 
failure of inhibition? 
The results paint a clear picture: whilst there is no direct indication that one task 
is more readily acquired than the other, the ease of acquisition of either task 
does seem to vary depending on reinforcement method. Pigeons in the 
Go/Change task, in which they had to perform an alternative action when the 
Change stimulus was presented, learned to do so much faster (or only) when 
they were rewarded for making that alternative response than when the 
incorrect execution of the Go response was punished with a delay period.  
For the pigeons in the Go/Stop task, which required the withholding of any 
response in trials in which the Stop signal was shown, as seen in Figure 4.1.2, 
being punished for making a wrong response resulted in a somewhat more 
successful performance in Stop trials in the latter half of the experiment than 
receiving a reward for correctly withholding any response.  
Overall, the Go/Stop-Delay condition seemed to achieve the most stable level of 
response inhibition. The Go/Change-Reward condition also elicited good levels 
of response inhibition, as overall accuracy was above the success criterion of 
80%. Similar results have previously been found in humans, for example by 
Guitart-Masip, Huys, Fuentemilla et al. (2012), whose participants were better at 
learning a particular response when correct behaviour was rewarded, and better 
at withholding a response when incorrect behaviour was punished. Guitart-
Masip et al. (2012) argued that these findings reflect the disruptive influence of 
Pavlovian processes, by which an individual learns about the affective value of 
an outcome, on instrumental learning, by which an individual learns a 
behavioural response based on its consequences. As discussed in Sections 2.2 
and 3.4, the behaviour of pigeons might predominantly be determined by 
Pavlovian processes, which was reflected in the marked influence of the 
positive or negative affect associated with a particular response key on the 
pigeons' behaviour.  
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4.2  Procedures for a Comparative Response-Inhibition Paradigm  
In Section 4.1, it was shown that pigeons could succeed in both a Go/Stop and 
a Go/Change paradigm. The pigeons’ performance in the Go/Stop task seemed 
to be the most stable if the pigeons were punished for failing to inhibit a 
response. Conversely, the pigeons completing the Go/Change task in Section 
4.1 showed a better level of accuracy if they were rewarded for correct 
response alteration. 
Because both tasks have distinct merits in the investigation of response-
inhibition processes, in the following sections, the response-inhibition ability of 
pigeons and humans were assessed in both a Stop-Signal and a Change-
Signal task. The tasks that the humans completed were modelled on the tasks 
used with pigeons. For each task, I administered the reinforcement method that 
facilitated performance of the pigeons the most in that task; that is, subjects 
assigned to the Stop-Signal task were punished with a delay to the next trial for 
failing to inhibit the Go response in trials that afforded it, and subjects 
performing the Change-Signal task were rewarded for correctly executing the 
alternative response when signalled to do so. The procedures of the Stop-
Signal and the Change-Signal tasks were otherwise identical, except of course 
for the response requirements to Stop or Change. Figure 4.2.1 illustrates the 
trial procedure and reinforcement contingencies for the two tasks. 
 
Pigeons 
 
In the full Change-Signal and Stop-Signal tasks (shown in Figure 4.2.1), each 
trial began with the presentation of a white start key (75 pixels / 22.5mm in 
diameter) presented in the centre of a black display to focus attention on the 
screen. Following two pecks at the start key, it was replaced by a smaller 
circular key (50 pixels / 15mm in diameter) in the display centre that varied in 
appearance, to serve as a cue (its function is described below). A peck at this 
cue led to the addition of two circular response keys (each 50 pixels / 15mm in 
diameter), whose centres were offset by 50 pixels (15mm) to the left and the 
right side of the centre of the still visible cue. One of these keys was filled in red 
or green (counterbalanced across subjects). The other key was yellow and 
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served as a pecking alternative to the red or green stimulus. The locations of 
the stimulus and the alternative key (left or right) were randomised across trials. 
 
For some pigeons, a green stimulus indicated that the current trial was a Go 
trial and a red stimulus indicated a Stop or Change trial; for other pigeons, the 
colour assignment was reversed. Only on some of the Stop/Change trials (see 
below for the exact ratio), the Stop/Change signal was shown right from the 
beginning of the trial; on the remaining Stop/Change trials, the trial started with 
the presentation of the Go stimulus, which was then replaced with the 
Stop/Change signal after one of three stimulus-onset intervals. This procedure 
is described in more detail below. 
 
Before performing the full task, pigeons went through several training stages to 
learn the correct response to each part of the task. During all training sessions, 
pecking the start key led directly to the presentation of the two response keys; 
that is, the cue was omitted from the display entirely during training.  
 
Go Training 
First, the pigeons received Go-training sessions, each consisting of 64 Go trials. 
The procedure of the Go training was identical to that reported in Section 4.1. 
The presentation time of the stimulus display was decreased as described in 
Section 4.1 from 20 seconds to 4 (the lowest value in the Change-Signal task) 
or 2.5 seconds (the lowest possible value in the Stop-Signal task). If 
performance was below 70% overall in a session, the presentation time was 
increased by a second for the following session. After an increase, the value 
was decreased again if the pigeon completed the next two sessions above 
85%. Otherwise, training continued at the increased value until the pigeon 
performed at 80% or above in two consecutive training sessions to pass this 
training stage. The stimulus presentation interval at which a pigeon passed the 
Go training was used as the stimulus presentation interval for all following 
sessions for that pigeon.  
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Figure 4.2.1. Procedure of Go and Signal trials and respective reinforcement 
contingencies in the Change-Signal and Stop-Signal task. Note: the Start Key was only 
presented to pigeons, but not to humans. The colour of the Go stimulus and Signal 
(green and red) were counterbalanced across subjects. 
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Go/Stop and Go/Change Training 
Once the Go-training pass criterion was met, pigeons completed twenty 
Go/Stop or Go/Change training sessions, which were identical in procedure to 
those described in Section 4.1, with the difference that, for both tasks, now, two 
pecks at the stimulus were required in Go trials to obtain the reward key.  
For reasons that will become apparent below, the remaining trials will be 
referred to as no-delay Stop-Signal and no-delay Change-Signal trials. In these 
trials, instead of the Go stimulus, the Stop or Change signal was presented; 
reinforcement contingencies varied between the Stop-Signal and the Change-
Signal task.  
In the Stop-Signal task, if a pigeon made no or only a single peck at the Stop 
signal during the stimulus presentation interval, the trial terminated after 
completion of this interval and a new trial started. If the pigeon made a second 
peck at the Stop signal, it entered a timeout period in which the signal remained 
on screen for four times the duration of the stimulus presentation interval (i.e., if 
the pigeon's stimulus presentation interval was 3 seconds, the delay period was 
set to 12 seconds), before the trial was terminated and a new trial started after 
an inter-trial interval of 10 seconds. During this timeout period, pecking the Stop 
signal had no effect. The six pigeons completing the Stop-Signal task reliably 
responded to at least 80% of Go trials and withheld a response on at least 80% 
of no-delay Stop-Signal trials at the end of the twenty training sessions. 
In no-delay Change-Signal trials, two pecks at the yellow alternative key 
resulted in the immediate deletion of the response display and the presentation 
of the reward key closest to the alternative key, followed by access to the 
respective food magazine for 2.5 seconds. Any pecks at the Change signal 
were ineffective for the duration of the display presentation interval; if no pecks 
at the alternative key were made during this interval, the trial was terminated 
and the next trial started after an inter-trial interval of 10 seconds. The six 
pigeons in the Change-Signal task successfully pecked the Go stimulus on at 
least 80% of Go trials and pecked the alternative key on at least 80% of no-
delay Change-Signal trials by the end of the twenty training sessions.  
 
Delayed Signal Training 
Upon reaching the pass criterion of the Go/Stop and Go/Change training, 
pigeons were given ten sessions in which, in addition to Go and no-delay Signal 
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trials, they also experienced Signal trials in which the appearance of the signal 
was delayed. In these trials, after pecking the start key, the Go stimulus was 
initially presented; it was subsequently replaced by the Stop or Change signal 
after one of three defined intervals (conventionally referred to as stop-signal-
onset intervals, or SSOs): they were set to 25%, 50% and 75% of a pigeon's 
mean response time in the previous session. That is, the absolute values of the 
SSOs in a given session depended on the pigeon's performance in the previous 
session; it could thus change from one session to the next. I established this 
tracking procedure in an effort to estimate the pigeons' ability to withhold a 
response at different stages of response preparation better than would be 
possible using arbitrarily chosen, fixed values, which might be too short or too 
long to necessitate any potential inhibitory control. Each of the three SSOs 
occurred equally often. The onset of the Stop or Change signal indicated that 
any pecking response towards the Go stimulus should be withheld. If, in the 
Stop-Signal task, the Go stimulus was pecked twice before the signal appeared, 
the pigeon immediately entered the timeout period in which the signal was 
presented on its own; to calculate the probability of incorrectly responding (and 
failing at inhibition), such a pre-emptive response was coded as an incorrect 
response in both the Stop-Signal and the Change-Signal task (even though at 
the time of making the response the signal had not appeared yet). Similarly, if, 
in the Change-Signal task, the alternative key was pecked twice before the 
signal onset, it was coded as a correct response; the second peck led to the 
immediate presentation of the reward key. 
Each of the ten 64-trial Signal-training sessions consisted of 48 Go trials, four 
no-delay Signal trials, four 25%-delayed Signal trials, four 50%-delayed Signal 
trials and four 75%-delayed Signal trials; that is, 75% of all trials were Go trials.  
 
Cued Stop-Signal and Change-Signal Task  
Following the Delayed Signal training sessions described above, the pigeons 
completed 30 further Signal sessions in which cues were presented prior to and 
during the stimulus display, as shown in Figure 4.2.1. The cue predicted the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a signal on this trial. There were three distinct 
cues: Cue A indicated that there would be a signal on the current trial with a 
probability of 25%; it preceded 18 Go trials, three no-delay Signal trials and 
three delayed Signal trials (each one with a different SSO). Cue B indicated a 
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50% probability of a signal; it preceded twelve Go trials, six no-delay Signal 
trials and six delayed Signal trials (two trials of each SSO). Cue C indicated a 
75% probability that the current trial would be a Signal trial; it preceded six Go 
trials, nine no-delay Signal trials and nine delayed Signal trials (three trials of 
each SSO). For easier discriminability, I shall henceforth refer to Cue A as a Go 
cue (as it was most likely to be followed by a Go trial), to Cue B as a neutral cue 
and to Cue C as a Signal cue (as it was most likely to be followed by a Signal 
trial). 
The Go and Signal cues were composed of vertically or horizontally orientated 
Gaussian grating patterns of high (21 circles per 100 pixels) or low (7 circles per 
100 pixels) spatial frequency, 50 pixels (15mm) in diameter. All four possible 
combinations of horizontal/vertical orientation of the grating and low/high spatial 
frequency were used and counterbalanced across subjects such that the two 
cues that indicated either a 25% or a 75% likelihood of a Stop signal on the 
current trial did not share any identical visual dimensions. For example, if one of 
the cues was made up of a horizontal grating pattern with a low spatial 
frequency, the complementary cue was a vertical pattern with a high spatial 
frequency grating. The neutral cue that indicated a 50% likelihood of an 
upcoming Signal trial was always uniformly filled with grey. A single peck at a 
cue led to the addition of the stimulus and alternative key to the display. From 
here on, the trial procedure matched that of an un-cued Signal trial as described 
for the Signal-training sessions.  
The ratio of Go trials was decreased to 50% of all trials in the cued sessions; 
this was done to limit the overall duration of a session whilst presenting a 
sufficient number of Signal trials. Furthermore, to highlight the function of the 
cues, the number of no-delay Signal trials was increased from ca. 6% of trials in 
the un-cued Signal-training sessions to 25% of all trials in the cued sessions. 
Thus, each cued session consisted of 36 Go trials, 18 no-delay Signal trials and 
18 delayed Signal trials.  
 
Cue-Probe Sessions  
Following the thirty cued Signal sessions, two probe sessions were 
administered to examine any transfer of response inhibition from the signal to 
the cues. In these sessions, the same three cues as in the cued Signal sessions 
were presented, but each cue was followed by 18 Go trials, nine no-delay 
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Signal trials, and nine delayed Signal trials (three trials of each SOA). That is, 
all three cues predicted a 50% chance of the occurrence of a signal. 
 
Humans  
 
Human participants completed one block of 72 trials of Signal training as 
described above for pigeons. This block was followed by 14 blocks of 72 trials 
of the cued Stop-Signal or Change-Signal task as described above, and then 
one cue-probe block of 72 trials, also as described above. Each block consisted 
of 36 Go trials, 18 no-delay Signal trials, six 25%-delayed Signal trials, six 50%-
delayed Signal trials and six 75%-delayed Signal trials. 
At the start of the experiment, i.e., in the Signal-training block, the signal-onset 
intervals for the delayed Signal trials were fixed to be 250ms, 500ms and 
750ms, respectively. The stimulus-presentation interval was set to two seconds 
in the Signal-training block; in subsequent blocks, the interval was defined as 
twice the mean response time of the previous block. 
 
The trial procedure was mainly identical to the procedure used with pigeons, 
shown in Figure 4.2.1, with the one difference that, in the full Stop-Signal and 
Change-Signal tasks, the observing key was omitted. 
During Signal training, each trial began with the presentation of a white 
observing key (200 pixels / 60mm in diameter) presented in the centre of a 
black display. Following a click at the observing key, it was replaced by two 
circular response keys (each 200 pixels / 60mm in diameter), whose centres 
were offset by 200 pixels (60mm) to the left and the right side of the display 
centre. For the cued trials in the subsequent blocks, a cue was presented 
instead of the observing key; i.e., a trial started with the presentation of one of 
the three predictive cues (200 pixels / 60mm in diameter). The cue remained 
visible on screen after being clicked, and the two response keys were added to 
the display on either side of the cue. One of the response keys was filled in red 
or green. For some participants, a green stimulus indicated that the current trial 
was a Go trial and a red stimulus indicated a Stop or Change trial; for other 
participants, the colour assignment was reversed. The other key was yellow and 
served as a choice alternative to the red or green stimulus. The locations of the 
stimulus and the alternative key (left or right) were randomised across trials. 
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For both the Stop-Signal and the Change-Signal task, in Go trials, a click at the 
Go stimulus resulted in the deletion of the response display and the 
presentation of a gold star in the location of the Go stimulus, next to the word 
“Correct!” presented in white letters in the centre of the display for one second. 
Then, the next trial started after an inter-trial interval of 100ms. Any clicks on the 
alternative key were ineffective; if the participant did not click the Go stimulus 
within the stimulus-presentation interval, the trial ended and the next trial started 
after the inter-trial interval. 
For Signal trials, reinforcement varied between the two tasks. In the Stop-Signal 
task, any mouse-clicks on the alternative key were ineffective. As for the 
pigeons, as soon as a participant clicked on the Go stimulus/Stop signal, he or 
she entered a timeout period in which only the Stop signal remained on screen 
for three times the stimulus-presentation interval. If no click was made at the 
stimulus, the trial terminated at the end of the stimulus-presentation interval and 
the next trial started after an inter-trial interval of 100ms. In the Change-Signal 
task, any clicks on the stimulus/Stop signal were ineffective. A click on the 
alternative key resulted in the deletion of the response display and the 
presentation of a gold star in the location of the alternative key, next to the word 
“Correct!” presented in white letters in the centre of the display for one second. 
Then, the next trial started after the inter-trial interval. If the participant did not 
click the alternative key within the stimulus-presentation interval, the trial ended 
and next trial started after the inter-trial interval. 
 
At the end of the experiment, participants completed an on-screen 
questionnaire to assess their approach to the paradigm, and their awareness of 
the function of the two stimulus colours as either Go or Stop/Change signals 
and of the function of the predictive cues. The questionnaire is attached as 
Appendix A4. 
 
Data Collection 
 
To assess whether the predictions made by the independent horse-race model 
about the duration of Go and Stop processes apply to the performance of 
pigeons and humans in this paradigm, and to examine the potential influence of 
cue information on the subjects’ ability to inhibit a response, I recorded error 
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rates in response to each type of trial. For pigeons, correct responses were 
defined as follows: for Go trials, pecking the Go stimulus twice in succession (in 
the Change-Signal task, doing so without previously pecking the alternative 
key); for Signal trials in the Stop-Signal task, pecking the Go stimulus or Stop 
signal once or not at all (pecks at the alternative key were irrelevant); for Signal 
trials in the Change-Signal task, pecking the alternative key twice in succession 
without previously pecking the Go stimulus. All other responses (including, in 
the Change-Signal task, making no response) were coded as errors. For 
humans, correct responses were defined as follows: for Go trials, clicking the 
Go stimulus; for Stop-Signal trials, not clicking the Go stimulus or Stop signal 
(clicks at the alternative key were irrelevant); for Change-Signal trials, clicking 
the alternative key (to allow for comparison to the Stop-Signal task, making no 
response at all was also considered correct). All other responses were coded as 
errors. From these measures, it was possible to calculate the probability of 
responding incorrectly on Signal trials, P(respond), the probability of incorrectly 
responding on Signal trials after the signal had occurred, P(respond|Signal), 
and the probability of missing a correct response to the Go stimulus on Go 
trials, P(miss|Go). These data are conventionally reported in the stop-signal 
literature and will allow for an accurate comparison of the pattern of 
performance of pigeons to that of humans. Additionally, I recorded response 
latencies of the pigeons’ first and the second peck, including the identity of the 
key that was chosen at the first and second peck. For the pigeons in the 
Change-Signal task, I also recorded the number of pecks at the alternative key 
and the latencies of the first and second peck at that key. It has to be noted 
that, although I collected information about the first peck, I focussed the 
analyses on the second consecutive peck made towards a stimulus, since the 
first peck might have been of a ballistic nature and might not have been target-
specific. For humans, the latencies of clicking a response key and the identity of 
that key were recorded. 
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4.3  Are Associative Processes Sufficient to Inhibit or Change a Prepared 
Response? 
In this section, I aimed to verify Verbruggen et al.’s claims (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008b, 2009a; Verbruggen et al., 2014; Best et al., 2016) by assessing 
whether the predictions made by the independent horse-race model of 
response inhibition apply to performance that is governed purely by associative 
processes. More specifically, I investigated whether the model fits the 
performance of pigeons in the response-inhibition paradigms developed in 
Section 4.2, which included a Stop-Signal task in which the failure to inhibit the 
Go response in trials that afforded it was punished with a timeout, and a 
Change-Signal task in which the correct execution of an alternative response 
was rewarded, to estimate whether the same or different cognitive processes 
govern response inhibition in these two tasks. I also accounted for the 
possibility that executive control mediates goal activation, which might become 
apparent in sequential effects across trials, by examining the effects of 
executing or inhibiting a response in one trial on performance in the subsequent 
trial. 
In addition to pigeons, I tested human participants in the same paradigms, to 
assess whether the Stop-Signal and Change-Signal tasks established in 
Section 4.2 could elicit the pattern of behaviour in humans that is conventionally 
observed when completing these response-inhibition tasks. 
 
Subjects 
 
Forty-seven undergraduate Psychology students and twelve pigeons were 
subjected to the experimental procedure described in Section 4.2. Six pigeons 
completed the Stop-Signal task, the other six pigeons completed the Change-
Signal task. Of the human participants, 30 participants were assigned to the 
Stop-Signal task, the other 17 participants were in the Change-Signal task. 
Because trial lengths were adjusted dynamically based on a participant's mean 
response times, the average trial length increased from one test block to the 
next for participants who responded very slowly or not at all, to the point that 
they had not completed the entire experiment before the end of the two hours 
allocated for the experiment and consequently aborted the task. This affected 
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15 participants in the Stop-Signal task and one participant in the Change-Signal 
task. This difference between tasks is not surprising, since the participants in 
the Stop-Signal task learned that an early response potentially has negative 
consequences (see Section 3.2 for details) and thus responded more and more 
slowly; the demand in the Change-Signal task to make a response (either 
towards the Go stimulus or the alternate key, see Section 3.2 for details) 
prevented an escalation of response times. The data of those participants was 
excluded from the analyses reported below, which only includes the data of the 
15 participants from the Stop-Signal task and the 16 participants from the 
Change-Signal task who did complete all test blocks including the probe block. 
However, the data of the excluded participants that was available at the point at 
which their session was aborted was compared to the data of those who did 
complete the experiment. As expected, the participants who were excluded for 
responding too slowly or not at all showed longer latencies to respond towards 
the Go stimulus than the included participants, F(1,32)=25.57, p<.001, ηp2=.44, 
and showed a lower probability of responding to the signal, F(1,43)=9.28, 
p=.004, ηp2=.18, but they showed no significant differences in their error rates, 
F(1,43)=3.05, p=.088. 
 
Results 
 
Pigeons 
The pigeons completed the Go training in a mean of 14 sessions. Final stimulus 
presentation intervals ranged from 2.5 to 4 seconds for pigeons completing the 
Stop-Signal task and from 4 to 5 seconds for pigeons in the Change-Signal 
task.  
 
Both error rates and latencies to make two pecks at the stimulus in Go trials, 
no-delay Signal trials and delayed Signal trials were analysed in repeated-
measures ANOVAs using Trial Type (Go, no-delay Signal, 25%-delayed Signal, 
50%-delayed Signal, 75%-delayed Signal) as a within-subjects factor and Task 
(Stop-Signal or Change-Signal) as a between-subjects factor.  
Conventionally, the human response-inhibition literature considers the 
probability of incorrectly responding on Signal trials, P(respond), and the latency 
to make a response to the Go stimulus on both Go and Signal trials to be the 
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most informative measures of performance in Stop-Signal and Change-Signal 
paradigms. In the Stop-Signal task, P(respond) is identical to the pigeons' error 
rates on Signal trials. For the pigeons in the Change-Signal task, overall error 
rates additionally included trials in which fewer than two consecutive pecks at 
either key were made. Hence, in order to facilitate comparison to P(respond) in 
the Stop-Signal task, trials with such missing responses were recoded as 
correct in Change-Signal trials (making errors on Change-Signal trials 
synonymous to the probability of responding to the incorrect key instead of 
making any other response), those data are also reported in Table 4.3.1. 
P(respond) includes responses to the Go stimulus before the appearance of the 
signal; I also recorded the probability of responding to the signal when it had 
already occurred, P(respond|Signal), so that this could be contrasted with the 
overall error rates on Signal trials. P(respond|Signal) in Signal trials was 
examined via a repeated-measures ANOVA using Signal Delay (no delay, 25% 
delay, 50% delay and 75% delay) as a within-subjects factor and Task (Stop-
Signal or Change-Signal) as a between-subjects factor.  
For the Change-Signal task, I also recorded the latencies to peck the alternative 
key, which made it possible to compare the latencies to peck the correct key 
across trial types, using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial Type as a 
within-subjects factor. Where applicable, the reported results were subject to 
Huynh-Feldt corrections. Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables are 
summarised in Table 4.3.1. 
 
The potential influence of the previous trial type (Go or Signal trial) on 
performance in each measure was examined in repeated-measures ANOVAs 
using Current Trial Type (Go, no-delay Signal, 25%-delayed Signal, 50%-
delayed Signal, 75%-delayed Signal) and Previous Trial Type (Go or Signal) as 
within-subjects factors, and Task (Stop-Signal or Change-Signal) as between-
subjects factor (with the exception of the latencies to peck the correct key, 
which was analysed for the Change-Signal task only). Only trials following a 
correct trial were included in these analyses to ensure that response execution 
and inhibition in the previous trial had been successful. 
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Table 4.3.1. Pigeons: Descriptive statistics of errors, P(respond|Signal), latency to 
peck the Go stimulus and latency of correct responses (Change-Signal task only) 
depending on Trial Type. 
 
Trial Type 
Go 
Signal - 
no delay 
Signal - 
25% 
delayed 
Signal - 
50% 
delayed 
Signal - 
75% 
delayed 
Stop-Signal Task      
 
Errors Mean % 16.5 0.2 1.8 12.8 34.8 
Std. Error 5.0 2.7 2.5 2.0 2.5 
P(respond|Signal) Mean - 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.24 
Std. Error - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 
Latency to peck 
the Go stimulus 
Mean ms 1606 2469 667 821 999 
Std. Error 153 523 96 62 82 
Number of 
valid trials 
5417 12 17 136 378 
% of all 
trials of this 
type 
83.5 0.6 1.6 12.6 35.0 
Change-Signal Task       
 
Errors Mean % 30.2 24.7 36.0 49.2 61.3 
Std. Error 5.4 3.9 3.8 2.7 2.6 
Errors recoded as 
P(respond) 
Mean % 30.2 1.5 1.8 4.8 12.3 
Std. Error 5.4 0.9 0.9 1.3 2.3 
P(respond|Signal) Mean - 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08 
Std. Error - 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Latency to peck 
the Go stimulus 
Mean ms 2016 1802 538 1115 1131 
Std. Error 105 466 357 146 91 
Number of 
valid trials 
4513 50 20 53 133 
% of all 
trials of this 
type 
69.9 1.5 1.9 4.9 12.4 
Latency of correct 
response 
(SSO subtracted) 
Mean ms 2015 1997 1896 1812 1673 
Std. Error 104 105 84 62 48 
Number of 
valid trials 
752 406 116 91 69 
% of all 
trials of this 
type 
69.8 75.4 64.3 50.9 38.6 
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Figure 4.3.1. Pigeons: Error rates in % depending on Trial Type in A) the Change-
Signal task and B) the Stop-Signal task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
Errors  
Error rates are illustrated for each task respectively in Figure 4.3.1. They 
differed between the Stop-Signal and the Change-Signal tasks, F(1,10)=38.96, 
p<.001, ηp2=.80, as pigeons in the Change-Signal task made more errors than 
the pigeons performing the Stop-Signal task. The Trial Type greatly influenced 
error rates, F(4,40)=54.66, p<.001, ηp2=.85, and the way that error rates 
depended on Trial Type was significantly affected by the task that pigeons 
performed, F(4,40)=5.90, p=.009, ηp2=.37. 
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that, for the Stop-Signal task, errors on Go 
trials (i.e., pecking the Go stimulus once or not at all) differed significantly from 
errors on no-delay Stop-Signal trials (i.e., pecking the Go stimulus twice or 
more), p=.026; for the Change-Signal task, performance was also significantly 
different between Go trials and no-delay Change-Signal trials, p=.030. The 
uncorrected comparisons are provided here as these give some insight into the 
pattern present in the data; however, when applying Bonferroni corrections on 
the basis of all comparisons made in analysing these data, the comparison of 
Go trials to no-delay Signal trials becomes non-significant for both tasks, both 
p≥.26.  
The mean percentage of errors in Signal trials differed significantly for all 
uncorrected comparisons between these four trial types in both tasks, all 
p≤.020.  
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There was a significant linear trend for both tasks (both p<.001; due to the low 
errors for no-delay and 25%-delayed Stop-Signal trials, there was also a 
significant quadratic trend in the Stop-Signal task, p<.001) in that error rates 
increased from no-delay Signal trials to 25%-delayed Signal trials to 50%-
delayed Signal trials to 75%-delayed Signal trials in both the Stop-Signal task 
and the Change-Signal task, which is in line with the predictions of the 
independent horse-race model. 
 
Comparing errors in each Trial Type between the two tasks, error rates in 
Signal trials differed significantly between the Stop-Signal and the Change-
Signal task, all p≤.007; as reported in Table 4.3.1, error rates in response to the 
signal were higher in the Change-Signal task than in the Stop-Signal task for all 
four types of Signal trials. Errors on Go trials however, though also somewhat 
higher in the Change-Signal task, were not significantly different between the 
two tasks, p=.10. 
 
Figure 4.3.6 shows these data in comparison to the human data. The previous 
trial (Go or Signal) did not significantly affect error rates overall, F(1,10)=3.93, 
p=.076, but there was a significant interaction between the previous trial type 
and the current trial type, F(4,40)=4.81, p=.008, ηp2=.33. The task that the 
pigeons performed did not influence these results, both interactions: p≥.79. 
However, the differences were only significant in post-hoc comparisons when 
no corrections for multiple comparisons were applied; on Go trials, error rates 
were marginally higher following a Signal trial than following a Go trial 
(difference: 2.5%, SE: 1.1%), p=.050. In Signal trials, error rates were 
somewhat higher following a Go trial than following a Signal trial when the 
current trial was a 50%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 2.9%, SE: 5.1%), 
p=.050, or a 75%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 4.8%, SE: 3.6%), p=.042; all 
other comparisons: p≥.28. When Bonferroni-corrections were applied, none of 
the comparisons were significant, all p≥.21. That is, the pigeons showed a slight 
tendency to benefit from a repetition in response requirements, but this benefit 
did not persist in the light of statistical corrections.  
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P(respond|Signal) 
Like overall error rate, the probability of pecking at the signal differed 
significantly between tasks, F(1,10)=7.94, p=.018, ηp2=.44, although the direction 
was reversed: pigeons in the Stop-Signal task showed a greater probability of 
responding after the signal was shown than those in the Change-Signal task, as 
shown in Figure 4.3.2. Signal Delay had a strong influence on the probability of 
responding to the signal, F(3,30)=28.97, p<.001, ηp2=.74. The task that pigeons 
performed influenced the effect of Signal Delay on the likelihood to respond to 
the signal, F(3,30)=9.02, p=.006, ηp2=.47.  
For the pigeons in the Stop-Signal task, uncorrected post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that P(respond|Signal) differed between all four types of Stop-Signal 
trials, all p≤.035. A significant linear trend (p=.003) confirms that the likelihood 
of responding to the signal increased from no-delay Stop-Signal trials to 25%-
delayed Stop-Signal trials to 50%-delayed Stop-Signal trials to 75%-delayed 
Stop-Signal trials. However, when applying Bonferroni corrections, 
P(respond|Signal) did not differ significantly between no-delay Stop-Signal and 
25%-delayed Stop-Signal trials, p=.12, nor between 50%-delayed and 75%-
delayed Stop-Signal trials, p=.21; all other p≤.045. In the Change-Signal task, 
P(respond|Signal) was of a similar magnitude in no-delay Change-Signal and 
25%-delayed Change-Signal trials, p=.70, and increased significantly from 25%-
delayed to 50%-delayed to 75%-delayed Change-Signal trials, all pairwise 
comparisons: p≤.028. The significant quadratic trend of the data confirms this 
pattern, p=.015. When applying Bonferroni corrections, the difference between 
50%-delayed and 75%-delayed Change-Signal trials becomes nonsignificant, 
p=.17, and the difference between no-delay and 75%-delayed Change-Signal 
trials was marginal, p=.059; all other p≤.038. All in all, the patterns for each task 
largely adhered to the predictions of the independent horse-race model. 
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Figure 4.3.2. Pigeons: The probability of responding on Signal trials after the signal 
had occurred, P(Respond|Signal), depending on Trial Type in A) the Change-Signal 
task and B) the Stop-Signal task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.8 shows these data in comparison to the human data. The previous 
trial (Go or Signal) significantly affected P(respond|Signal), F(1,10)=6.30, 
p=.031, ηp2=.39, in that the probability of responding to the Signal was greater in 
trials following a Go trial than in trials following a Signal trial (difference: 0.015, 
SE: 0.006), but there was no significant interaction between the previous trial 
type and the signal-onset delay of the current trial, F(3,30)=1.42, p=.27. The 
task that the pigeons performed did not influence these results, both 
interactions: p≥.42. This result implies that the pigeons generally showed a 
greater probability of making an incorrect response if that response was 
required (and executed) in the previous trial. 
 
Latency to respond  
The latencies of the second consecutive peck at the Go stimulus or signal (for 
the Change-Signal task, without having previously pecked the alternative key) 
are illustrated in Figure 4.3.3. It has to be noted that only four of the pigeons 
completing the Stop-Signal task and two pigeons completing the Change-Signal 
task responded (incorrectly) to the stimulus in at least one trial of each type of 
Signal trial, and thus produced analysable latencies for every trial type.  
For those six pigeons, response latencies did not differ significantly between 
tasks, F(1,5)=0.16, p=.71, nor did the task that pigeons performed influence the 
effect of Trial Type on response times, F(4,20)=1.83, p=.17. The factor Trial 
Type did affect latencies significantly, F(4,20)=10.80, p<.001, ηp2=.68. 
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Figure 4.3.3. Pigeons: Latencies in ms of the second peck that is made at the Go 
stimulus, depending on Trial Type, in A) the Change-Signal task (given that there have 
not been any pecks to the alternative key) and B) the Stop-Signal task. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
Post-hoc comparisons between trial types (regardless of task) showed that 
latencies of correct responses in Go trials and of incorrect responses to the 
stimulus/signal in no-delay Signal trials were significantly longer than those in 
the three types of delayed Stop-Signal trials, all p≤.023. The latency to 
incorrectly peck the stimulus in no-delay trials however did not differ significantly 
from latencies in Go trials, p=.38. Furthermore, the latencies of 75%-delayed 
Signal trials were significantly longer than those in 50%-delayed Signal trials, 
p=.019. Again, the uncorrected comparisons are provided here to illustrate the 
pattern present in the data; when applying Bonferroni corrections, only the 
differences in latencies in Go trials compared to 50%-delayed and 75%-delayed 
Signal trials stays significant, p=.002 and p=.001, respectively; all other 
comparisons: p≥.14. This result is not surprising considering that the number of 
Signal trials in which the pigeons made an error was very low (it only happened 
in 799 of the 12932 (6.2%) Signal trials, which resulted in very high variability in 
the data).  
 
Only two pigeons (one in each task) produced enough data to compare the 
effects of the previous trial type on response times when the current trial was a 
Signal trial; therefore, the analysis of sequential effects included Go trials only. 
Response times in Go trials were not significantly affected by the previous trial 
type (difference between trials following a Signal trial and following a Go trial: 
27ms, SE: 24ms), F(1,10)=1.58, p=.24. The task that pigeons performed had no 
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significant influence on this result, F(1,10)=3.47, p=.092. Figure 4.3.10 shows 
these data in comparison to the human data. 
 
Latency of correct responses in the Change-Signal task 
The data of the Change-Signal task made it possible to assess response 
latencies to make a correct choice from the moment of the signal onset. For this 
analysis, I considered only those trials in which both a pigeon's first and second 
peck were made towards the correct stimulus (Go stimulus on Go trials, 
alternative stimulus on Change-Signal trials) and occurred after the onset of the 
Change signal, and subtracted the corresponding SSO of each type of Change-
Signal trial from the latency of the second peck. The resulting latencies of the 
second peck from signal onset are illustrated in Figure 4.3.4. Latencies differed 
significantly between the five trial types, F(4,20)=7.40, p=.001, ηp2=.60. 
Uncorrected post-hoc comparisons showed that the latency to peck the correct 
response key once the signal had appeared in 75%-delayed Change-Signal 
trials was significantly shorter than the latency to respond correctly in Go trials, 
p=.007, no-delay Change-Signal trials, p=.012, and 25%-delayed Change-
Signal trials, p=.025, and marginally shorter than latencies in 50%-delayed 
Change-Signal trials, p=.080. Further, the difference between making a second 
peck at the correct key in no-delay Change-Signal trials and in 25%-delayed 
Change-Signal trials was statistically significant, p=.008. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.4. Pigeons: Latencies in ms to make two pecks at the correct key after the 
signal had occurred in the Change-Signal task. Note: in no-delay Signal trials, the 
signal occurred immediately; in Go trials, no signal occurred, reported are the latencies 
to respond to the Go stimulus. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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However, after applying Bonferroni corrections, the latencies to make a correct 
response did not differ significantly across the five trial types, although the 
difference between Go trials and 75%-delayed Change-Signal trials and the 
difference between no-delay and 25%-delayed Change-Signal trials remained 
marginally significant, p=.065 and p=.081 respectively, all other p≥.13. 
Nonetheless, there is a significant linear trend in the data, p=.013; latencies 
decrease across trial types. 
The previous trial (Go or Signal) did not significantly affect latencies to peck the 
correct key, F(1,5)=1.02, p=.36, nor was there an interaction between the 
previous and the current trial type, F(4,20)=2.27, p=.15.  
 
Humans 
As for pigeons, error rates and latencies to click on the stimulus in Go trials, no-
delay Signal trials and delayed Signal trials were analysed in two repeated-
measures ANOVAs using Trial Type (Go, no-delay Signal, 25%-delayed Signal, 
50%-delayed Signal, 75%-delayed Signal) as a within-subjects factor and Task 
(Stop-Signal or Change-Signal) as a between-subjects factor. The error rates 
for Signal trials are identical to P(Respond) for both the Stop-Signal and the 
Change-Signal task, as only clicks at the Go stimulus were marked incorrect in 
these trials; all other behaviour (i.e., clicking the alternative key or making no 
response) were marked as correct. As for the pigeons, I also assessed the 
probability of responding to the signal when it had already occurred, 
P(respond|Signal), via a repeated-measures ANOVA, using Signal Delay (no 
delay, 25% delay, 50% delay and 75% delay) as a within-subjects factor and 
Task (Stop-Signal or Change-Signal) as a between-subjects factor.  
For the Change-Signal task, I additionally compared the latencies to click the 
correct key across trial types, using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Trial 
Type as a within-subjects factor. Where applicable, the reported results were 
subject to Huynh-Feldt corrections. Descriptive statistics for all dependent 
variables are summarised in Table 4.3.2. 
 
As for the pigeons, the potential influence of the previous trial type (Go or Signal 
trial) on performance in each measure was examined in repeated-measures 
ANOVAs using Current Trial Type (Go, no-delay Signal, 25%-delayed Signal, 
50%-delayed Signal, 75%-delayed Signal) and Previous Trial Type (Go or 
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Signal) as within-subjects factors, and Task (Stop-Signal or Change-Signal) as 
between-subjects factor (with the exception of the latencies to click the correct 
key, which was analysed for the Change-Signal task only). Only trials following 
a correct trial were included in these analyses to ensure that response 
execution and inhibition in the previous trial had been successful. 
 
Table 4.3.2. Humans: Descriptive statistics of errors, latency to click the Go stimulus, 
P(respond|Signal) and latency of correct responses (Change-Signal task only) 
depending on Trial Type. 
 
Trial Type 
Go 
Signal - 
no delay 
Signal - 
25% 
delayed 
Signal - 
50% 
delayed 
Signal - 
75% 
delayed 
Stop-Signal Task      
 
Errors Mean % 5.7 11.8 46.7 73.5 87.1 
Std. Error 3.0 4.4 3.6 3.2 3.0  
P(respond|Signal) Mean - 0.13 0.48 0.57 0.55 
Std. Error - 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Latency to click 
the stimulus 
Mean ms 676 831 538 581 628 
Std. Error 36 95 25 22 27 
Number of 
valid trials 
7119 449 590 925 1096 
% of all 
trials of this 
type 
94.2 11.9 46.8 73.4 87.0 
Change-Signal Task      
 
Errors Mean % 16.0 11.3 19.9 47.9 69.9 
Std. Error 5.1 4.4 4.0 4.2 4.1 
P(respond|Signal) Mean - 0.13 0.21 0.47 0.57 
Std. Error - 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Latency to click 
the stimulus 
Mean ms 749 754 613 606 658 
Std. Error 52 89 77 42 45 
Number of 
valid trials 
6775 457 268 644 939 
% of all 
trials of this 
type 
84.0 11.3 19.9 47.9 69.9 
Latency of correct 
response 
(SSO subtracted) 
Mean ms 737 755 691 721 642 
Std. Error 55 43 42 61 43 
Number of 
valid trials 
6775 3511 1030 575 218 
% of all 
trials of this 
type 
84.0 87.1 76.6 42.8 16.2 
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Figure 4.3.5. Humans: Error rates in % depending on Trial Type in A) the Change-
Signal task and B) the Stop-Signal task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
Errors  
Error rates are illustrated for each task respectively in Figures 4.3.5. For both 
Stop-Signal and Change-Signal trials, error rates are identical to the probability 
of incorrectly responding to the Go stimulus, P(respond). Errors differed 
between the Stop-Signal and the Change-Signal tasks, F(1,29)=18.11, p<.001, 
ηp2=.38, as participants in the Stop-Signal task made more errors overall than 
those in the Change-Signal task. The Trial Type greatly influenced error rates, 
F(4,116)=119.66, p<.001, ηp2=.81, and the task that was performed significantly 
influenced the effect of Signal Delay on error rates, F(4,116)=8.82, p=.001, 
ηp2=.23. 
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that, for the Stop-Signal task, errors 
in Go trials (i.e., not clicking the Go stimulus) did not differ significantly from 
errors in no-delay Stop-Signal trials (i.e., clicking the Go stimulus), p=.63, but 
did differ from errors in the three delayed Stop-Signal trials, all p<.001. Mean 
error rates in Stop-Signal trials differed significantly for all comparisons between 
these four trial types, all p≤.001, as errors increased from no-delay Stop-Signal 
trials to 25%-delayed Stop-Signal trials to 50%-delayed Stop-Signal trials to 
75%-delayed Stop-Signal trials.  
 
In the Change-Signal task, performance was significantly different for all 
comparisons of 50%-delayed and 75%-delayed Signal trials, all p≤.003. Error 
rates in no-delay Change-Signal trials were not significantly smaller than those 
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in 25%-delay Change-Signal trials, p=.17, and marginally but non-significantly 
smaller than those in Go trials, p=.056. Taken together, error rates were of 
comparable size in no-delay and 25%-delayed Change-Signal trials, but 
increased to 50%-delayed Change-Signal trials and again to 75%-delayed 
Change-Signal trials.  
Comparing errors in each trial type between the two tasks, error rates in the 
three delayed types of Signal trials differed significantly between the Stop-
Signal and the Change-Signal task, all p≤.002; as reported in Table 4.3.2, error 
rates in response to the signal were higher in the Stop-Signal task than in the 
Change-Signal task for those Signal trials. Errors in no-delay Signal trials were 
of comparable magnitude in the two tasks, p=.94. Errors in Go trials, though 
somewhat lower in the Stop-Signal task, were also not significantly different 
between the two tasks, p=.095. 
 
 
 
   
Figure 4.3.6. Error rates in trials following a Go trial and trials following a Signal trial, 
depending on the current trial type (Go, no-delay Signal, 25%-delayed Signal, 50%-
delayed Signal or 75%-delayed Signal trial), for humans and pigeons. 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.3.6, the previous trial (Go or Signal) significantly affected 
error rates, F(1,29)=44.92, p<.001, ηp2=.61, and there was a significant 
interaction of the previous trial type with the current trial type, F(4,116)=12.48, 
p<.001, ηp2=.30. These results did not differ between the two tasks that were 
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performed, both interactions: p≥.11. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed 
that, on Go trials, error rates were significantly higher following a Signal trial 
than following a Go trial (difference: 2.4%, SE: 0.7%), p=.005. In Signal trials, 
error rates were significantly higher following a Go trial than following a Signal 
trial when the current trial was a 25%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 16.6%, 
SE: 2.5%), p<.001; 50%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 14.9%, SE: 3.2%), 
p=.001, or a 75%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 10.6%, SE: 2.3%), p=.001. 
For no-delay Signal trials, the difference was not-significant (difference: 2.7%, 
SE: 0.9%), p=.13. 
Comparing across species, humans and pigeons differed significantly in the 
way the previous trial type affected error rates on the subsequent trial, three-
way interaction between previous trial type, current trial type and species: 
F(4,156)=2.96, p=.030, ηp2=.07. Although the same general pattern - in that 
performance benefitted when the current trial afforded the same response 
(either response execution or response inhibition) as the previous trial - was 
somewhat visible in the performance of pigeons, humans showed a greater 
decrease in error rates following a Signal trial than pigeons when the current 
trial was a 25%-delayed Signal trial, p<.001, or a 50%-delayed Signal trial, 
p=.017 (see Figure 4.3.6). 
 
P(respond|Signal) 
The probability of responding to the signal, shown in Figure 4.3.7, differed 
significantly between tasks, F(1,29)=6.47, p=.017, ηp2=.18. Signal Delay had a 
strong influence on the probability of responding to the signal, F(3,87)=50.43, 
p<.001, ηp2=.64, and the task that was performed significantly influenced the 
effect of Signal Delay on the likelihood to respond to the signal, F(3,87)=5.42, 
p=.003, ηp2=.16. 
For the Stop-Signal task, Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that 
P(respond|Signal) was significantly lower for no-delay Stop-Signal trials than for 
the other three types of Stop-Signal trials, all p≤.001. All comparisons between 
the other three trial types were non-significant, all p≥.41. 
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Figure 4.3.7. Humans: The probability of responding on Signal trials after the signal 
had occurred, P(Respond|Signal), depending on Trial Type in A) the Change-Signal 
task and B) the Stop-Signal task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
In the Change-Signal task, P(respond|Signal) was of a similar magnitude in no-
delay Change-Signal and 25%-delayed Change-Signal trials, p=.11, but it was 
significantly increased in 50%-delayed and 75%-delayed Change-Signal trials, 
all p≤.001. 50%-delayed and 75%-delayed Change-Signal trials did not differ 
from each other, p=.31. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.3.8, the previous trial (Go or Signal) significantly affected 
P(respond|Signal), F(1,28)=21.79, p<.001, ηp2=.44, and there was a significant 
interaction between the previous trial type and the current trial type, 
F(3,84)=3.40, p=.027, ηp2=.11. The task that was completed did not affect these 
results, both interactions: p≥.24. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons show that the 
probability of responding to the signal was significantly higher following a Signal 
trial than following a Go trial when the current trial was a no-delay Signal trial 
(difference: 0.03, SE: 0.01), p=.026, 25%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 0.16, 
SE: 0.03), p<.001, or a 50%-delayed Signal trial (difference: 0.13, SE: 0.04), 
p=.003, but not when the current trial was a 75%-delayed Signal trial, p=.091. 
Humans and pigeons did not differ significantly in the way the previous trial type 
affected P(respond|Signal) on the current trial, three-way interaction between 
previous trial type, current trial type and species: F(3,117)=1.04, p=.38.  
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Figure 4.3.8. P(respond|Signal) in trials following a Go trial and trials following a Signal 
trial, depending on the current trial type (no-delay Signal, 25%-delayed Signal, 50%-
delayed Signal or 75%-delayed Signal), for humans and pigeons.  
 
 
 
Latency to respond 
The latencies to click the stimulus (for the Change-Signal task, without having 
previously clicked the alternative key) are illustrated in Figure 4.3.9. Response 
latencies did not differ significantly between tasks, F(1,25)=0.13, p=.72, nor did 
the task that was performed influence the effect of Trial Type on response 
times, F(4,100)=1.40, p=.26. The factor Trial Type did affect latencies 
significantly, F(4,100)=11.75, p<.001, ηp2=.32.  
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that, for the Stop-Signal task, 
latencies of correct responses in Go trials were significantly longer than the 
latencies of incorrect responses to the Go stimulus in the three types of delayed 
Stop-Signal trials, all p≤.042. Further, the latencies of 75%-delayed Stop-Signal 
trials were significantly longer than those in 50%-delayed Stop-Signal trials, 
p=.011, and in 25%-delayed Stop-Signal trials, p=.006. Latencies in no-delay 
Stop-Signal trials were marginally longer than those in 25%-delayed Stop-
Signal trials, p=.099; all other comparisons between trials: p≥.15. 
For the Change-Signal task, latencies in Go trials were significantly longer than 
those of 50%-delayed and 75%-delayed Change-Signal trials, both p≤.001. All 
other comparisons between trials were non-significant, all p≥.11.  
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Figure 4.3.9. Humans: Latencies in ms to click the Go stimulus/signal, depending on 
Trial Type, in A) the Change-Signal task (given that there have not been any clicks at 
the alternative key) and B) the Stop-Signal task. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
When comparing latencies to respond to the stimulus in each Trial Type 
between tasks, latencies to correctly choose the stimulus in Go trials were not 
significantly different in the Change-Signal task and in the Stop-Signal task, all 
p≥.31.  
 
Eighteen humans produced sufficient data to analyse the effect of the previous 
trial type on response times towards the Go stimulus. For those participants, the 
previous trial (Go or Signal) did not significantly affect the latencies to respond 
to the Go stimulus, F(1,16)=0.27, p=.61; nor was there an interaction between 
the previous and the current trial type, F(4,64)=1.10, p=.36. The task that was 
performed did not affect these results, both p≥.28. To compare performance to 
pigeons, the analysis of sequential effects was repeated including Go trials only. 
As shown in Figure 4.3.10, response times were significantly longer in Go trials 
following a Signal trial than in those following a Go trial (difference: 73ms, SE: 
15ms), F(1,29)=22.88, p<.001, ηp2=.44. This result was not affected by the task 
that was completed, F(1,29)=1.42, p=.24. Humans and pigeons differed 
significantly in the way the previous trial type affected response times on the 
current Go trial, interaction between previous trial type and species: 
F(1,39)=12.75, p=.001, ηp2=.25 (see Figure 4.3.10). 
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Latency of correct responses in the Change-Signal task 
As above for pigeons, I considered only those trials in which the first click was 
made at the correct key (Go stimulus on Go trials, alternative key on Change-
Signal trials) and occurred after the onset of the Change signal, and subtracted 
the corresponding SSO of each type of Change-Signal trial from the response 
latency. The resulting latencies from signal onset are illustrated in Figure 4.3.11. 
Latencies did not differ significantly between the five Trial Types, F(4,60)=1.97, 
p=.13. There was no significant linear trend or non-linear trend in the data when 
considering all trials, p>.071, but the latency to make a correct response 
decreased linearly when considering only the four types of Change-Signal trials, 
p=.029. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.10. Response times towards the Go stimulus in Go trials, depending on 
whether the previous trial was a Go trial (white bars) or a Signal trial (grey bars), for 
pigeons and humans. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 4.3.11. Humans: Latencies in ms to respond to the correct key after the signal 
had occurred in the Change-Signal task. Note: in no-delay Signal trials, the signal 
occurred immediately; in Go trials, no signal occurred, reported are the latencies to 
respond to the Go stimulus. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
The previous trial (Go or Signal) did not significantly affect the latencies to 
respond correctly, F(1,15)=2.72, p=.12, but there was a significant interaction 
between the previous trial type and the current trial type, F(4,60)=2.65, p=.042, 
ηp2=.15. On Go trials, latencies to make the correct response were marginally 
longer following a Change-Signal trial than following a Go trial (difference: 
55ms, SE: 25ms), but the difference was only significant when no corrections 
for multiple comparisons were applied to the post-hoc comparisons, p=.048 
(Bonferroni-corrected: p=.24). In Change-Signal trials, response latencies were 
not significantly longer following a Change-Signal trial than following a Go trial, 
all p≥.070. Humans and pigeons differed significantly in the way the previous 
trial type affected error rates on the subsequent trial, three-way interaction 
between previous trial type, current trial type and species: F(4,80)=2.95, 
p=.037, ηp2=.13. However, Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that 
humans only marginally showed a greater increase in response times following 
a Change-Signal trial than pigeons when the current trial was a Go trial, p=.14. 
Because none of the differences were significant in Bonferroni-corrected post-
hoc comparisons, no separate figure of the results is provided. 
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Discussion 
  
The performance of pigeons and humans in both the Stop-Signal and the 
Change-Signal task matched the predictions made by the independent horse-
race model, which assumes that the process of initiating a response and the 
process of inhibiting a response are independent mechanisms, and behaviour is 
determined by the process that is completed first. Based on this assumption, 
one can expect to observe that performance should decrease with increasing 
signal onset.  
This was the case for both pigeons and humans, who behaved remarkably 
similarly to each other: errors (that is, the probability of incorrectly performing 
the Go response in Signal trials) increased from trials without a delay in signal 
onset to trials in which the signal appeared after a delay of 25% of their mean 
response times to trials with a 50% delay to trials with a 75% delay. Similarly, 
the pigeons' likelihood to make a response at the signal increased with 
increasing signal onset, i.e., from trials in which the signal appeared 
immediately (in no-delay Signal trials) to trials with a 25% signal-onset delay to 
trials in which the signal appeared after a 50% delay and again after a 75% 
delay. Humans showed a trend in the same direction, in both the Stop-Signal 
and Change-Signal task. 
More importantly, the independent horse-race model estimates that response 
latencies should be lower for Signal trials than for Go trials, which was the case 
for humans and pigeons in both tasks (albeit a bit more evident in the Stop-
Signal task than in the Change-Signal task, and with the caveat that the few no-
delay trials were anomalous in this respect). Both species also tended to show 
longer latencies to incorrectly make a response to the Go stimulus or the signal 
in Signal trials as the interval between the presentation of the Go stimulus 
(indicating the requirement to make a response) and the presentation of the 
signal (indicating to withhold that response) increased. 
Taken together, the paradigm developed in Section 4.2 appears to elicit the 
commonly observed response-inhibition phenomena in both humans and 
pigeons. Additionally, the results provide quite good evidence that the 
independent horse-race model applies to associatively-mediated response 
inhibition as expressed by pigeons, both in the Stop-Signal and the Change-
Signal task.  
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Another question addressed in this section was whether the Stop-Signal and 
Change-Signal tasks utilise the same inhibition mechanisms, or whether the 
mechanisms differ between tasks, either in the Change-Signal task requiring a 
more complex level of inhibitory control than the Stop-Signal task, or by it 
requiring less (or no) inhibitory control. There was no detectable difference in 
the pigeons' performance between the two tasks; their performance of response 
inhibition was no more or less successful in the Change-Signal task than it was 
in the Stop-Signal task, although the pigeons performing the Stop-Signal task 
did show a greater probability of responding after the signal appeared when the 
delay between the onset of the Go stimulus and the onset of the Stop signal 
was very long, see Figure 4.3.2. These results are broadly in accordance with 
Verbruggen and Logan's (2009b) claim that the two tasks employ similar 
response-inhibition mechanisms. 
 
Nonetheless, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, adherence to the 
independent horse-race model does not imply a presence of inhibitory control, 
and the next question posed in this section was whether the process of 
executing the alternative response in the Change-Signal task is preceded by a 
process of inhibiting the initially indicated Go response at all. I assessed this 
issue by comparing the latencies to respond to the correct key in no-delay 
Change-Signal trials to those in delayed Change-Signal trials: if an additional 
process was required to stop the initially prepared response, the latency to 
execute the alternative response may be longer in delayed Signal trials than in 
no-delay Signal trials. 
 
For both humans and pigeons, responding to the correct key took equally long 
in no-delay Change-Signal trials and Go trials. Although it has been found 
(Chikazoe et al., 2009) that response times can be longer when the response 
requirements are uncertain (as they would be in Go trials, as the presentation of 
the Go stimulus may or may not be followed by the Change signal) than when 
the requirements are certain (as they are in no-delay Change-Signal trials), 
equal response times in these two trial types are plausible. The subjects most 
likely only prepared and carried out one response option in both trial types 
(choosing the correct key), which required a fixed amount of time. 
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When subtracting the delay of the signal onset from the latencies of delayed 
Change-Signal trials, latencies to respond to the correct key were of 
comparable duration across all trials. This result is in accordance with the 
independent horse-race model: as it is assumed that the processes of initiating 
the Go response and initiating an alternative response run independently of 
each other (irrespective of whether the initiation of the alternative response is 
preceded by an inhibition of the prepared Go response or whether it 
immediately overrides the preparation of the Go response), the arrival of a 
Change signal would be expected to trigger the initiation of the alternative 
response immediately, so that the latency to make the alternative response in 
the Change-Signal task should be of equal length from the arrival of the signal.  
Nonetheless, this outcome is quite interesting as it, on the one hand, confirms 
that the execution of the alternative response is triggered immediately upon 
signal onset and independently of the progress that initiates the Go response; 
on the other hand, it implies that there is no difference in latencies between 
trials in which only one response has to be prepared and executed (be it 
responding to the Go stimulus in Go trials, or choosing the alternative key in no-
delay Change-Signal trials) and delayed Change-Signal trials in which, 
presumably, the initial Go response has to be inhibited and replaced by the 
alternative response. This phenomenon is not unknown in the human literature, 
where it has raised the question of whether a separate process of inhibiting the 
Go response is indeed needed before an alternative response can be initiated 
(cf. Boecker et al., 2013). Verbruggen et al. (2008b) explicitly addressed the 
issue of whether or not performance in Change-Signal tasks relies on response 
inhibition and concluded that, in accordance with the independent horse-race 
model, the inhibition process is indeed a necessary mechanism to stop the Go 
response on Signal trials. They reiterate that, because the inhibition process is 
performed independently of the process to initiate a response, both processes 
can occur in parallel, so that no additional time is needed to initiate the 
alternative response once the inhibition process is completed.  
 
However, although the two mechanisms run independently of each other, 
Verbruggen et al. (2008b) noted that, at least when executive control is 
involved, the cognitive capacities required to perform them are most likely 
limited and shared by the two processes. Consequently, each process is 
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expected to take longer in the presence of the other process than when all 
capacities were allocated to a single process; that is, the process of executing 
the alternative response is assumed to take longer when the inhibition process 
is performed in parallel than when no inhibition is required. Consequently, 
reaction times might be equal in all trials in which the inhibition of the Go 
response is necessary (i.e., delayed Change-Signal trials), but in trials in which 
the response can be executed without the need to inhibit a previously prepared 
response (i.e., Go trials and no-delay Change-Signal trials), reaction times 
should be shorter than the reaction times in delayed trials. This was not the 
case for the pigeons or humans in this experiment; latencies were similar in 
length in all trial types regardless of whether and when a signal appeared, 
implying that the response latencies were determined by the duration of the 
response-initiation process and independent of the involvement of an inhibition 
mechanism. The logical consequences of this finding is that, for both pigeons 
and humans, the response-inhibition process did not reduce the capacities 
allocated to the process of response execution. This could be either because no 
inhibition process was involved in Change-Signal trials in this paradigm - 
perhaps instead, the initiation of the alternative response was sufficient to 
override the execution of the Go response, although Verbruggen et al. (2008b) 
ruled out the possibility that the execution of an alternative response can 
replace the execution of the Go response -, or because the parallel processes 
of inhibition and execution shared unlimited capacities. For executive-control 
processes, the general assumption is that capacities are limited, see 
Verbruggen et al. (2008b); but if associative processes governed behaviour, 
such constraints might not apply. 
 
Evidence for an absence of inhibitory control might be taken from trial-sequence 
effects. In task-switching studies (cf. Chapter 3), the influence of executive 
control on behaviour is mostly observed in effects of trial sequence (i.e., switch 
costs) thought to reflect a mental reconfiguration of competing task sets. 
Similarly, the requirement to initiate or withhold a response on a given trial in 
Stop-Signal and Change-Signal tasks might elicit the activation of a mental goal 
to perform or inhibit that response, which might remain somewhat activated on 
trials that follow (similar to task-set inertia that can affect task-switching 
performance, cf. Monsell, 2003), leading to slowed responses and reduced 
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errors in subsequent trials. If this is the case, sequential trial effects might be 
visible in the data of human participants, who are assumed to construct mental 
task goals, but not in the data of pigeons, which are assumed not to do so. The 
comparison of performance in trials following a successful Go response and in 
trials following successful inhibition suggests that this might be the case: human 
participants slowed down in their response times in Go trials following response 
inhibition, and made fewer errors in Go trials (i.e., missing a response) following 
correct responding and fewer errors in Signal trials (i.e., responding to the 
stimulus) following successful response inhibition. Pigeons, however, did not 
alter their behaviour in such a way; although they showed an increased 
probability of incorrectly performing the Go response when the previous trial 
demanded that response, they showed no reliable difference in performance in 
trials affording the same response requirement (inhibiting or executing the Go 
response) as the previous trial compared to trials affording a different response 
requirement than the previous trial, which indicates that the pigeons did not 
perform any kind of mental goal adjustment. This result is further discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
If performance in the Change-Signal task - at least for pigeons - was indeed not 
regulated by an inhibition process, it might be that subjects were able to 
respond correctly only if they had been prepared to perform either the Go or the 
alternative response from the start of a trial. Following Verbruggen et al. 
(2008b), such behaviour would lead to shorter reaction times with increasing 
signal-onset delay, that is, is would produce the pattern of performance 
depicted in Figures 4.3.4 and 4.3.11 (which only include correct trials). It would 
also imply that subjects either chose which response they were going to 
execute before the start of the trial, irrespective of the trial type (cf. Logan & 
Cowan, 1984), or had some notion of whether the trial was going to be a Go or 
a Change-Signal trial. The latter possibility is plausible in principle, since the 
likely type of the trial was indicated by the predictive cues; however, to 
foreshadow the analyses of the cue-dependent measures of performance in 
Section 4.4, these cues probably did not determine the behaviour of the pigeons 
and humans. Regarding the former possibility, Logan and Cowan (1984) noted 
that if responses were prepared ahead of the start of a trial (even if just for a 
proportion of trials), the probability of responding incorrectly in signal trials could 
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never be zero, regardless of how early the signal was presented. Instead, the 
probability would equal the proportion of trials on which subjects chose to 
respond to the Go stimulus regardless of the signal. For humans, this may have 
been the case; P(respond) for no-delay Change-Signal trials equals 0.13, 
indicating that the participants ignored the signal in 13% of trials. For pigeons, 
however, this number is very close to zero, which implies that pigeons did not 
select the response they were going to execute ahead of a trial. 
 
One might assume a speed/accuracy trade-off: because in both Go trials and 
delayed Change-Signal trials, the Go stimulus was initially presented, the 
ambiguity about whether or not responding to the Go stimulus would be 
rewarded might have caused subjects to hesitate to make that response, so that 
the response latencies in all these trials were equally long. However, subjects 
would not be expected to hesitate before responding when the Change signal is 
presented, because the appearance of the signal unambiguously indicates that 
the alternative response has to be performed (cf. Chikazoe et al., 2009); thus, 
reaction times to perform the correct response in no-delay Change-Signal trials 
should be shorter than the reaction times in the other four types of trials. This 
was not the case in this experiment. Thus, the subjects either hesitated in every 
trial regardless of current response requirements, which, according to Aron 
(2011), requires executive control to enable the inhibition of any "spur of the 
moment" impulsive response, or they did not selectively adjust their behaviour. 
If the pigeons had learned to wait before making a response, the response 
times of the first peck in the Change-Signal test sessions that were analysed in 
this section, which included no-delay and delayed Change-Signal trials, should 
be longer than those in the previously administered Go/Change-training 
sessions (see Section 4.2), which included only no-delay Change-Signal trials. 
They were not; in fact, the latencies to respond to the Go stimulus in both Go 
trials and no-delay Change-Signal trials were significantly shorter in the pigeons' 
final ten Change-Signal test sessions (Go: 1154ms; no-delay Change-Signal: 
1112ms) than in the final ten Go/Change training sessions (Go: 1227ms; no-
delay Change-Signal: 1350ms), F(1,5)=7.13, p=.044, ηp2=.59. The pigeons did 
not learn to hesitate before responding to increase accuracy. 
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The discussion of which cognitive processes likely determined the behaviour of 
pigeons and humans is continued in Section 4.5, following an analysis of the 
use of predictive cues in Section 4.4. 
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4.4  Does Signal-Specific Response Inhibition Transfer to Cues Predicting 
the Probability of the Signal? 
Although the predictions of the independent horse-race model (Logan & Cowan, 
1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) apply to the response-inhibition 
performance of pigeons and humans, reported in Section 4.3, this match alone 
does not allow any inferences about the involvement of executive control or 
associative processes in Stop-Signal and Change-Signal tasks, because the 
model makes no assumptions about the presence of specific cognitive abilities. 
Moreover, the results reported in Section 4.3 leave room to speculate about the 
involvement of inhibitory control in the Change-Signal task, as the observed 
performance might have been achieved without inhibiting a previously prepared 
response. Nonetheless, the fact that the performance of pigeons followed the 
model's predictions suggests that associative processes contribute to the 
pattern - or at least that the absence of executive control does not eradicate the 
pattern. 
 
The influence of executive control on response inhibition may be observed in 
trial-to-trial effects reflecting mental goal activation that carries over between 
trials. In Section 4.3, I report that human participants showed both slower 
response times in Go trials if the trial was preceded by successful response 
inhibition than if the trial was preceded by correct response execution, and a 
decrease in error rates in trials that were of the same type (Go or Signal) as the 
previous trial; pigeons also showed a weak trend of improved accuracy in trials 
following trials of the same type, but did not alter the speed of responding in Go 
trials depending on the demands of the previous trial. However, given that, as 
stated in Section 1.3, the estimation of pigeons' response times can be 
unreliable with the apparatus available at the time of conducting this research, it 
is difficult to unambiguously attribute sequential trial effects to a mental goal 
adjustment elicited by executive-control processes. Associative processes 
might account for differences in performance that apparently occur at task level: 
considering specifically the paradigms used in this chapter, the two "tasks" of 
going and inhibiting (or changing) each afforded one specific response, allowing 
response-repetition effects (cf. Chapter 3) or priming effects to take effect. But 
there is also evidence that the influence of associative processes on inhibitory 
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control may more generally be observed at the level of task goals. For example, 
Bowditch et al. (2016) found that response-stopping can become associated 
with cues that predict the likelihood of a stop signal in the upcoming trial: seeing 
the cue might automatically initiate a stopping response even before any stop 
signal has appeared, which makes it plausible that even behaviour that 
seemingly involves proactive planning might be reduced to associative 
processes.  
 
Consequently, in this section, I investigated whether presenting cues that were 
stochastically related to the events of the current trial (either performing the Go 
response, or stopping/changing the response) can come to deliver 
associatively-mediated inhibition. Specifically, I assessed whether a cue 
predicting either a Go trial or a Signal trial influenced the pigeons' or humans' 
response probabilities and response latencies towards the Go stimulus. If 
associative links are formed between the cues and the occurrence of a signal 
or, more directly, between the cues and the demand to withhold a Go response, 
then incorrect responses to the Go stimulus in Signal trials might be less likely, 
and correct responses in Go trials might occur more slowly in trials showing a 
cue that predicts a high probability of a signal occurring on that trial compared 
to trials in which the cue predicts a low probability that a signal might occur. 
Conversely, the likelihood of missing a response in Go trials should be lower for 
trials in which a cue indicating a low probability of a signal on that trial is 
presented compared to trials in which the cue indicates a high probability of the 
occurrence of a signal. 
 
It has to be noted that, despite Bowditch et al.’s (2016) findings, it may be that, 
unlike signal-dependent response inhibition, cue-dependent inhibition relies on 
executive control; in this case, pigeons would not be expected to be able to 
adapt their behaviour depending on the nature of the cues that are presented. 
Instead, they might only express response inhibition in response to the Stop or 
Change signal. 
If that was the case, it might further be that humans only show cue-dependent 
response inhibition if they are aware of the function of the cues and thus able to 
deliberately apply inhibitory control in response. 
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Results 
 
Pigeons 
I estimated changes in performance depending on the cues that were presented 
ahead of a trial by examining the probability of responding in Signal trials, both 
overall, P(respond), and after the signal occurred, P(respond|Signal), the 
probability of missing a response in Go trials, P(miss|Go), and the pigeons' 
latencies to respond to the Go stimulus in Go trials. P(respond) and P(miss|Go) 
correspond to the pigeons' error rates in Signal trials and Go trials, respectively. 
The data were analysed in four repeated-measures ANOVAs using Cue Type 
(Go cue, Neutral cue and Signal cue) and Session (blocked sessions 1-10, 11-
20, 21-30, Probe Session 1 and Probe Session 2) as within-subjects factors and 
Task (Change-Signal or Stop-Signal task) as a between-subjects factor. Where 
applicable, the reported results were subject to Huynh-Feldt corrections. The 
results for all four dependent variables are shown in Figure 4.4.1; descriptive 
statistics are summarised in Table 4.4.1. 
 
P(respond) 
As shown in Figure 4.4.1 Panel A, the task that pigeons completed affected 
their likelihood of making a response in a Signal trial, F(1,10)=7.20, p=.023, 
ηp2=.42, in that pigeons in the Stop-Signal task showed a greater probability of 
responding than those in the Change-Signal task. However, there was no 
significant difference in performance between the cue types that were 
presented, F(2,20)=0.65, p=.54, or between sessions, F(4,40)=1.46, p=.24. 
There were also no significant interactions between any factors, all p≥.16.  
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the two probe sessions 
confirmed that P(respond) did not differ significantly between trials in which the 
Go cue was presented and trials in which the Signal cue was shown, either in 
the Stop-Signal task (Probe Session 1: uncorrected: p=.097, Bonferroni-
corrected: p=.29; Probe Session 2: uncorrected: p=.46, Bonferroni-corrected: 
p=1.0) or in the Change-Signal task (Probe Session 1: uncorrected: p=.11, 
Bonferroni-corrected: p=.73; Probe Session 2: uncorrected: p=.18, Bonferroni-
corrected: p=.47). 
In light of the absence of statistically reliable cue effects on performance, the 
data were also examined using the Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA 
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function in JASP (Love et al., 2015) including Cue Type as a within-subjects 
factor. For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factor suggests that the 
data are 0.40:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.5 times 
more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect of the three cues than 
under a model including Cue Type as a factor. When considering only the Go 
cue and Stop-Signal cue (and not including the neutral cue in the analysis), the 
estimated Bayes factor is 0.47:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data 
are 2.11 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than 
under a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
 
Table 4.4.1. Pigeons: Means [and standard errors] of P(respond) on Signal trials, 
P(respond|Signal) on Signal trials after the signal occurred, P(miss|Go) on Go trials, 
and latencies to respond to the Go stimulus, depending on Cue Type (Go, Neutral 
and Signal cue) and Test Sessions (three test blocks of ten sessions, in which the 
Go and Signal cues predicted the occurrence of a signal on the following trial to 75% 
accuracy, and two probe sessions, in which all cues predicted the occurrence of a 
signal on the following trial to 50% accuracy). 
 Cue 
Sessions 
1-10 11-20 21-30 
Probe 
1 
Probe 
2 
Stop Signal Task       
 
P(respond) Go Cue 0.08 
[0.01] 
0.10 
[0.02] 
0.08 
[0.02] 
0.07 
[0.04] 
0.11 
[0.04] 
Neutral Cue 0.07 
[0.01] 
0.07 
[0.01] 
0.09 
[0.01] 
0.14 
[0.03] 
0.09 
[0.03] 
Signal Cue 0.08 
[0.01] 
0.09 
[0.02] 
0.10 
[0.07] 
0.12 
[0.03] 
0.07 
[0.04] 
P(respond|Signal) Go Cue 0.05 
[0.01] 
0.08 
[0.02] 
0.05 
[0.01] 
0.02 
[0.02] 
0.06 
[0.02] 
Neutral Cue 0.05 
[0.01] 
0.04 
[0.01] 
0.04 
[0.01] 
0.05 
[0.02] 
0.07 
[0.02] 
Signal Cue 0.05 
[0.01] 
0.05 
[0.01] 
0.06 
[0.01] 
0.06 
[0.02] 
0.02 
[0.02] 
P(miss|Go) Go Cue 0.18 
[0.05] 
0.21 
[0.08] 
0.12 
[0.04] 
0.20 
[0.09] 
0.22 
[0.13] 
Neutral Cue 0.16 
[0.05] 
0.21 
[0.08] 
0.12 
[0.03] 
0.19 
[0.08] 
0.15 
[0.09] 
Signal Cue 0.18 
[0.04] 
0.19 
[0.08] 
0.09 
[0.03] 
0.18 
[0.09] 
0.08 
[0.06] 
Latency to peck 
the Go stimulus in 
Go trials 
Go Cue 1561 
[124] 
1661 
[147] 
1562 
[142] 
1662 
[169] 
1486 
[175] 
Neutral Cue 1616 
[139] 
1741 
[163] 
1537 
[122] 
1425 
[179] 
1620 
[346] 
Signal Cue 1591 
[135] 
1670 
[171] 
1598 
[162] 
1707 
[180] 
1599 
[263] 
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Table 4.4.1 continued. 
Change-Signal Task       
 
P(respond) Go Cue 0.04 
[0.01] 
0.05 
[0.01] 
0.03 
[0.02] 
0.08 
[0.03] 
0.06 
[0.03] 
Neutral Cue 0.05 
[0.02] 
0.04 
[0.01] 
0.03 
[0.01] 
0.07 
[0.03] 
0.06 
[0.03] 
Signal Cue 0.04 
[0.01] 
0.05 
[0.02] 
0.03 
[0.01] 
0.03 
[0.02] 
0.03 
[0.03] 
P(respond|Signal) Go Cue 0.02 
[0.01] 
0.01 
[0.02] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.02 
[0.02] 
0.02 
[0.02] 
Neutral Cue 0.03 
[0.01] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.05 
[0.03] 
0.02 
[0.02] 
Signal Cue 0.02 
[0.01] 
0.02 
[0.02] 
0.02 
[0.01] 
0.00 
[0.01] 
0.00 
[0.01] 
P(miss|Go) Go Cue 0.27 
[0.06] 
0.31 
[0.06] 
0.31 
[0.09] 
0.39 
[0.08] 
0.38 
[0.08] 
Neutral Cue 0.29 
[0.05] 
0.29 
[0.07] 
0.31 
[0.09] 
0.38 
[0.11] 
0.39 
[0.11] 
Signal Cue 0.33 
[0.05] 
0.35 
[0.05] 
0.34 
[0.08] 
0.40 
[0.08] 
0.38 
[0.08] 
Latency to peck 
the Go stimulus in 
Go trials 
Go Cue 1924 
[124] 
1979 
[147] 
2112 
[142] 
2020 
[169] 
2166 
[175] 
Neutral Cue 1941 
[139] 
1972 
[163] 
2114 
[119] 
1886 
[233] 
2415 
[471] 
Signal Cue 2076 
[141] 
2036 
[154] 
2130 
[157] 
2166 
[115] 
2052 
[293] 
 
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factor implies that the data 
are 1.67 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than a 
model assuming an effect of all three cues (0.6:1 in favour of the null 
hypothesis) and equally likely to occur under a model assuming no effect as 
under a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Change-Signal 
cue (0.99:1 in favour of the null hypothesis).  
 
P(respond|Signal) 
As shown in Figure 4.4.1 Panel B, the task that pigeons completed affected 
their likelihood of making a response in a Signal trial, F(1,10)=6.77, p=.026, 
ηp2=.40, in that pigeons in the Stop-Signal task showed a greater probability of 
responding than those in the Change-Signal task. However, the cue type that 
was presented did not influence performance, F(2,20)=0.53, p=.60, nor did the 
session, F(4,40)=0.45, p=.78. There were no significant interactions between 
any factors, all p≥.08. 
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Figure 4.4.1. Pigeons: A) The overall probability of responding on Signal trials, 
P(respond), B) the probability of responding on Signal trials after the signal had 
occurred, P(respond|Signal), C) the probability of missing a response to the Go 
stimulus on Go trials, P(miss|Go), and D) the mean latency to respond to the stimulus 
on Go trials, depending on the cue that was shown in a trial (Go, Neutral, or Signal 
cue), across 30 cued sessions and 2 probe sessions (the cued sessions are blocked 
for easier visualisation). 
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Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the two probe sessions 
confirmed that P(respond|Signal) did not differ significantly between trials in 
which the Go cue was presented from trials in which the Signal cue was shown, 
neither in the Stop-Signal task (Probe Session 1: uncorrected: p=.076, 
Bonferroni-corrected: p=.23; Probe Session 2: uncorrected: p=.12, Bonferroni-
corrected: p=.36) nor in the Change-Signal task (Probe Session 1: uncorrected: 
p=.36, Bonferroni-corrected: p=1.0; Probe Session 2: uncorrected: p=.36, 
Bonferroni-corrected: p=.1.0).  
As above, the absence of any cue effects were further examined by performing 
a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA in JASP (Love et al., 2015) including 
Cue Type as a within-subjects factor. For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated 
Bayes factor suggests that the data are 0.43:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; 
that is, the data are 2.33 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no 
effect of the three cues than under a model including Cue Type as a factor. 
When considering only the Go cue and Stop-Signal cue (and not including the 
neutral cue in the analysis), the estimated Bayes factor is 0.51:1 in favour of the 
null hypothesis; that is, the data are 1.96 times more likely to occur under a 
model assuming no effect than under a model assuming a difference between 
the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factors estimates that the 
data are 2.63 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than 
a model assuming an effect of all three cues (0.38:1 in favour of the null 
hypothesis) and 1.18 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no 
effect than a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Change-
Signal cue (0.85:1 in favour of the null hypothesis). 
 
P(miss|Go) 
As shown in Figure 4.4.1 Panel C, the probability of missing a response on Go 
trials was marginally influenced by the task that pigeons completed, 
F(1,10)=4.35, p=.064, but not by the presented cue type, F(2,20)=0.12, p=.87, 
nor by the session, F(4,40)=1.23, p=.31. There were no significant interactions 
between any of the three factors, all p≥.15.  
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the two probe sessions 
confirmed that P(miss|Go) did not differ significantly between trials in which the 
Go cue was presented from trials in which the Signal cue was shown, neither in 
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the Stop-Signal task (Probe Session 1: uncorrected: p=.47, Bonferroni-
corrected: p=1.0; Probe Session 2: uncorrected: p=.13, Bonferroni-corrected: 
p=.38) nor in the Change-Signal task (Probe Session 1: uncorrected: p=.79, 
Bonferroni-corrected: p=1.0; Probe Session 2: uncorrected: p=.91, Bonferroni-
corrected: p=1.0).  
As above, the absence of any cue effects were further examined by performing 
a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA in JASP (Love et al., 2015) including 
Cue Type as a within-subjects factor. For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated 
Bayes factor suggests that the data are 0.39:1 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.56 times more likely to occur under a model 
including Cue Type as a factor than under a model assuming no effect of the 
three cues. When considering only the Go cue and Stop-Signal cue (excluding 
the neutral cue), the estimated Bayes factor is 0.38:1 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.66 times more likely to occur under a model 
assuming a difference between the Go and the Stop-Signal cue than under a 
model assuming no effect.  
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factors estimates that the 
data are 1.07 times more likely to occur under a model assuming an effect of all 
three cues than a model assuming no effect (0.93:1 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis) and 1.61 times more likely to occur under a model assuming a 
difference between the Go and the Change-Signal cue than a model assuming 
no effect (0.62:1 in favour of the alternative hypothesis).  
 
Reaction times towards the Go stimulus in Go trials 
As shown in Figure 4.4.1 Panel D, the pigeons' latencies to respond to the Go 
stimulus were not affected by the cue type presented, F(2,20)=0.58, p=.55, or 
by the session, F(4,40)=0.41, p=.71, nor was there a significant interaction 
between the two factors, F(8,80)=1.49, p=.23. Pigeons doing the Change-Signal 
task were slower to respond to the Go stimulus than pigeons in the Stop-Signal 
task, F(1,10)=5.20, p=.046, ηp2=.34; however, this factor did not interact with any 
other factor, all interactions p≥.31. 
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the two probe sessions 
confirmed that response times towards the Go stimulus did not differ 
significantly between trials in which the Go cue was presented from trials in 
which the Signal cue was shown, neither in the Stop-Signal task (Probe Session 
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1: uncorrected: p=.80, Bonferroni-corrected: p=1.0; Probe Session 2: 
uncorrected: p=.25, Bonferroni-corrected: p=.76) nor in the Change-Signal task 
(Probe Session 1: uncorrected: p=.26, Bonferroni-corrected: p=.77; Probe 
Session 2: uncorrected: p=.61, Bonferroni-corrected: p=1.0). 
As above, the absence of any cue effects were examined by performing a 
Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA in JASP (Love et al., 2015) including Cue 
Type as a within-subjects factor. For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated Bayes 
factor suggests that the data are 0.39:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, 
the data are 2.56 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect 
of the three cues than under a model including Cue Type as a factor. When 
considering only the Go cue and Stop-Signal cue (excluding the neutral cue), 
the estimated Bayes factor is 0.63:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the 
data are 1.59 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than 
under a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factors estimates that the 
data are 1.27 times more likely to occur under a model assuming an effect of all 
three cues than a model assuming no effect (0.78:1 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis) and 1.19 times more likely to occur under a model assuming an 
effect than a model assuming no difference between the Go and the Change-
Signal cue (0.84:1 in favour of the alternative hypothesis). 
 
Humans 
As was done for the pigeons above, the human data were analysed in four 
repeated-measures ANOVAs using Cue Type (Go cue, Neutral cue and Signal 
cue) and Block (Test Blocks 1-4, 5-9, 10-14, and Cue-Probe Session) as within-
subjects factors and Task (Change-Signal or Stop-Signal task) as a between-
subjects factor. Where applicable, the reported results were subject to Huynh-
Feldt corrections. The results for all four dependent variables are shown in 
Figure 4.4.2; descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 4.4.2. 
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Figure 4.4.2. Humans: A) The overall probability of responding on Signal trials, 
P(respond), B) the probability of responding on Signal trials after the signal had 
occurred, P(respond|Signal), C) the probability of missing a response to the Go 
stimulus on Go trials, P(miss|Go), and D) the mean latency to respond to the stimulus 
on Go trials, depending on the cue that was shown in a trial (Go, Neutral, or Signal 
cue), across 14 cued blocks and a cue-probe block (the cued blocks are blocked for 
easier visualisation). 
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P(respond) 
As shown in Figure 4.4.2 Panel A, the task that participants completed affected 
their likelihood of making a response in a Signal trial, F(1,29)=12.31, p=.001, 
ηp2=.30; the probabilities also decreased significantly across successive blocks, 
F(3,87)=5.90, p=.003, ηp2=.17. However, the cue type that was presented did not 
affect the probability of making a false response in Signal trials, F(2,58)=1.46, 
p=.24. There were no significant interactions between any factors, all p≥.42.  
 
 
 
Table 4.4.2. Humans: Means [and standard errors] of P(respond) on Signal trials, 
P(respond|Signal) on Signal trials after the signal occurred, P(miss|Go) on Go trials, 
and latencies to respond to the Go stimulus, depending on Cue Type (Go, Neutral or 
Signal cue) and Test Blocks (three blocks in which the Go and Signal cues predicted 
the occurrence of a signal on the following trial to 75% accuracy, and a cue-probe 
block, in which all cues predicted the occurrence of a signal on the following trial to 
50% accuracy). 
 Blocks 
 1-4 5-9 10-14 Probe  
Stop-Signal Task     
 
P(respond) Go Cue 0.47 
[0.04] 
0.40 
[0.02] 
0.39 
[0.02] 
0.37 
[0.03] 
Neutral Cue 0.45 
[0.03] 
0.39 
[0.03] 
0.40 
[0.03] 
0.38 
[0.03] 
Signal Cue 0.44 
[0.03] 
0.39 
[0.02] 
0.38 
[0.03] 
0.36 
[0.05] 
P(respond|Signal) Go Cue 0.34 
[0.06] 
0.27 
[0.03] 
0.24 
[0.04] 
0.20 
[0.04] 
Neutral Cue 0.31 
[0.04] 
0.25 
[0.04] 
0.24 
[0.04] 
0.25 
[0.04] 
Signal Cue 0.31 
[0.05] 
0.24 
[0.04] 
0.23 
[0.04] 
0.19 
[0.06] 
P(miss|Go) Go Cue 0.06 
[0.03] 
0.05 
[0.04] 
0.06 
[0.03] 
0.12 
[0.07] 
Neutral Cue 0.06 
[0.02] 
0.04 
[0.02] 
0.07 
[0.04] 
0.11 
[0.06] 
Signal Cue 0.06 
[0.02] 
0.06 
[0.04] 
0.06 
[0.03] 
0.09 
[0.06] 
Latency to click 
the Go stimulus in 
Go trials 
Go Cue 651  
[23] 
669 
[25] 
717 
[41] 
760 
[69] 
Neutral Cue 657 
[31] 
642 
[21] 
710 
[45] 
733 
[49] 
Signal Cue 673 
[30] 
657 
[40] 
718 
[47] 
772 
[66] 
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Table 4.4.2 continued. 
Change-Signal Task     
 
P(respond) Go Cue 0.32 
[0.03] 
0.26 
[0.03] 
0.31 
[0.03] 
0.24 
[0.03] 
Neutral Cue 0.33 
[0.03] 
0.28 
[0.03] 
0.28 
[0.03] 
0.28 
[0.04] 
Signal Cue 0.29 
[0.03] 
0.29 
[0.03] 
0.27 
[0.03] 
0.26 
[0.03] 
P(respond|Signal) Go Cue 0.27 
[0.04] 
0.20 
[0.03] 
0.25 
[0.03] 
0.18 
[0.03] 
Neutral Cue 0.27 
[0.03] 
0.23 
[0.04] 
0.22 
[0.03] 
0.22 
[0.04] 
Signal Cue 0.23 
[0.03] 
0.23 
[0.04] 
0.22 
[0.03] 
0.21 
[0.03] 
P(miss|Go) Go Cue 0.17 
[0.05] 
0.16 
[0.05] 
0.15 
[0.05] 
0.14 
[0.05] 
Neutral Cue 0.18 
[0.05] 
0.15 
[0.06] 
0.16 
[0.06] 
0.11 
[0.05] 
Signal Cue 0.19 
[0.06] 
0.17 
[0.05] 
0.14 
[0.05] 
0.13 
[0.06] 
Latency to click 
the Go stimulus in 
Go trials 
Go Cue 766 
[65] 
749 
[59] 
715 
[43] 
757 
[72] 
Neutral Cue 739 
[56] 
730 
[55] 
698 
[46] 
713 
[60] 
Signal Cue 762 
[61] 
743 
[51] 
742 
[53] 
713 
[64] 
 
 
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the probe block confirmed 
that P(respond) did not differ significantly between trials in which the Go Cue 
was presented from trials in which the Signal Cue was shown, neither in the 
Stop-Signal task, p=.65, nor in the Change-Signal task, p=.18. 
As for pigeons, the absence of any cue effects were further examined by 
performing a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA. For the Stop-Signal task, 
the estimated Bayes factor suggests that the data are 0.19:1 in favour of the 
null hypothesis; that is, the data are 5.25 times more likely to occur under a 
model assuming no effect of the three cues than under a model including Cue 
Type as a factor. When considering only the Go and Stop-Signal cues 
(excluding the neutral cue), the estimated Bayes factor is 0.38:1 in favour of the 
null hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.61 times more likely to occur under a 
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model assuming no effect than under a model assuming a difference between 
the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
For the Change-Signal task, the Bayes factors estimates that the data are 4.15 
times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than a model 
assuming an effect of all three cues (0.24:1 in favour of the null hypothesis) and 
1.19 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than a model 
assuming a difference between the Go and the Change-Signal cue (0.84:1 in 
favour of the null hypothesis). 
 
P(respond|Signal) 
As shown in Figure 4.4.2 Panel B, the task that was completed did not affect the 
likelihood of responding in the presence of the signal, F(1,29)=0.42, p=.53; nor 
did the cue type that was presented, F(2,58)=0.58, p=.56. However, the 
probability of responding differed between blocks, F(3,87)=7.31, p=.001, ηp2=.20, 
in that it decreased as the experiment progressed. There were no significant 
interactions between any of the three factors, all p≥.28.  
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the probe block confirmed 
that P(respond|Signal) did not differ significantly between trials in which the Go 
Cue was presented from trials in which the Signal Cue was shown, neither in 
the Stop-Signal task, p=.81, nor in the Change-Signal task, p=.25.  
For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factor suggests that the data are 
0.45:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.24 times more 
likely to occur under a model assuming no effect of the three cues than under a 
model including Cue Type as a factor. When considering only the Go and Stop-
Signal cues (excluding the neutral cue), the estimated Bayes factor is 0.41:1 in 
favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.46 times more likely to occur 
under a model assuming no effect than under a model assuming a difference 
between the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factors estimates that the 
data are 3.75 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than 
a model assuming an effect of all three cues (0.27:1 in favour of the null 
hypothesis) and 1.81 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no 
effect than a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Change-
Signal cue (0.55:1 in favour of the null hypothesis). 
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P(miss|Go) 
As shown in Figure 4.4.2 Panel C, the probability of missing a response on Go 
trials was not significantly influenced by the task that was completed, 
F(1,29)=2.09, p=.16, nor by the presented cue type, F(2,58)=0.13, p=.86, nor by 
the block of trials, F(3,87)=0.15, p=.78. There were no significant interactions 
between any of the three factors, all p≥.21.  
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the probe block confirmed 
that P(miss|Go) did not differ significantly between trials in which the Go cue 
was presented from trials in which the Signal cue was shown, neither in the 
Stop-Signal task, p=.36, nor in the Change-Signal task, p=.68.  
For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factor suggests that the data are 
0.28:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 3.53 times more 
likely to occur under a model assuming no effect of the three cues than under a 
model including Cue Type as a factor. When considering only the Go and Stop-
Signal cues (excluding the neutral cue), the estimated Bayes factor is 0.47:1 in 
favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.14 times more likely to occur 
under a model assuming no effect than under a model assuming a difference 
between the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factors estimates that the 
data are 5.20 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than 
a model assuming an effect of all three cues (0.19:1 in favour of the null 
hypothesis) and 2.73 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no 
effect than a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Change-
Signal cue (0.37:1 in favour of the null hypothesis). 
 
Reaction times towards the Go stimulus in Go trials 
As shown in Figure 4.4.2 Panel D, latencies to respond to the Go stimulus were 
not affected by the task that was completed, F(1,29)=0.43, p=.52, or by the 
block, F(3,87)=0.88, p=.40 (although participants in the Stop-Signal task 
became increasingly slower as the experiment went on, p=.018). The presented 
cue type marginally affected latencies towards the Go stimulus, F(2,58)=2.63, 
p=.081. There was no significant interaction between the three factors, all 
p≥.11. 
Planned comparisons focussing on performance in the probe block confirmed 
that response times towards the Go stimulus did not differ significantly between 
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trials in which the Go cue was presented from trials in which the Signal cue was 
shown, either in the Stop-Signal task, p=.72, or in the Change-Signal task, 
p=.47. 
For the Stop-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factor suggests that the data are 
0.22:1 in favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 4.53 times more 
likely to occur under a model assuming no effect of the three cues than under a 
model including Cue Type as a factor. When considering only the Go and Stop-
Signal cues (excluding the neutral cue), the estimated Bayes factor is 0.37:1 in 
favour of the null hypothesis; that is, the data are 2.71 times more likely to occur 
under a model assuming no effect than under a model assuming a difference 
between the Go and the Stop-Signal cue.  
For the Change-Signal task, the estimated Bayes factors estimates that the 
data are 4.63 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no effect than 
a model assuming an effect of all three cues (0.22:1 in favour of the null 
hypothesis) and 2.46 times more likely to occur under a model assuming no 
effect than a model assuming a difference between the Go and the Change-
Signal cue (0.41:1 in favour of the null hypothesis). 
 
Discussion 
 
Neither pigeons nor humans showed any indication of altering their behaviour 
when provided with information about the likely nature of an upcoming trial. That 
is, performance was similar regardless of whether the cue predicted a high or a 
low likelihood of the appearance of a signal in the upcoming trial. Bayesian 
analyses of the influence of the cues on performance remained inconclusive, as 
there was no strong support for either the null hypothesis that the cues did not 
affect performance, or the hypothesis that the cues altered behaviour.  Although 
the graphs in Figure 4.4.1 might suggest that the presentation of a predictive 
cue influenced the pigeons' ability to inhibit an unwanted response, the data 
were too variable to carry any statistical meaning. For example, the apparent 
differences in the probability of responding in Signal trials in probe session 1 of 
the Change-Signal task (Figure 4.4.1 Panel A) were caused by the behaviour of 
a single pigeon that responded to every trial that was accompanied by a Go 
cue, whereas the other five pigeons completing this task had a much lower 
probability of doing so (in fact, four of them never responded after the Change 
207 
 
signal had appeared in the probe sessions). Nonetheless, the procedure of 
averaging the performance of those six pigeons led to the apparent decrease in 
performance for trials showing a Go cue.  
 
Had the pigeons or humans differentiated between the cues, one would expect 
both their response times towards the Go stimulus and the probability of 
missing a response in Go trials to increase in the presence of the Signal cue 
(compared to presenting the Go cue) and the probability of responding to the 
signal to increase in the presence of the Go cue (compared to presenting the 
Signal cue). This pattern should have been especially apparent in the probe 
sessions, in which the cues did not reliably predict the nature of the upcoming 
trial any more. But, statistically speaking, performance in the cued blocks was 
similar to that in the probe blocks, in which the cues were uninformative. 
Consequently, there is no discernible evidence that pigeons differentiated 
between the cues that predicted with varying probabilities whether the next trial 
would be a Signal trial. However, since humans also gave no such indication, 
one can only speculate about what this finding implies about the cognitive 
requirements for exerting cue-based response inhibition. There is so far no 
concrete evidence that pigeons are unable to utilise the cues; it may be that 
they simply did not do so in the current paradigm, or with the amount of training 
they received. Assuming that pigeons were unable to use the information of the 
cues consequently means that the same would have to be assumed for 
humans, who are certainly able to use predictive cues, as they have done so in 
Bowditch et al. (2015). Further, although pigeons do not always attend to 
information that would reduce the ambiguity of a problem (e.g., Roberts, 
Feeney, McMillan et al., 2009; Smith, 2009), they are able to do so under the 
right circumstances (e.g., Dinsmoor, Sears, & Dout, 1976; Silberberg, & 
Fantino, 2010; Zentall & Stagner, 2012). Thus, it cannot be concluded that a 
mere failure to come under the control of predictive cues indicates that cued 
inhibitory control requires higher cognitive abilities than the associative 
processes that pigeons are restricted to.  
Only two human participants (one in each task) reported that they had become 
aware of the predictive function of the cues. In an attempt to gain more insight 
into the cognitive processes that elicit cue use, their performance was 
considered separately. Although both participants appeared to demonstrate 
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some sensitivity to the identity of the cues, mainly in the later blocks of the 
experiment and the probe block, the data from a single person per task did not 
carry the statistical power to make a definite statement, and Bayesian analyses 
of the effects remained inconclusive about the influence of the cues. Thus, it 
may simply be the case that the paradigm used in this chapter cannot 
adequately capture cueing effects. The question of whether or not cue 
awareness is necessary to utilise the cues, or whether behaviour might come 
under the control of automatic associations of the cue with the occurrence of a 
signal (or direct associations with the action of withholding a response), cannot 
be answered with the data that was generated with this paradigm. 
 
What the results of this section do indicate, however, is that cue-dependent 
response inhibition, although potentially mediated by associative learning as 
previous research suggests, is not acquired as easily or quickly associatively as 
the response inhibition following an explicit signal that is reported in Section 4.3. 
This is not too surprising given that a peck or click at the stimuli had immediate 
consequences (either a reward or timeout), whereas a peck or click at the cues 
did not. Awareness of the predictive function of the cues may enhance their 
influence on inhibitory control, but it is currently not certain whether such 
awareness is needed to enable an individual to perform cue-dependent 
response inhibition. 
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4.5  Discussion - Associative Processes in a Response-Inhibition Paradigm  
The experiments in Chapter 4 were conducted to estimate the influence of 
executive control and associative processes on response inhibition in both a 
Stop-Signal and a Change-Signal task. The results of Section 4.3 brought up a 
few interesting possibilities in this regard: first, executive control might not be 
needed to perform accurately in these tasks, as pigeons succeeded and 
showed similar patterns of behaviour in both tasks as humans did, and these 
patterns matched the predictions about performance made by the currently 
most prominent model of response inhibition, the independent horse-race model 
(Logan & Cowan, 1984). Secondly, although it is generally assumed that both 
tasks engage similar response-inhibition mechanisms (Verbruggen et al., 
2008b), the pattern of responding in the Change-Signal task exhibited by both 
pigeons and humans, in combination with the observed absence of trial-
sequence effects in pigeons, may suggest that no response-inhibition 
mechanism has in fact been employed in this task - and the many similarities 
between the two tasks speak towards the possibility that performance in the 
Stop-Signal task might equally be accomplished without the involvement of 
inhibitory-control processes.  
 
Regarding the first of the above possibilities, although there are a great number 
of similarities in the performance of humans and pigeons, one will need to 
consider the differences in the performance between the two species to make a 
definite statement about the cognitive capacities involved in response inhibition. 
The most prevalent performance difference was found in the way humans and 
pigeons used the information of one trial to prepare for response execution or 
inhibition in the next trial, described in Section 4.3. The human participants 
persistently slowed down in their response latencies in Go trials after a Signal 
trial relative to Go trials following a Go trial, and greatly reduced the probability 
of wrongly responding to the Go stimulus in Signal trials following a Signal trial. 
Pigeons did not reliably do so. The human participants expressed in the post-
experiment questionnaire that they had been aware of the function of the green 
and red stimuli (as a signal to Go or Stop/Change), and this awareness of the 
different response demands might have enabled them to mentally adjust the 
balance between focussing on performing the Go response and diverting 
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attention away from this action to detect the potential occurrence of a signal 
(Verbruggen & McLaren, in preparation). 
 
Furthermore, executive control processes might contribute to different degrees 
towards reactive response inhibition in response to a signal and towards 
proactive inhibition by which subjects prepare for the possibility of having to 
inhibit a response. As reported in Section 4.4, neither pigeons nor humans 
reliably altered their behaviour based on information provided by cues 
predicting the likelihood that the Go response had to be withheld in a given trial. 
However, the mere lack of cue utilisation cannot be interpreted as an inability to 
respond to the predictive cues if performance is governed by associative 
processes, especially since previous research does suggest otherwise 
(Bowditch et al., 2015). Although it may be argued that an awareness of the 
function of the cues facilitated the appropriate adjustment of behaviour - two 
participants detected the contingencies between cues and the occurrence of a 
signal, and those two showed a pattern of behaviour that could be interpreted in 
favour of cue sensibility -, the data gained from the experiment in this thesis 
were insufficient to allow for a definite statement in this regard.  
Bowditch et al. (2015) argued that inhibition both in response to a signal and in 
response to a cue may be reactive, that is, neither require a proactive 
preparation to inhibit one's response. This may well be the case; it may be that 
the subjects in the experiment reported in this chapter simply did not receive 
enough exposure to each of the cues to form a stable association with a cue 
and either the occurrence of a signal or, more directly, the goal to withhold a 
response, whereas the experienced number of Signal trials was sufficient to 
promote awareness of the contingencies of the stimulus and signal, and the 
associated demand to execute or withhold the Go response. Alternatively, it 
may be that cue-dependent response inhibition, like the trial-dependent 
adjustment of mental action goals discussed above, relies on the subjects' 
ability to utilise the information provided by the cues, and that subjects can only 
reliably adjust their behaviour in preparation for a potential need to inhibit a 
response if they possess executive control. Unfortunately, the results in this 
chapter provide no conclusive evidence in regard to this assumption, so that no 
definite statement can be made at the moment in regard to the cognitive 
requirements that allow proactive response inhibition.  
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In summary, the results reported in this section provide a first insight into 
different patterns of performance as a result of different cognitive mechanisms. 
In the beginning of this chapter, it was speculated that the influence of executive 
control might be visible in behavioural adjustments that are a consequence 
either of the inhibition requirements of the previous trial, or of available 
information about the likelihood that a signal will occur in a trial. The latter could 
not reliably be detected in either pigeons or humans with the current paradigms, 
and there may be a multitude of reasons for this failure to detect cue effects, 
which made it, at least for the moment, impractical to pursue the investigation of 
cue effects on pigeons' response-inhibition performance in any further 
experiments. However, the former is worth examining in more detail, since the 
results of this chapter potentially provide some support for the assumption that 
executive control manifests itself in trial-to-trial adjustments, which was 
exhibited by humans, but not by pigeons. As stated previously in Section 2.3, it 
is possible that the assessment of the pigeons' response times was unreliable 
and would not adequately capture any effects that might have been observable 
in the pigeons' performance with more accurate ways of measurement. Even 
though the pigeon's response times did reflect the predictions of the 
independent horse-race model, the possibility exists, especially if it can be 
assumed that trial-to-trial effects might be small. 
 
In Chapter 5, I report an additional experiment I conducted to investigate 
whether pigeons may be able to adjust their behaviour from one trial to the next 
under different circumstances than the computerised tests that were used in the 
experiments reported in this chapter. This additional experiment was not reliant 
on a timed pecking response and, in addition, its design necessitated that a 
response was initiated before the appearance of the signal, in an attempt to 
ensure that inhibition had to be applied to correct that response. Because of 
these two advantages over the paradigms reported in this chapter, the 
experiment reported in Chapter 5 might provide further insights to the questions 
as to whether pigeons can perform post-signal adjustments to their behaviour, 
and whether the associatively-mediated withholding of a response requires 
inhibition.  
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CHAPTER 5: CAN PIGEONS INHIBIT A RESPONSE IN A CONTINUOUS 
RESPONSE-INHIBITION PARADIGM? 
In Chapter 4, I established that pigeons and humans show similar patterns of 
performance in a Stop-Signal and Change-Signal task. However, although it is 
generally assumed that in humans both tasks require a mechanism of response 
inhibition (Verbruggen et al., 2008b) and performance in both is regarded as a 
measure of executive control, there is evidence that the response-inhibition 
mechanism governing Stop-Signal and Change-Signal performance has an 
associative component (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2009a; Verbruggen et al., 
2014; Best et al., 2016). The pigeons' success in both tasks in Chapter 4 
suggest that performance can be mediated entirely by associative processes 
and without the involvement of controlled inhibition. 
 
The possibility that the paradigms in Chapter 4 had been solved without the 
executive process of inhibitory control poses a potential threat to their validity in 
attributing behaviours to certain cognitive mechanisms, i.e., in attributing the 
ability to inhibit an initiated response to executive control. In order to test this 
assumption, it has to be assured that the pigeons indeed initiate a Go response, 
necessitating an act of response inhibition when its execution becomes 
inappropriate. A suitable paradigm has to be designed in such a way as to force 
the subjects to initiate a response before the command to withhold it arrives.  
 
The tasks used in Chapter 4 required subjects to perform a discrete action 
towards the Go stimulus (in Change-Signal task, this was also the case for the 
alternative key). Further, once a response location was chosen in the Change-
Signal task, the act of inhibiting a response to that location might have been 
difficult for pigeons, because the alternative response location was - to the 
pigeon - spatially separated, and required a head or full-body movement of the 
pigeon to be brought into sight. In combination, the paradigm might have been 
unsuitable to elicit inhibitory control for pigeons, even if they might have been 
able to exert it under different circumstances. 
 
A more promising approach might be the use of a paradigm that allows 
continuous response adjustment. For example, Verbruggen and McLaren (in 
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preparation) established a continuous Change-Signal paradigm to assess 
inhibitory control in children and adolescents of different ages. Unlike 
conventional paradigms, their task did not require a discrete action towards the 
Go stimulus and a separate action following the appearance of the Change 
signal, but instead participants were allowed to adjust their behaviour in one 
continuous motion. In their computer-based paradigm, participants had to 
quickly move the mouse cursor towards a target presented in one corner of the 
computer screen; sometimes, that target started moving towards the opposite 
screen corner after the children started dragging the mouse cursor towards it, 
forcing them to change the trajectory of the cursor to reach the target.  
 
Verbruggen and McLaren’s (in preparation) paradigm has been adapted for the 
use with pheasants (Madden, personal communication), by tracking their 
movement towards a target within a confined space. The pheasants entered a 
small arena at one end and crossed it to reach one of two food wells presented 
in the two corners at the other end of the arena. The right-hand food well was 
visibly baited, whilst the left-hand one was covered. In two of the six repeat 
trials of this experiment, as the birds crossed the arena, the right-hand food well 
was covered and the food in the left-hand well became accessible, so that the 
pheasants had to change their path to approach the usually unavailable left-
hand food well to retrieve the food reward. As expected, the pheasants showed 
increased response times to reach the target location in these circumstances, 
and showed a distinct bias to approach the initially presented well for a short 
while after the accessible food well changed.  
 
Verbruggen and McLaren (in preparation) claimed that the trajectories of the 
subjects' movement in space allow inferences about the mechanisms of 
response inhibition. They argued that the inhibitory control afforded in one trial 
can influence performance on the following trial if subjects perform mental goal 
adjustments between two trials. Such adjustments might induce similar effects 
on performance as the mental task-set reconfigurations that contribute to switch 
costs in task-switching paradigms: whilst focussing on the previous task set 
might allow subjects to perform that task more quickly on repeat trials, it 
decreases the ability to quickly and flexibly change to the other task set on 
switch trials (cf. Monsell, 2003). The same is thought to apply to response 
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inhibition (Verbruggen et al., 2008a; Bissett & Logan, 2011, 2012): humans 
might continuously calibrate the balance between focussing on completing the 
Go task on one side and, on the other side, diverting attention from the Go task 
to detect potential signals that that response has to be inhibited (cf. Elchlepp et 
al., 2016). Adjustments in favour of the goal to perform a response might not 
only increase the readiness to perform the required response on Go trials but 
also on Signal trials, whilst adjustments towards the mental goal to withhold a 
response might facilitate inhibition in Signal trials but lead to slower response 
execution when the Go response is required in Go trials. Such adjustments did 
appear to underlie the response patterns of the older children in Verbruggen 
and McLaren’s (in preparation) study; the turning points in Change trials, at 
which the trajectories of the mouse cursor started moving towards the changed 
target location, were biased towards the Go location more if the previous trial 
had been a Go trial than if the previous trial had been a Change trial. 
 
Conversely, if subjects possess poor executive control (for example, if the 
subjects are very young children), performance might be influenced less by trial-
to-trial adjustments of abstract task goals but more by a residual activation of 
the motor system (cf. Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Verbruggen, 
McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens, & McLaren, 2016), in that there might be a 
bias to execute the exact motor response that was performed in the previous 
trial (including, on Signal trials, any initial movement towards the Go target). 
Such an influence can be assumed to be quite strong if the Go and the changed 
response targets always afford the same motor response (if, for example, the 
Go response is always a movement to the right, and the changed response is 
always a movement to the left). This was the case in the study of Verbruggen 
and McLaren (in preparation), and indeed, if the trial before a Change trial had 
also been a Change trial, their youngest participants moved the mouse cursor in 
a more curved line - with the turning point being closer to the initially indicated 
target location - than if the preceding trial had been a Go trial. This might 
indicate that the demand of the previous trial to perform a curved motion (from 
the start position in the direction of the initial location and then to the changed 
location) influenced that movement in the next trial. 
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It has to be noted that a potential inertia of motor responses can behaviourally 
be differentiated from a tendency to repeat a previously rewarded response, for 
example, in the specific case of Verbruggen and McLaren's and Madden's 
paradigms, returning to the most recently rewarded target location (cf. 
response-repetition effect, Chapter 3). In the latter case, the previously 
rewarded target location might be approached directly; it would be expected 
that the trajectories in Go trials following Go have a more direct path to the Go 
location than the trajectories in Go trials following a Change, and consequently 
the turning points in Go trials following Go would be expected to occur earlier in 
a trial than the turning points in Go trials following a Change. 
For clarity, the patterns of performance that are expected to occur given each of 
the above three potential behavioural strategies is illustrated in Figure 5.1. In 
addition to mental goal adjustments, residual motor activation and a bias to 
approach the previously rewarded location, a non-directional approach is 
included as a fourth potential factor; it is discussed later on. 
 
Executive-control processes can reduce the effects of any of the mentioned 
causes. To disentangle the potential causes of any bias towards a target 
location as a consequence of the previous trial, it is thus once again helpful to 
examine the pattern that emerges when behaviour is not guided by executive 
control. The pheasants in Madden's (personal communication) study completed 
one trial per day, which prevented the analysis of any trial-to-trial goal 
adjustments; therefore, I assessed the performance of pigeons in this task. As 
pigeons are not assumed to be able to formulate the kind of mental goal sets 
that may underlie human behaviour, any difference in their trajectories towards 
a goal location in Go and Change trials should be a consequence either of 
residual motor activation of the response that was executed in the previous trial, 
or of a bias to move towards the most recently rewarded target location. Any 
such effects should be evident in the comparison of Go trials that were 
preceded by another Go trial with Go trials that were preceded by a Change trial 
(Verbruggen et al., 2008a; Bissett & Logan, 2011, 2012). 
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                       Go trial following a Go trial 
                       Go trial following a Change trial 
                       Change trial 
                 
A) Goal Adjustments C) Response Repetition 
B) Residual Motor Activation D) Non-directional 
Figure 5.1. Expected trajectories in Go trials (following a Go or following a Change 
trial) and Change trials when behaviour is governed by A) inter-trial goal 
adjustments, B) residual activation of motor programs, or C) a tendency to approach 
the previously baited food well, or D) when the arena is entered without direction. 
Note: the target location was on the right in Go trials and on the left in Change trials. 
 
 
Following Madden's procedures, I built an arena (described below) containing 
two food locations. In two thirds of trials - the Go trials -, the right-hand-side 
location (the Go location) was baited and a pigeon was rewarded for 
approaching it. In the remaining third of trials, after the pigeon started its 
approach, the initially available Go location was covered and the left-hand-side 
food location became available. In these trials, in order to gain a reward, the 
pigeon had to stop any movement towards the right location and instead 
approach the newly exposed location. The necessary continuous response 
adjustment in this setup has one obvious benefit over the response 
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requirements of the paradigm developed in Chapter 4: because the task 
requires movement in space, the pigeons were forced to initiate a response 
towards a goal (a food location) on every trial. This made it possible to assess 
the pigeons' ability (both in terms of success and speed) to correct their 
behaviour after initialising a response. Another advantage of the paradigm used 
in this chapter over the one used in Chapter 4 is that no extended training 
period was required to establish associations between arbitrary colours and 
symbols and the command to inhibit a response. The paradigm used in this 
chapter utilised the pigeons' natural behaviour of approaching a food source; no 
further reward or punishment was required to elicit a response towards the 
target. As a result, a substantially larger sample of subjects could be tested. 
 
Methods 
 
Subjects 
Forty-nine pigeons entered this experiment (including all the pigeons that took 
part in the experiments reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4); 38 completed the 
entire procedure. Housing conditions were the same as described in Chapter 2. 
Each pigeon was tested in isolation. Inside the testing arena, the pigeons had 
no access to water or grit, but they received water and grit ad libitum in the 
aviaries and holding areas. 
 
Apparatus 
Figure 5.2 Panel A is a scale plan of the experimental apparatus; for a 3D-
sketch, see Figure 5.2 Panel D. The arena was mounted onto a sheet of 
135x100cm melamine-covered chipboard (Contiboard®) with six pillars of 
planed soft wood, each 10x10x45cm in size. The outer walls of the arena were 
made of 6mm plywood of 30cm in height; the long walls were 124cm long, the 
short walls were 80cm long. Because the poles were taller than the walls, a 
curtain made of blue cloth was drawn between the poles along the long walls 
(seen in Figure 5.2 Panel B) to restrict the pigeons' vision to the inside of the 
arena. The arena that was accessible to the pigeons measured 82x76cm. The 
pigeons entered the arena from one of the short walls via a 40cm long and 
26cm wide runway corridor (seen in Figure 5.2 Panel C). The corridor and the 
interior walls adjacent to it were made of 6mm plywood and plastic-covered  
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Figure 5.2. A) Scale plan (1:10) of the testing arena. B) View from above at the see-
saw. Both wells are uncovered in this picture. C) The pigeon's view from the inside of 
the entrance corridor into the arena. Both wells are uncovered in this picture. D) Design 
of the testing arena shown from the side (not to scale, for exact proportions see Panel 
A). See text for details.  
A 
B 
C 
D 
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25mm chicken wire, enabling the pigeons to view the arena from inside the 
corridor. A see-saw device was mounted along the opposite short wall of the 
arena. The see-saw consisted of a plywood beam  
of 50cm length that was fixed onto a block of wood by a bolt. A small plastic cup 
was attached to each end of this axis, cut to size to cover another plastic lid 
glued in place underneath that served as a food well. The two wells were 
approximately 35cm apart from each other in the corners of the arena. The see-
saw could be operated to cover one of the two food wells. In its default position, 
the see-saw covered the left (as seen from the corridor entrance) food well, 
exposing the right well. Its axis rested on the armature of a solenoid integrated 
into the see-saw hinge, which retracted when the solenoid was activated, 
allowing the see-saw to tip over to cover the right food well and expose the left 
well. Directly adjacent to the right side of the corridor exit on the inside of the 
testing area, an LED diode was mounted 7cm from the ground and continuously 
generated an infrared light beam. The beam was detected by a lux meter 
mounted at the same height on the left side of the corridor exit. The lux meter 
recorded any changes in the incoming infrared beam and submitted this 
information to an Arduino® One microchip board; if the there was an interruption 
in the light beam, the Arduino One board operated the solenoid attached to the 
see-saw. The arena was covered by a Plexiglas® roof hinging onto one of the 
long walls. It opened to the top to allow the experimenter to manually remove 
the pigeon from the arena. The runway corridor was covered by a scrap-board 
roof. A video camera was mounted onto this roof to overlook the testing arena. 
 
Procedure 
Before testing, all pigeons received a 15-minute habituation session in which 
the see-saw was fixed in place to expose both food wells, which were both 
baited. One pigeon at a time was placed into the entrance corridor of the arena 
and was allowed to freely explore the testing arena and feed from the two food 
wells. A pigeon received up to three habituation sessions until it fed from both 
food wells in the same session. If a pigeon had not visited both wells by the 
third session, it was excluded from any further test sessions. 
Following a successful visit to both food wells within 15 minutes, the pigeon 
received a 5-minute session in which, again, both food wells were accessible 
and baited. If the pigeon visited both wells within the 5-minute interval, it was 
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moved on to the test sessions. This 5-minute feeding session was also 
repeated up to three times, until the pigeon had fed from both wells in the same 
session. As above, if a pigeon failed to do so within three sessions, it was 
excluded from any further test sessions. 38 of the 49 pigeons successfully 
completed the habituation sessions; the remaining 11 pigeons did not explore 
the arena. 
Test trials were administered in two sessions, each session consisting of 4 
blocks of 3 trials, totalling 24 trials per pigeon. The first two trials in each block 
were 'Go' trials: the see-saw was fixed to expose the right food well (covering 
the left well) and a pigeon was allowed to feed freely from that well after 
approaching it. The third trial in the sequence was a 'Change' trial: at the start of 
this trial, the see-saw was in the same position as in Go trials but rested loosely 
on the solenoid armature, and it was allowed to flip to the other side when the 
pigeon crossed the infrared light beam at the arena entrance and so operated 
the solenoid. In these trials, the pigeon was allowed to feed from the newly 
exposed left food well; the right well was covered after the see-saw had tipped 
over. 
A trial ended either once the pigeon had consumed all the food from the 
available food well or, if the pigeon failed to approach a well, after a maximum 
of three minutes. In the latter case, the trial was repeated up to two more times 
until the pigeon approached the exposed food well; if it had not done so by the 
third trial repetition, the session was aborted. If this was the case, the pigeon 
repeated the entire block of three trials in its next session. 
All trials were recorded using the video camera. 
 
Data Collection 
To estimate the pigeons' ability to correct their behaviour after initiating 
movement towards a food location, I recorded the latency from releasing a 
pigeon into the entrance corridor until it fed from the exposed food well. 
Furthermore, using the video recordings of each trial, I recorded the position of 
a pigeon's beak and its trajectory as it moved within the arena and mapped its 
path to the food well using the Open Source Physics Tracker© video tracking 
software (Brown, 2009). From these data, I extracted the latency to reach the 
accessible food well from the point of being released into the entrance corridor; 
I also extracted the coordinates of the turning point at which a pigeon's 
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trajectory was distinctly directed towards the accessible food well, defined as 
the final local minimum (in Go trials) or maximum (in Change trials) of the x-
coordinate of the pigeon's beak before the value of this coordinate continuously 
increased or decreased respectively until the correct food well was reached. I 
also recorded the time to reach that turning point since entering the arena and 
crossing the infrared light beam. The axes of coordinates were standardised so 
that the entrance point from the corridor into the arena was marked by the 
coordinates (0,0); the available food well in Go trials was located at (1,1) and 
the available food well in Change trials was located at (-1,1).  
As the trials were administered in two sessions of 12 trials, the first trial and the 
thirteenth trial were not preceded by either another Go or a Change trial, so 
they were excluded from analyses. Thus, there were 8 Go trials preceded by 
Go, 6 Go trials preceded by Change and 8 Change trials that went into 
analyses. 
Where applicable, the reported results of the statistical analyses were subject to 
Huynh-Feldt corrections. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the average trajectory path that a pigeon's beak took from the 
entrance of the arena to the accessible food well for each trial. To account for 
individual differences in the latencies to reach the correct food well, the 
trajectories of each trial were standardised by Vincentisation (Vincent, 1912; 
Ratcliff, 1979; Genest, 1992); the graphs depict the twenty 0.05-quantile points 
of the latency to reach the available food well. These were averaged across the 
eight (or six) trials of each trial type for each pigeon (shown as grey lines in 
Figure 5.3), and then again averaged to calculate the group mean trajectories. 
The coordinates of every pigeon's average turning points (the moment of 
starting to approach the available food well) in each trial type are illustrated in 
Figure 5.4.  
 
The x-coordinate of the pigeons' average turning points in Change trials 
(M=0.14, SD=0.22, Figure 5.4 Panel C) was significantly greater than zero, 
t(37)=3.80, adjusted p=.003, ηp2=.28, indicating that pigeons were closer to the 
Go food well than to the changed food well when their trajectory irreversibly  
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Figure 5.3. Average trajectories towards the baited food well in A) Go trials following 
another Go trial, B) Go trials following a Change trial and C) Change trials. Grey 
lines: mean trajectories of individual pigeons, black lines: overall mean trajectory. 
Note: the grey circles depict the locations of the two food wells; in Go trials the 
accessible well was at (1,1), the location of the accessible well in Change trials was 
at (-1,1). 
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Figure 5.4. The individual pigeons' average turning point (coordinates of the first 
location at which the distance to the available food well decreased and did no further 
increase subsequently) in A) Go trials following another Go trial, B) Go trials following a 
Change trial and C) Change trials. Note: the grey circles depict the locations of the two 
food wells; in Go trials the accessible well was at (1,1), the location of the accessible 
well in Change trials was at (-1,1).  
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started approaching the changed well. For Go trials, the average turning point 
(as the x-coordinate at which a subject started decreasing the distance to the 
Go well without any further increase in distance) was marginally lower than zero 
for Go trials following a Go trial (M=-0.10, SD=0.23, Figure 5.4 Panel A; 
t(37)=2.41, adjusted p=.063, ηp2=.14), and significantly lower than zero for Go 
trials following a Change trial (M=-0.11, SD=0.28, Figure 5.4 Panel B; t(37)=-
2.71, adjusted p=.030, ηp2=.17), indicating that the pigeons were somewhat 
closer to the inaccessible food well than to the Go food well when starting to 
approach the Go well.  
 
To assess whether there were any differences in the trajectories in Go-
following-Change and Change-following-Go trials, the x-coordinates of the 
pigeons' trajectories on Change trials were mirrored along the y-axis, so that the 
location of the correct food well had the coordinates of (1,1), like the correct well 
in Go trial types. The x-coordinates of the pigeons' mirrored turning points in 
Change trials did not differ significantly from the x-coordinate of their turning 
points in Go trials, F(2,74)=0.24, p=.72; Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons to Go 
trials: both p=1.0. The turning points in the two types of Go trials did not differ 
depending on whether that trial was preceded by a Go trial or a Change trial, 
p=1.0. Likewise, there was no difference between the two types of Go trials and 
the Change trials in the (mirrored) x-coordinates at the point of entering the 
arena and in the subsequent twenty 0.05-quantile points of the pigeons' mean 
trajectories, interaction between trial type and trajectory of x-coordinates: 
F(40,1480)=1.46, p=.23. 
 
The y-coordinate of the average turning points for all three trial types also 
differed significantly from zero (which represents the entrance point into the 
arena); Go trials following a Go trial: M=0.51, SD=0.31, Figure 5.4 Panel A; 
t(37)=10.21, adjusted p<.001, ηp2=.74; Go trials following a Change trial: 
M=0.51, SD=0.34, Figure 5.4 Panel B; t(37)=9.40, adjusted p<.001, ηp2=.71; 
Change trials: M=0.60, SD=0.28, Figure 5.4 Panel C; t(37)=13.36, adjusted 
p<.001, ηp2=.83. These coordinates did not differ significantly between trial 
types, F(2,74)=1.25, p=.28.  
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Figure 5.5 shows the latencies from being released into the entrance corridor to 
reaching the accessible food well. Additionally, the average time to reach the 
turning point, that is, the time from entering the arena and crossing the light 
beam to distinctly moving towards the newly available food well, is shown as 
grey bars. 
The turning-point latencies were analysed in a repeated-measures ANOVA 
using Trial Type (Go trial following another Go trial, Go trial following a Change 
trial, Change trial) as a within-subjects factor. They differed significantly 
between Go and Change trials, F(2,74)=6.70, p=.004, ηp2=.15. Bonferroni post-
hoc comparisons confirmed that the pigeons started approaching the correct 
food well equally fast in both types of Go trials regardless of whether the 
previous trial had been a Go (M=6.2sec, SD=1.2) or a Change trial (M=6.5sec, 
SD=1.2), p=1.0; that is, there was no effect of the response requirements in the 
previous trial on reaching the turning point in Go trial. However, the pigeons 
took longer to start approaching the correct food well in Change trials 
(M=11.4sec, SD=2.2), comparisons to Go trials: both p≤.023. 
The time from the turning point to reaching the correct food location (shown as 
white bars in Figure 5.5) did not differ significantly between trials, F(2,74)=1.68, 
p=.20. Once the pigeons were on a distinct path towards the correct food well, 
they reached it in roughly the same time in all trials. 
 
To assess whether the difference in the latencies to reach the turning point 
might be due to being more familiar with approaching the Go location, the 
analysis was repeated including only the data from the last block of trials, at 
which point the pigeons had experienced seven Change trials. The time to 
reach the turning point in the last block did not differ significantly between trial 
types, F(2,74)=1.91, p=.17; the pigeons turned towards the correct food location 
not significantly different in Go trials following a Go (M=3.7sec, SD=0.9), Go 
trials following a Change (M=4.2sec, SD=1.1), and Change trials (M=8.5sec, 
SD=3.2). 
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Figure 5.5. Latencies in seconds to reach the correct food well in Go trials (following 
another Go trial or following a Change trial) and Change trials. The grey areas denote 
the average time to reach the turning point at which a pigeon started approaching the 
available food well. Error bars represent standard errors. Note: Change trials were 
always followed a Go trial. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The paradigm used in Chapter 4 could have been completed without the 
involvement of a response-inhibition mechanisms. Therefore, in an effort to 
necessitate the inhibition of a prepared response, the design of the experiment 
in this chapter forced pigeons to initiate a Go response before the signal to alter 
that response was given. The paradigm required pigeons to approach a baited 
food well, a behaviour that is, presumably, highly prevalent in the pigeons' 
natural behavioural repertoire and executed quickly, and might thus require a 
considerable amount of inhibitory control to be overcome. 
 
The pigeons took significantly longer to start approaching the correct food 
location in Change trials, and their trajectories suggest that they were inclined to 
initially approach the (incorrect) Go location in those trials before adjusting their 
movement towards the changed location. I return to the response times later; 
but first, I focus on the trajectory data. 
 
Verbruggen and McLaren (in preparation) claimed that the influence of inhibitory 
control, at least in their subjects, would be visible in a clear movement towards 
the Go location followed by a sharp curve towards the changed location. As can 
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be seen in Figure 5.3 Panel C, some pigeons do seem to change direction 
abruptly, but the group as a whole showed no trajectory of abruptly changing 
directions from moving towards the Go target to the changed target; neither did 
they show a tendency to approach the Go well in a straight line in Go trials. 
Instead, judging by the overall trajectory curves in Figure 5.3, it appears that the 
general trend was to move towards the centre of the arena in all trials, and then 
to approach the accessible food well from there.  
 
To determine the cognitive mechanism that determined the pigeons' behaviour, 
I evaluated the effect of the previous trial on movement trajectories. Similar to 
the post-signal effects on response latencies and P(respond) discussed in 
Sections 1.2 and 4.3, the influence of the response requirement of the previous 
trial on performance in the current trial can have several possible causes. For 
example, differences in trajectories depending on the previous trial type can be 
due to mental goal adjustments (Elchlepp et al., 2016), residual motor activation 
(Verbruggen & McLaren, in preparation), or a bias to repeat the previous 
response (cf. Chapter 3). Each potential cause should have a different effect on 
the expressed trajectories, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The pigeons' average turning points at which the distance to the correct food 
well only decreased, indicating that the pigeons approached the appropriate 
well, was indeed biased towards the previously rewarded food location, both in 
Change trials and in Go trials following a Change trials, which would support the 
response-repetition account. For Go trials following a Go trial, however, this 
account (as well as the other two potential mechanisms described above) 
predicts a direct path towards the Go location from the moment of entering the 
arena - but for the pigeons, the average turning point for Go trials following 
another Go trial were not closer to the Go location than the turning points in Go 
trials following a Change trial (indicated by similar values of the x-coordinates); 
they were also not closer to the entrance of the arena (and thus earlier in a trial) 
for Go trials following Go than for Go trials following Change (indicated by 
similar values of the y-coordinate). In fact, the pigeons crossed the arena about 
half-way (see Figure 5.3 Panel A) before turning towards the Go well. As 
mentioned above, this pattern suggests that, instead of employing any of the 
strategies proposed above which would induce a bias towards the Go location, 
the pigeons tended to move towards the centre of the arena in all trials, and 
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then approached the accessible food well from there. Accordingly, Figure 5.1 
Panel D presents the pattern of behaviour that would be expected if there was 
no bias towards either target location, and subjects instead proceeded without a 
goal direction into the arena. As is evident when comparing the mean 
trajectories in Figure 5.3 with those predicted in Figure 5.1, the pigeons likely 
pursued this approach. It also explains the observation that the turning points in 
each trial were biased towards the incorrect food location: if a pigeon entered 
the arena not in a straight line but towards the side of the correct location, it 
would be able to reach the correct food well with minimal adjustments to its path 
- and the recorded turning point for these occasions would be close to the arena 
entrance and close to zero. If the pigeon, upon entering the arena, proceeded in 
the direction of the incorrect well, it would have to change its trajectory, at the 
latest point when reaching the wrong corner of the arena - the turning point for 
these trials would all be on the opposite side to the correct food well. Averaging 
the turning points across trials would thus produce coordinates that are skewed 
towards the opposite side of the correct food location. 
The apparent lack of direction in the pigeons' trajectories can possibly be 
explained by their comparatively long response latencies to reach a correct food 
well. As shown in Figure 5.5, the pigeons took ten to fifteen seconds to 
complete a trial, whereas the pheasants in Madden's experiment took around 
five to ten seconds (Madden, personal communication). Whilst it is possible that 
this difference between species is due to a somewhat larger arena for the 
pigeons (the distance from the entrance to the other side of the arena was 
124cm for the pigeons and 75cm for the pheasants), long latencies make it 
difficult to assess whether the pigeons engaged a mechanism of response 
inhibition to adjust their responses when necessary. The paradigm in this 
chapter did not impose any negative consequences for approaching the 
incorrect food well or for responding slowly, so that there was no pressing need 
to quickly readjust any incorrect behaviour. 
It could have been the case that the pigeons generally completed the 
movement towards the Go location until they reached it and only approached 
the other food well after discovering that the Go well was inaccessible. Some 
pigeons did seem to do so in all eight Change trials, but there is no overall 
pattern across all subjects that would indicate that the pigeons generally 
approached the Go well first (and failed to employ inhibitory control) and then 
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corrected their behaviour. Instead, the non-directional trend in their overall 
trajectories suggests that, as in the experiment in Chapter 4, the pigeons did not 
inhibit a prepared response in order to be able to perform the correct response. 
 
Despite this apparent overall trend, it is not the case that experience had no 
effect on behaviour - as mentioned above, the pigeons took considerably longer 
to reach the turning point in the Change trials than in the Go trials. In all trials, 
the distance from the entrance to the two food wells was equal; thus, if there 
had been no bias in approaching either well, those latencies should have been 
equal in Go and Change trials. The fact that this was not the case shows that 
the pigeons more readily approached the Go well than they approached the 
Change well.  
Because Change trials occurred less frequently than Go trials, the required 
response in Change trials (i.e., approaching the left food well) might not have 
been as well practised as the Go response, making pigeons slower. Thus, the 
slower response latencies, and the pigeons' initial tendency to move towards 
the Go location could be seen as a matter of familiarity with the response 
requirements, rather than as evidence for the inhibition of an incorrect 
response. Indeed, in the last block of trials, the pigeons' latencies to reach the 
turning point in each trial type did not differ significantly between trial types; that 
is, after having had experienced seven Change trials previously, the pigeons 
approached the changed food location as quickly as the Go location, although 
the greater variability in the Change latencies suggests that the pigeons might 
still had a tendency to approach the Go well, which had been baited twice as 
often. 
 
Separately, familiarity with the Go response might be the key to the question as 
to why the pigeons did not show the same strong tendency to approach the Go 
location as the pheasants in Madden's (personal communication) experiment, 
which performed the same task under very similar conditions. In contrast to the 
24 trials that were given to the pigeons, the pheasants only completed six trials, 
each administered on a different day. Only two of those trials were Change 
trials, one of which was the very last trial; that is, when entering their first 
Change trial, the pheasants had experienced only two Go trials, and at the start 
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of their second Change trial, the pheasants had previously experienced four Go 
trials and one Change trial. 
 
Some specifics about the design of the arena might have further contributed to 
differences in strategies between pheasants and pigeons. It might be that the 
pigeons were unable to determine which one of the two wells was open and 
contained food when they entered the arena, so that a strategy of entering the 
arena in a straight line and thus minimising the distance to each well was the 
most efficient way of resolving uncertainty. Another likely possibility is that the 
pigeons, although able to view both food wells from within the entrance corridor, 
did not start to move towards one food location until they had entered the arena, 
which was the same moment that the light beam initiating a change was 
crossed. A possible improvement of the design in this regard would be to 
change the point at which the light beam is crossed. In Verbruggen and 
McLaren (in preparation) study, the children had started a distinct movement 
towards the Go target before the change was induced; perhaps installing the 
light beam at a position closer to the Go location - for example, at the 
coordinates of (0.25,0.25) - would initiate a comparable goal-directed movement 
for the pigeons. Increasing the ratio of Go trials to Change trials might 
additionally promote more direct trajectories towards the Go location. 
 
All in all, although it was initially thought that this paradigm might provide a 
more direct way of assessing response inhibition in pigeons than the paradigm 
used in Chapter 4, it appears that it had problems if its own. Nonetheless, if the 
procedure used in the present chapter are refined, it can have merits; for 
example, it allows a quick assessment of a large sample size without the need 
for extensive training in an operant chamber. The computer-based approach 
reported in Chapter 4, which allows relatively close mirroring of the procedures 
used with adult humans, might be better suited to measure inhibitory processes 
if it can be implemented practically, as it can with pigeons. 
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Executive control provides humans (and perhaps other capable animals) with 
the outstanding cognitive ability to plan their actions and flexibly adjust these 
plans to current intrinsic and extrinsic demands. This ability has been studied 
extensively, with two of the most widely used paradigms being the task-
switching (Monsell, 2003) and the Stop-Signal paradigm (Logan & Cowan, 
1984).  
 
In task-switching paradigms, it is assumed that the influence of executive 
control is evident in task-switch costs, and that humans perform a mental task-
set reconfiguration (Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006), by which the 
specific stimulus-response rules of the current task are retrieved into working 
memory, and the rules of the previous task are deleted. It has been proposed 
that this process of replacing one set of rules with a different set of rules, 
despite its cost to performance, shields an individual's attention against external 
distraction (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009; Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011) and 
thus limits the execution of incorrect responses.  
Indeed, in the experiments reported in this thesis (and in line with the literature 
on task-switching performance in humans, cf. Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010), the participants who based their behaviour on the 
task rules that defined the paradigm showed substantial switch costs. In further 
evidence for the shielding function of switch costs (Dreisbach, 2012), these 
costs were mainly observed in responses towards response-incongruent stimuli, 
to which the correct response varied between tasks, and occurred irrespective 
of whether or not a stimulus or a response was repeated from one trial to the 
next. This result suggests that the behaviour of those participants was indeed 
sensitive only to the abstract task structure of the paradigm, and any 
interference from potentially conflicting stimulus-response contingencies was 
minimised by executive-control operations. 
 
Similarly, Stop-Signal paradigms are thought to depend on executive control, 
enabling an individual to inhibit the execution of a response after it has been 
prepared; Change-Signal paradigms additionally demand the preparation and 
execution of an alternate response. Although there is now considerable doubt 
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that the proposed "horse-race" between the process that governs response 
execution and the process that governs response inhibition relies on executive 
control (cf. van Gaal et al., 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2009a), other 
phenomena might reflect the influence of executive control, such as the 
observation that response latencies increase in trials following successful 
inhibition (Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Bissett & Logan, 2011, 2012; Elchlepp et 
al., 2016) and accuracy increases in trials that demand the same process 
(either response execution or inhibition) as the previous trial (Verbruggen & 
McLaren, in preparation). The human participants in the experiments reported in 
this thesis showed these effects. 
 
However, as pointed out in Chapter 1 and subsequent chapters, the behavioural 
effects that are captured with task-switching and Stop-Signal paradigms might 
not necessarily reflect executive-control processes, but could emerge when 
behaviour is guided by associative processes. 
 
For example, it could be expected that, without executive control, subjects 
would not perform any of the mental inter-trial adjustments that presumably 
enable successful task switching. Specifically, associative learning could guide 
acquisition without a mental representation of competing sets of task rules (and 
consequently without requiring task-set reconfiguration; Dreisbach, 2006, 2007; 
Forrest, 2012; Forrest et al., 2014) - behaviour would be based on the 
experience with specific stimuli and their associated responses. Similarly, in 
Stop-Signal tasks, subjects relying on associative processes should not be able 
to perform any adjustments of their mental inhibition threshold (Bissett & Logan, 
2011; Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012; Verbruggen & McLaren, in preparation) in 
anticipation of having to inhibit a response. In fact, any potential trial-to-trial 
effects in either paradigm should be limited to specific aspects of the presented 
stimuli or the performed response, but should not be visible at the level of an 
abstract task structure (cf. Chapters 3 and 4). 
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6.1  How Do Executive Control and Associative Processes Affect 
Performance?  
The main focus of this thesis was to examine whether the above predictions 
could be confirmed by studying the performance of pigeons. One important 
assumption of this approach was that the behaviour of pigeons is guided purely 
by associative processes. It is widely assumed, on the basis of substantial 
evidence, that this is the case (Mackintosh, 1988), and the cognitive capacities 
of pigeons and their evident limitations relative to human performance are well 
documented (e.g., Lea & Wills, 2008; Lea et al., 2009, Wills et al., 2009; Smith 
et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Maes et al., 2015). The studies reported in this 
thesis provide further evidence that the pigeons indeed relied exclusively on 
associative processes to acquire and perform accurately in a given task: in 
Section 2.2, I show that a small change in the way forced-choice response 
options were displayed determined success or failure to learn a discrimination 
task. Additionally, in Section 4.1, I report the observation that the specific 
method of reinforcement greatly influenced whether pigeons acquired a 
behavioural response. As discussed in the relevant sections, these 
observations support the contention that the behaviour of the pigeons primarily 
relied on Pavlovian processes. 
 
In the assessments of task-switching effects reported in Chapter 3, pigeons 
demonstrated a marked absence of task-switch costs. A series of further 
experiments confirmed these findings; due to the similarity in the results, these 
experiments were not reported in greater detail in this thesis, but their results 
are summarised in Appendix A5. In one experiment, each task was indicated by 
a single cue (so that every cue switch signalled a task switch, which can 
contribute largely to task-switch costs in humans; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010), to assess whether the number of cue-task 
mappings would affect the emergence of switch costs in the performance of 
pigeons. In another experiment, the task-switching paradigm included only 
response-incongruent stimuli, to which humans show increased switch costs 
(Kiesel et al., 2010; Forrest, 2012). In a final experiment, the inter-trial interval 
was reduced from 15 to 30 seconds to one to two seconds, and the 
presentation of a start key was omitted, to assess whether a shorter latency 
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between trials and before the arrival of the stimulus would increase switch costs 
- in humans, shorter intervals reduce the time to prepare a task switch, which 
leads to a decrease in performance in task-switch trials (Logan, 2003; Monsell, 
2003; Altmann, 2004). None of these variations produced detectable switch 
costs in pigeons. 
Despite the consistent lack of task-switch costs, the pigeons' performance in the 
task-switching paradigm was greatly affected by the response-congruency of 
the stimuli and by response-repetition effects, which both occur independently 
of any task demands and are best explained in terms of associative processes 
(cf. Chapter 3). That is, the congruency effect reflects interference from 
conflicting stimulus-response mappings; the response-repetition effect seems to 
relate mainly to the appetitive value of a recently reinforced stimulus location. 
 
The results of the experiments with pigeons are quite intriguing on their own - 
but in order to be able to make a more comparative assessment, I examined 
whether humans could come under the control of the same associative 
processes. 
Previous studies in humans have tried to determine the influence of associative 
processes on performance by limiting the extent to which participants could 
engage executive control. For example, information about the task structure of 
the task-switching paradigm was withheld (e.g., Dreisbach, 2006; 2007; Forrest, 
2012; Forrest et al., 2014), and participants were only provided with stimulus-
response contingencies or had to learn the specific contingencies via trial and 
error.  
I took a similar approach in this thesis: in an attempt to limit the extent to which 
humans employed executive control to complete the paradigms but instead 
engaged associative learning, all participants were encouraged to learn the 
correct responses to each stimulus as they performed the tasks. 
The underlying assumption of this procedure (and of key studies in this area, 
e.g., Dreisbach, 2006; 2007; Forrest, 2012; Forrest et al., 2014) was that 
participants who report that their responses had not been guided by any 
abstract rules had relied on associative processes to perform accurately. But is 
there any evidence in the experiments reported in this thesis that this was 
indeed the case? 
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In the task-switching experiments reported in this thesis, the performance of 
most Rules-Ignorant participants could be attributed to a rule-based strategy of 
some sort, although the rules that had been generated deviated (sometimes 
greatly) from the objective task rules. One may be cautious about how much the 
rules that the participants reported indeed governed their behaviour as they 
performed the experiment. It is not uncommon that specific rules are simply 
offered as a post-hoc explanation of how responses could be generated but had 
not in fact been applied by the participant. It is impossible to find out if this might 
have been the case; nonetheless, all of the participants who reported a rule-
based strategy expressed similar sequential trial effects, including reliable task-
switch costs. In addition to the strategic (yet Rules-Ignorant) task-switchers, 
some participants reported that they had tried to memorise the stimulus-
response contingencies, and others reportedly found no pattern that would link 
a specific stimulus to a response - those two groups of participants were of the 
greatest interest from a comparative point of view, as they probably were the 
groups that relied most on associative learning.  
 
Unlike pigeons, (but like the participants in Forrest's, 2012, studies), those 
participants who memorised the contingencies expressed switch costs in their 
performance. Their performance also differed from that of the pigeons in that 
response-repetition effects greatly affected performance in task-repeat trials but 
were absent in task-switch trials. This result, as explained in detail in Section 
3.4, might show the differential effects of Pavlovian and instrumental processes: 
the pigeons were more sensitive to the appetitive value of a cue-stimulus-
location compound, preferring to approach response locations that were 
recently paired with reward, whereas humans acquired the cue-stimulus-
response contingencies in a way that incorporated the closer associative 
relation between those cues that indicated the same task and consequently 
facilitated performance in trials repeating equivalent cues. Importantly, this 
finding shows that task-switch costs can occur in human performance even 
when their responses were not based on task rules but on stimulus-response 
contingencies. 
 
In fact, only those participants who had assumed that responses were randomly 
marked correct were entirely unaffected by a change in tasks. Although in some 
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regards the pattern of their performance showed similarity to that of the pigeons' 
performance, these humans performed at chance level overall, which speaks 
against the possibility that they had come under the control of the same 
cognitive processes as the highly accurately performing pigeons. These 
participants also showed an absence of any congruency effect, and varied 
greatly in their general response patterns. It can be assumed that they did not 
learn anything about the effective stimulus-response contingencies or the 
underlying tasks, neither guided by rules nor by associative processes - which 
seemed to be the only way to eradicate switch costs in human performance. 
These participants most likely responded randomly, with a strong tendency to 
repeat the response that was indicated as correct in the previous trial (cf. 
Section 3.4).  
 
In the Stop-Signal and Change-Signal paradigms, despite having to learn the 
function of specific stimuli via trial and error, all human participants were able to 
report the contingencies between the Go stimulus and the demand to execute 
the Go response, and between the Stop/Change signal and the demand to 
withhold the Go response. The participants in these two tasks also showed 
reliable inter-trial adjustments that reflected an abstract representation of the 
goals to execute or inhibit a response, namely increased response latencies in 
trials following successful inhibition and increased accuracy in trials that 
demand a repetition of the same process (either response execution or 
inhibition). The pigeons showed no such trial-to-trial effects, either in the 
computerised task reported in Chapter 4, or in the physical task reported in 
Chapter 5. Although the pigeons showed an increased probability of wrongly 
executing a response when the execution of that response had been rewarded 
in the previous trial, this behaviour does not necessarily imply an adjustment of 
the subjects' inhibition threshold - it merely reflects a greater readiness to 
perform a recently reinforced response, regardless of current trial demands 
(similar to the response-repetition effect on the pigeons' task-switching 
performance, cf. Section 3.3). Any adjustments in inhibitory control would be 
expected to primarily facilitate the ability to detect the signal and inhibit an 
inappropriate response, and not to lead to a more rigid (and error-prone) 
execution of the Go response. 
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In summary, although the pigeons showed some sequential trial-to-trial effects, 
both in the task-switching and in the response-inhibition paradigms, these 
effects were due only to the repetition of specific stimulus features or 
responses, but did not extend to repetitions at the level of abstract tasks, i.e., 
performing the same discrimination task during task switching or executing the 
same goal-oriented response (response inhibition or execution) in the Stop-
Signal and Change-Signal task. 
 
For humans, the majority of participants generated and followed abstract rules.  
Nonetheless, a small group of participants in the task-switching experiments 
tried to learn the contingencies, and had no awareness of the task rules that 
were in place. The performance of this group differed noticeably from that of the 
participants who had followed rules: like pigeons, they were greatly affected by 
stimulus- and response-specific attributes. However, unlike for pigeons, the 
processes that mediated learning in these humans led to a performance benefit 
in task-repeat trials compared to task-switch trials (cf. Section 3.4). Taken 
together, humans were apparently able to acquire part of the task-switching 
paradigm associatively, in an instrumental fashion that is sensitive to the 
presented stimulus-response contingencies and the associative equivalence of 
task cues; however, a strategy of continued hypothesis-testing might 
nonetheless have influenced the effect of associative processes on the 
performance of those humans. The pigeons on the other hand were able to 
acquire the paradigm via Pavlovian processes, on the basis of the affective 
value of the presented combination of cue, stimulus and response location. 
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6.2  Do Executive-Control Paradigms Measure Executive Control? 
Before addressing the question stated in the heading of this section, it has to be 
reiterated that conventional task-switching studies examine response times, 
whereas I primarily considered error rates. However, task-switching effects 
reliably occur in both measures of performance (Monsell, 2003; Forrest, 2012), 
and it was shown in Section 3.1 that this was also the case in the experiments 
carried out for this thesis. Similarly, Castro and Wasserman (2015) reported an 
absence of switch costs not only for errors but also for the response times of 
pigeons. In the Stop-Signal and Change-Signal studies reported in this thesis, 
both response times and the probability of responding were relevant, and, as 
reported in Chapter 4, I was able to capture at least some response-inhibition 
effects in both these measures in pigeons and humans.  
 
In task-switching paradigms, regardless of whether performance is assessed 
via response times or error rates, executive-control processes are thought to 
result in task-switch costs, as a reflection of mental task-set reconfiguration. 
However, since it has been shown that switch costs can also occur in humans 
who did not use task rules (cf. Chapter 3; Forrest, 2012; Forrest et al., 2014), 
assessing switch costs in isolation may not be a suitable indicator of an 
individual's level of executive control. Systematic errors in task-switch trials 
might be the result of an insufficient application of the relevant task rules; 
furthermore, large response-repetition effects (especially in the absence of 
response-repetition costs in task-switch trials) in addition to switch costs might 
point towards the influence of associative processes on performance (cf. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4).  
Executive control during task switching might be most evident in effects that 
occur exclusively at the task level, which would result from the preparation of a 
particular task-set of stimulus-response contingencies ahead of a trial. In 
addition, it can be expected that executive control of behaviour will reduce the 
influence of specific stimulus-response contingencies, so that task effects (e.g., 
switch costs) will affect behaviour in a magnitude comparable to (if not 
exceeding) the influence of stimulus congruency or response repetitions. 
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For Stop-Signal and Change-Signal tasks, performance in line with the 
independent horse-race model is not a good indicator of the executive-control 
processes that might be involved in achieving response inhibition (Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2008b, 2009b; Verbruggen et al., 2014; Best et al., 2016; Bowditch et 
al., 2016). More informative might be inter-trial effects on performance (cf. 
Chapters 4 and 5), which would give insight into whether a subject performs any 
trial-to-trial adjustments of a mental inhibition threshold to optimise the trade-off 
between accurately performing the Go response and diverting attention from 
this task to detect the sudden appearance of a stop signal (Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999; Chikazoe et al., 2009; Aron, 2011; Bissett & Logan, 2011, 2012; Elchlepp 
et al., 2016; Verbruggen & McLaren, in preparation). Such adjustments should 
be observable at the task-goal level (i.e., the goals to execute or inhibit a 
response) and less so at the level of specific stimuli or responses (i.e., 
repeating the same response). 
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6.3  Limitations and Further Research 
It was of course almost inevitable that, due to their comparative nature, the 
paradigms that were developed for the experiments reported in this thesis are 
subject to some caveats. For example, as pointed out in the previous section, 
the task-switching experiments mainly focussed on the analysis of error rates 
instead of the more conventional measure of response times.  
In this section, I summarise a few further limitations, and their potential 
solutions, which unfortunately could not be implemented within the constraints 
of this thesis. In addition, I propose additional experiments that might contribute 
to our knowledge in this research area. 
 
Task Switching 
 
One common issue with comparative studies is that the animals often undergo 
extensive training periods before completing the task of interest, which was also 
the case in the experiments conducted for this thesis. It might be argued that 
overtraining led to the absence of effects that might otherwise have been 
observable. While this is possible, it is unlikely that overtraining was the cause 
of the lack of task-switch costs: not only has previous research (Stoet & Snyder, 
2008) shown that extended training could not eradicate switch costs, at least for 
humans, but also, in the experiments reported in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, those 
(Rules-Ignorant) participants who had received training showed numerically 
greater switch costs than those who had not. It could be the case that this 
observation is limited to humans, in such a way that training would facilitate the 
development of a certain level of task awareness in humans (cf. Section 3.4) 
but does not apply to subjects that learn associatively. Although there is no 
previous research on this subject, it seems counterintuitive to argue that 
experiencing the stimulus-response contingencies of each task in isolation 
would diminish any switch costs that had potentially been present if the 
contingencies of both tasks had been acquired at the same time. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to explain how a too extensive training period might erase effects that 
are presumed to rely on executive control, but not the effects that are thought to 
relate to associative processes, such as response-congruency effects or 
response-repetition benefits; the extended experience with the stimulus-
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response contingencies during training would be expected to primarily affect the 
magnitude of the latter effects. 
 
There is a further caveat about the methodology of the paradigm, which might 
have prevented the emergence of switch costs in the performance of pigeons: 
after correctly responding to a trial, the pigeons had to move away from the 
display to obtain a reward, which might have disrupted any effects of task 
repetitions and switches. A possible way around this problem might be the 
administration of rows of trials without continuous reward, or (as was done in 
regards to the issue of potential overtraining) to test humans under similar 
disruptive conditions when receiving feedback for their response and examine 
the effects of such a procedure on their performance. 
 
Quite an obvious limitation on the human side of the task-switching experiments 
was the inevitable fact that there was no way of controlling the size of the 
groups of Rules-Aware and Rules-Ignorant participants, since group 
membership could only be determined at the end of the experiment. The 
resulting large variation in group sizes and the consistently low number of 
Rules-Ignorant participants could potentially have affected the power and 
informative value of any findings. There may be several possible ways of 
influencing the proportion of participants who did and did not infer the task rules, 
for example by introducing a second task and thus increasing the cognitive load 
of participants as they perform the task-switching task, by employing incidental-
learning paradigms in which participants are deceived about the real purpose of 
the experiment and about which behaviour is really of interest, or by, similar to 
an information-integration approach, defining the discrimination categories in a 
way that cannot easily be verbalised. Neuropsychological methods such as 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) might be a further possibility. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, focussing purely on task-switch costs in 
cued task-switching experiments might not be a valid indication of the executive 
processes behind a subject's task-set-shifting ability. Cued task-switching 
paradigms, such as the one used in this thesis, might reduce the amount of 
control that is usually employed to fixate on one task set and suppress a 
competing task set (cf. Dreisbach, 2012), because a task switch is possible on 
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every trial; participants need to be able to release the suppression of one task 
set (and apply inhibition to the irrelevant task set) rapidly. Thus, the rigid 
application of a certain task set might be prevented when the applicability of this 
task becomes less predictable (see also the variable adjustment of response-
inhibition thresholds; cf. Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen & McLaren, in 
preparation).   
One way to increase the amount of control of interference in the application of 
particular task sets would be to introduce invalid cues into the cued task-
switching procedure. If participants prepare on every trial for the possibility to 
have to change the task, they might delay the configuration of a task set until 
the arrival of the task cue. Then, introducing an unexpected mismatch in the 
task that was indicated by the cue and the task that will actually have to be 
performed on the stimulus (indicated, for example, by pairing the stimulus with a 
different cue) might induce additional performance costs. 
Humans who base their responses on task rules often show inverted switch 
costs when a cue is suddenly invalidated (Hübner, Kluwe, Luna-Rodriguez, & 
Peters, 2004; Wendt, Luna-Rodriguez, Reisenauer, Jacobsen, & Dreisbach, 
2012): they show impaired performance on unexpected task-repeat trials 
compared to unexpected task-switch trials. This finding is regarded as an 
indication that on unexpected repeat trials the task set of the previous trial has 
been inhibited in preparation for the presumed task switch, and the subsequent 
requirement to overcome this inhibition when the task suddenly repeats is more 
cognitively demanding than initialising such inhibition on unexpected switch 
trials. Given the results reported in this thesis, it is unlikely that pigeons (or more 
interestingly, humans acquiring the task associatively) would prepare a 
response at task level and consequently suffer such performance costs; they 
would probably only initiate a response once the cue-stimulus compound is 
presented.  
Another way to obtain a more rigorous control over behaviour, and enhance the 
inhibition of unwanted task sets to restrict interference, might be to use a 
voluntary task-switching paradigm. In such paradigms, participants are able to 
choose the task they want to perform. This procedure often eliminates 
exogenous influences on task-switch costs, because task switches are 
prepared well in advance and can thus be performed with little cost to 
performance; any residual cost is thought to reflect true executive-control 
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processes (Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Furthermore, if voluntary task-
switching paradigms induce stricter control operations, an unexpected demand 
to change one's chosen task, and the necessary task-set reconfiguration 
required to do so, might induce large performance costs (cf. Weaver, Foxe, 
Shpaner, & Wylie, 2014). 
One commonly observed consequence of the stricter control of behaviour by 
task rules in voluntary task-switching is that participants tend to perform more 
task-repeat trials than task-switch trials, even when instructed to perform each 
task equally as often (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Vandamme, Szmalec, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2010). This could be seen as evidence that the 
perceived stimulus-response contingencies are hierarchically organised into 
mental task sets. For pigeons, this does not seem to be the case: in 
unpublished pilot work by Brooks (personal communication), pigeons showed 
no preference to attend to an array of stimuli affording one discrimination task 
before moving on to an array of stimuli belonging to a different discrimination 
task. 
 
Response Inhibition 
 
In regards to the Stop-Signal and Change-Signal paradigms reported in Chapter 
4, it is worth investigating further why neither pigeons nor humans reliably 
adjusted their behaviour in response to cues that predicted how likely a signal 
would be to appear in the current trial, which would have been expected at least 
of the human participants, regardless of whether their performance had been 
based on executive control or governed by associative processes (cf. Bowditch 
et al., 2016). This observation might be a product of weaknesses of the 
paradigm; therefore, it would be helpful to conduct a systematic investigation of 
whether cue effects can occur at all using the paradigms described in Section 
4.2. For example, it could be assumed that an awareness of the function of the 
cues would elicit cue effects in humans; if participants who are explicitly 
instructed about the cues utilised them, this result would give room for further 
speculations about the absence of cue effects in the subjects included in the 
experiment reported in Chapter 4. 
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However, the main caveat concerning the response-inhibition paradigms used 
in this thesis is that it might not be certain whether the pigeons had indeed 
prepared the Go response at the time that the signal to withhold it arrived; if 
they had not, an inhibition of its execution would not have been necessary. 
A potential way to avoid this issue and elicit a greater likelihood that a Go 
response is indeed prepared may be to demand a series of responses, any one 
of which might potentially have to be withheld. In doing so, the aversiveness of 
pre-emptively performing a response should be reduced for any one response, 
and responses would be expected to be initiated less hesitantly. An experiment 
of this kind, combining the benefits of testing pigeons in an operant chamber (as 
for the experiments in Chapter 4) with the requirement to perform the first 
response before a Stop signal is shown (as in Chapter 5) is being carried out at 
the University of Exeter at the moment, and first results confirm the findings 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
As it stands, the results presented in this thesis strongly question whether 
response inhibition based on external signals does in fact require executive 
control. Nonetheless, more and more animal studies are being conducted with 
the purpose of assessing inhibitory, or impulse, control in a variety of species 
(e.g., MacLean, Hare, Nunn et al., 2014). To limit the extent of studies declaring 
executive-control abilities in animals, a recent proposal (Beran, 2015) has 
pointed out the importance of discriminating between passive response 
inhibition, which may not require any advanced cognitive abilities, and active 
inhibitory control, which depends on an individual's ability to restrict its 
behaviour intentionally based on intrinsic motivational factors. Response 
inhibition primarily relates to the suppression of a particular response in reaction 
to external demands and is assessed in go/no-go, Stop-Signal, A-not-B or 
detour tasks (Beran, 2015). Inhibitory control on the other hand requires an 
active choice to withhold a certain behaviour despite having the option to 
execute it. It can be assessed in tasks that present a choice between several 
response options, such as delayed-gratification tasks - although there may be 
some restriction in the behaviours a subject can carry out at any point in time, 
for example when subjects choose the option to wait a short or a long time (e.g., 
Fortes, Vasconcelos, & Machado, 2015) without any opportunity to change their 
choice after the initial decision; this behaviour would be more accurately defined 
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as an intended restriction rather than impulse control when being faced with an 
attractive distractor. True inhibitory control might be evident in the way by which 
subjects withstand the impulse to pursue a constantly present, highly desirable 
distractor (Beran, 2015).  
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6.4  Conclusions 
In a series of experiments, I have shown that pigeons could acquire adaptive 
behaviour in executive-control paradigms and hence that associative-learning 
processes are sufficient to account for such behaviour. However, some task-
specific effects that are normally seen in humans and can be attributed to 
executive-control processes were absent, or greatly reduced, in pigeons. Those 
effects either reflect the mental operations that are performed to ensure that a 
specific set of stimulus-response-contingencies is applied and any 
contingencies belonging to a different set are suppressed, or reflect mental 
preparations for the possibility that the requirement to execute a certain 
response suddenly changes. In particular, in Chapter 3, it is shown that the 
benefits of repeatedly applying the same set of stimulus-response 
contingencies also extend to instrumental learning, if the equivalence of cues 
indicating the same set of contingencies is recognised. However, without such 
cue equivalence, and when Pavlovian processes dominate learning, 
performance comes without such benefits (or, in reverse, without the costs of 
switching from one set to another). Furthermore, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, 
the behavioural effects of preparing for an unpredicted change in response 
requirements appear to be absent if behaviour is based purely on associative 
processes. 
 
Conversely, associatively mediated performance was largely influenced by the 
stimulus-response contingencies that were effective in each paradigm. 
Repeating the same response in consecutive trials facilitated the performance 
of pigeons and associatively learning human participants in the task-switching 
paradigm, and performing a particular Go response increased the pigeons' 
likelihood of executing that response in the following trial in Stop-Signal and 
Change-Signal paradigms. 
 
In summary, the implications of the experiments reported here is that the 
influence of executive-control processes in task-switching paradigms or in 
Stop-Signal and Change-Signal tasks is primarily reflected in effects at the 
level of abstract task requirements and not at the level of stimulus or 
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response attributes, and should therefore be assessed in preparatory 
behavioural adjustments that occur before the arrival of any stimulus. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A1. Participant questionnaire used in the experiment reported in 
Section 3.1. All answers were given verbally and noted down by the 
experimenter. 
  
 
1. What do you think this experiment was testing? 
2. Did you notice anything unusual or experience any problems with the 
programme during the experiment? 
3. Did you lose concentration for any significant amount of time at any point 
during the experiment (i.e., for more than a few seconds)? 
4. Can you describe the stimuli you saw during the experiment? 
5. How were you remembering how to respond to each stimulus, e.g., did you 
use any strategies when you were doing the experiment? If so, what were 
they? 
6. Do you think there was any relationship between any of the stimuli and the 
correct responses? (Can the participant name either of the rules for 
classification?) 
7. Do you think there was a relationship between the initial coloured circle and 
the stimulus that followed? 
8. Did you use the initial coloured circle to prepare for the stimulus that 
followed? 
9. Do you have any other comments about this experiment? 
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Appendix A2. Participant questionnaire used in the experiment reported in 
Section 3.2. The questions were presented on screen at the end of the 
experiment and required either a Yes/No answer, which was given by clicking 
the respective button on screen, or a typed response. 
 
 
This is the end of the experiment. Please answer the following short questions 
about the task. Press the space bar to continue. 
1. The stimuli you saw consisted of different elements. For example, each 
stimulus showed one of four colours - red, green, yellow and blue. Did 
you pay attention to the colour when you made a response? (Yes/No) 
1.1. (optional, presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 1) 
Did you need to know the colour to be able to choose the correct 
response? (Yes/No) 
2. The stimuli either showed a horizontal or a vertical pattern of lines. Did 
you pay attention to the orientation of the lines when you made a 
response? (Yes/No) 
2.1. (optional, presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 2) 
Did you need to know the orientation to be able to choose the 
correct response? (Yes/No) 
3. The stimuli either showed a pattern of thick lines or thin lines. Did you 
pay attention to the thickness of the lines when you made a response? 
(Yes/No) 
3.1. (optional, presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 3) 
Did you need to know the thickness to be able to choose the 
correct response? (Yes/No) 
4. (optional, presented if a participant answered one of the questions 1, 2 
and 3 with "yes" and the other two with "no") 
4.1. (presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 1.1)  
You said that you needed to know the colour to be able to choose 
the correct response. Please explain in which way this information 
helped you make a response. Please type in your response giving 
as much detail as possible and then press ENTER to submit your 
answer. (open field) 
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4.2. (presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 2.1)  
You said that you needed to know the orientation to be able to 
choose the correct response. Please explain in which way this 
information helped you make a response. Please type in your 
response giving as much detail as possible and then press 
ENTER to submit your answer. (open field)  
4.3. (presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 3.1)  
You said that you needed to know the thickness to be able to 
choose the correct response. Please explain in which way this 
information helped you make a response. Please type in your 
response giving as much detail as possible and then press 
ENTER to submit your answer. (open field)        
5. (optional, presented if a participant answered at least two of the 
questions 1, 2 and 3 with "yes") 
You said that you needed to know several elements of the stimulus to be 
able to choose the correct response. Please explain in which way 
knowing each of these stimulus elements helped you make a response. 
Please type in your response giving as much detail as possible and then 
press ENTER to submit your answer. (open field) 
6. (optional, presented if a participant answered all of the questions 1, 2 
and 3 with "no") 
Did you have a certain strategy to help you choose a response? Please 
explain how you picked the correct response. Please type in your 
response giving as much detail as possible and then press ENTER to 
submit your answer. (open field) 
Thank you very much! Please fetch the experimenter. 
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Appendix A3. Participant questionnaire used in the experiment reported in 
Section 3.3. The questions were presented on screen at the end of the 
experiment and required either a Yes/No answer, which was given by clicking 
the respective button on screen, or a typed response. 
 
 
This is the end of the experiment. Please answer the following short questions 
about the task. Press the space bar to continue. 
1. If the next participant of this study asked you what he or she should do to 
get as many trials correct as possible, what would you tell him or her? 
Please type in your response giving as much detail as possible and then 
press ENTER to submit your answer. (open field)        
2. The stimuli you saw consisted of different elements. For example, each 
stimulus showed one of four colours - red, green, yellow and blue. Did 
you need to know the colour to be able to choose the correct response? 
(Yes/No) 
3. The stimuli either showed a horizontal or a vertical pattern of lines. Did 
you need to know the orientation to be able to choose the correct 
response? (Yes/No) 
4. The stimuli either showed a pattern of thick lines or thin lines. Did you 
need to know the thickness to be able to choose the correct response? 
(Yes/No)                         
5. Was it necessary to remember the correct response to the stimulus that 
appeared in the trial just before to know how to respond? For example, if 
the current and the previous image looked the same, did you repeat the 
response you had just given before? Or, if the image looked different 
from the previous one, did you choose the opposite response to before? 
(Yes/No)      
5.1. (optional, presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 5) 
Please explain in which way knowing the response to the stimulus 
in the previous trial helped you make a response. Please type in 
your response giving as much detail as possible and then press 
ENTER to submit your answer. (open field) 
Thank you very much! Please fetch the experimenter. 
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Note: after the participant completed this questionnaire, the experimenter 
presented a screenshot of a trial showing an incongruent stimulus 
superimposed on a cue for task A (horizontal, high-spatial-frequency stimulus 
on a red cue). The participant was informed about the correct response to this 
stimulus (e.g., left; the response contingencies were counterbalanced across 
participants). Then the experimenter showed a screenshot of the next trial, 
containing the other incongruent trial on a cue for task B (vertical, low-spatial-
frequency stimulus on a blue clue). The participant was asked to name the 
correct response on this trial, and to explain why this response was chosen. 
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Appendix A4. Participant questionnaire used in the experiment reported in 
Section 4.3. The questions were presented on screen at the end of the 
experiment and required either a Yes/No answer, which was given by clicking 
the respective button on screen, or a typed response. 
 
 
This is the end of the experiment. Please answer the following short questions 
about the task. Press the space bar to continue. 
1. One of the circles on the side was a dim colour, the circle on the other 
side was brightly coloured. Sometimes, the bright circle changed its 
colour. Did this colour change affect you in the way you made a 
response? (Yes/No) 
1.1. (optional, presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 1) 
Please explain how this colour change might have influenced you 
when making a response. Please type in your answer giving as 
much detail as possible. (open field) 
2. There was always a grey circle in the middle, sometimes with vertical or 
horizontal stripes. Did this grey circle affect you in the way you made a 
response? (Yes/No) 
2.1. (optional, presented if a participant answered "yes" to question 2) 
Please explain how the circle in the middle might have helped you 
make a correct response. Please type in your answer giving as 
much detail as possible. (open field) 
3. If the next participant of this study asked you what he or she should do to 
get as many trials correct as possible, what would you tell him or her? 
Please type in your answer giving as much detail as possible. (open 
field) 
Thank you very much! Please fetch the experimenter. 
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Appendix A5. Results of further studies on the effects of various manipulations 
on pigeon task-switching effects. A) Only one instead of two cues per task were 
presented ("One Cue"); B) the inter-trial interval was decreased from 15-30 
seconds to 1-2 seconds ("Short ITI"); C) only incongruent trials were presented 
("Simple"). 
 
 
A) One Cue 
The purpose of this experiment was to assess whether switch costs emerge in 
the performance of pigeons when each task was indicated by a single cue; in 
humans, a great proportion of switch costs can be attributed to a switch of the 
task cue (Monsell, 2003; Forrest, 2012). 
 
Methods and Results 
 
Fourteen pigeons participated in this experiment. Eight pigeons had previously 
completed the experiment reported in Section 3.1; six naïve pigeons were 
trained on the two individual tasks in the same way as described in Section 2.3. 
They experienced all four task cues during training but, during task-switching 
test trials, only one cue per task was presented.  
 
The experiment consisted of 20 sessions of 73 trials each, designed in the 
same way as described in Section 3.1, with the difference that each of the two 
tasks was indicated by only one cue rather than two cues each. Four different 
cue-task combinations were possible: 1) Task A - Blue, Task B - Red; 2) Task A 
- Blue, Task B - Green; 3) Task A - Yellow, Task B - Red; 4) Task A - Yellow, 
Task B - Green. These were counterbalanced across individuals. 
 
Table A5.1 shows the results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on error rates, 
using Session (1 to 20), Trial Type (Cue/Task Repeat or Task Switch) and 
Stimulus Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) as within-subject factors. To 
assess whether performance of the naïve pigeons was comparable to the 
experienced birds, a between-subject factor accounting for the two groups of 
pigeons was included in the ANOVA. 
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 Pigeons (n=14) 
 F df p ηp2 
Experience 0.45 1,12 .52 .04 
Session 1.36 19,228 .17 .10 
Trial Type  0.59 1,12 .46 .05 
Congruency 26.43 1,12 <.001 .69 
Trial Type * Congruency 0.15 1,12 .70 .01 
Table A5.1. ANOVA results of study One Cue.  
 
 
 
 
B) Short ITI 
This experiment was carried out to assess whether a very short inter-trial 
interval (ITI) would lead to the occurrence of switch costs in pigeons. Stoet and 
Snyder (2003a, 2003b, 2008) reported the emergence of significant switch 
costs in macaques when the ITI was reduced from 345ms to 170ms. 
 
Methods and Results 
 
After completing the experiment reported in Section 3.1 and the One Cue 
experiment mentioned above in this appendix, the fourteen pigeons entered this 
experiment. It consisted of 10 sessions of 145 trials, of which roughly one third 
were switch trials. The Inter-trial interval was reduced from between 15 to 30 
seconds to one to two seconds. The cue-stimulus compound was presented 
immediately after a peck at the observation key, that is, the cue was not shown 
on its own first as it had been done in the previous experiments. 
 
Table A5.3 shows the results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on error rates, 
using Session (1 to 10), Trial Type (Task Repeat or Task Switch) and Stimulus 
Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) as within-subject factors. 
 
 Pigeons (n=14) 
 F df p ηp2 
Session 2.52 9,117 .026 .16 
Trial Type 1.26 1,13 .28 .09 
Congruency 32.30 1,13 <.001 .71 
Trial Type * Congruency 1.63 1,13 .22 .11 
Table A5.3. ANOVA results of study Short ITI.  
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C) Simple 
The purpose of this experiment was to assess whether switch costs emerge in 
the performance of pigeons when the correct response to each stimulus 
depended on the current task; in humans, switch costs mainly emerge in 
response to such response-incongruent stimuli (Monsell, 2003; Forrest, 2012). 
 
Methods and Results 
 
After completing the experiment reported in Section 3.1 and the two 
experiments mentioned above in this appendix, the fourteen pigeons entered 
this experiment. It consisted of 10 sessions of 73 trials each, designed in the 
same way as described in Section 3.1, with the difference that only incongruent 
stimuli were presented. 
 
Table A5.2 shows the results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on error rates, 
using Session (1 to 10) and Trial Type (Task Repeat or Task Switch) as within-
subject factors. 
 
 Pigeons (n=14) 
 F df p ηp2 
Session 0.27 9,117 .98 .02 
Trial Type 0.19 1,13 .67 .01 
Table A5.2. ANOVA results of study Simple.  
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